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SUMMARY 
 
 
 
   The purpose of this dissertation is to examine whether the implementation of 
site-based management leads to higher levels of principal autonomy and more 
collaborative decision-making processes between principals and teachers. It also 
measures the effects of principals’ job autonomy and other principal- and school-related 
factors on the levels of principal turnover. The data of this dissertation mainly come from 
the 2011-12 Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) and the 2012-13 Principal Follow-up 
Survey (PFS). The controlled principal- and school-related factors include the individual 
characteristics of the principal, the contextual factors of the school which assess the 
physical background of the school and the composition of the student and teacher body, 
and also the working conditions of the principal. 
  Using Wald-tests, linear regression models and logit regression models, I find 
that charter school principals perceive that they have higher levels of job autonomy than 
do traditional public school principals. I also find more collaborative and democratic 
decision-making processes in charter schools than in traditional public schools. In 
addition, I find that the levels of principals’ job autonomy negatively affect their turnover 
rates. Charter school principals, however, are more likely than traditional public school 
principals to leave their jobs even though they enjoy higher levels of job autonomy. The 
differences in the contextual factors of the school drive the higher levels of turnover 
probability among charter school principals.  
          
 
1 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
    Turnover is an important topic in organizational research, given the 
organizational costs employee turnover imposes in terms of loss of institutional memory, 
hiring, training, and lower levels of employee performance (Moynihan and Pandey, 
2008). A rich literature has explored the individual, organizational, and environmental 
factors that induce employees to leave. Managers have also implemented various human 
resource practices designed to reduce undesirable and avoidable employee turnover 
(Holtom, Mitchell, Lee and Eberly, 2008; Moynihan and Pandey, 2008). The importance 
of employee turnover has gained much attention in critical industries (Holtom, Mitchell, 
Lee and Eberly, 2008). Educational researchers, especially those focusing on public 
schools, have noticed the turnover behaviors of school employees (Renzulli, Parrott and 
Beattie, 2011; Stuit and Smith, 2012; Ladd, 2011; Johnson, 2006; Boyd, Grossman, Ing, 
Lankford, Loeb and Wyckoff, 2011).  
  School principals play a variety of roles in the daily operations of schools, not 
the least of which is creating academically supportive environments for both teachers and 
students (Weinstein, Jacobowitz, Ely, Landon and Schwartz, 2009). As school leaders, 
principals select, monitor, and support teachers, set school budgets, design curricula, 
manage discipline, and develop relationships with the broader community (Miller, 2013). 
They may substantially influence the recruitment, working environments, professional 
development, job satisfaction, and retention of teachers. For instance, principals have 
been found to strongly and directly affect the levels of teachers’ cohesion and 
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commitment to the schools (Price, 2012). New teachers’ inclination to remain teaching 
within the same school will decrease when they perceive having a poor relationship with 
the principal (Pogodzinski, Youngs, Frank and Belman, 2012). School principals also 
influence student achievement through configuring the goals of the school, determining 
curricula and instruction, and shaping school culture and climate (Hallinger and Heck, 
1998; Baker, Punswick and Belt, 2010). The role of school principals is essential for 
creating a positive learning environment for students, although their impact on student 
achievement is mediated by the work of teachers (Leithwood, Harris and Hopkins, 2008; 
Baker, Punswick and Belt, 2010; Coelli and Green, 2012).  
   Thus, schools with high levels of principal turnover lack the necessary 
leadership stability for success (Gates, Ringel, Santibanez, Guarino, Ghosh-Dastidar and 
Brown, 2006). High levels of principal turnover incur financial costs in that a school 
district has to spend resources on recruiting, hiring, and training a new principal (Fuller 
and Young, 2009). High levels of principal turnover may also lead to high levels of 
teacher turnover, which has negative financial and educational impacts on schools (Fuller, 
Baker and Young, 2007). 
  Job autonomy is also an important topic in organizational research. It has been 
defined, by Hackman and Oldman (1976: 258), as “the degree to which the job provides 
substantial freedom, independence, and discretion to the individual in scheduling the 
work and in determining the procedures to be used in carrying it out”. In other words, job 
autonomy is the discretion an employee has to make decisions on the job (Breaugh, 
1985). 
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   The research examining the impacts of work-related factors on employee 
turnover is very diverse, although the results are quite consistent in admitting the 
importance of job autonomy. Even the earliest research has found turnover to be related 
to perceived lack of autonomy or to less autonomy than employees expected (Walker and 
Guest, 1952; Guest, 1955; Ross and Zander, 1957). A large and increasing number of 
studies have shown that job autonomy has a negative effect on turnover behavior (Hom 
and Griffeth, 1995; Iverson, 1999; Liu, Spector and Jex, 2005; Kim and Stoner, 2008; 
Galletta, Portoghese and Battistelli, 2011). Spector (1986) has found that perceived 
autonomy is positively associated with job satisfaction, organizational commitment, job 
involvement, work performance, and internal motivation, and negatively associated with 
physical symptoms, emotional distress, role stress, absenteeism, and turnover. According 
to the cognitive evaluation theory and the self-determination theory, job autonomy is one 
of the important determinants of work motivation. Work motivation will positively 
influence work satisfaction and negatively influence emotional exhaustion, which will 
eventually have a negative effect on turnover behavior (Richer, Blanchard and Vallerand, 
2002). Liu, Zhang, Wang and Lee (2011) have indicated that high levels of job autonomy 
will increase the psychological empowerment of employees and ultimately reduce 
turnover rates. Dude (2012) has argued that increases in job autonomy are associated with 
increased organizational commitment, which will lead to decreased turnover rates. 
1.1 Overview of the Theoretical Framework 
   Job characteristics theory (Hackman and Oldham, 1976; Hackman and Oldham, 
1980) is one of the most influential theoretical frameworks for discussing job design in 
the public sector (Torraco, 2005). It links job autonomy with employee turnover, 
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explaining how autonomy and other four core characteristics of a job (skill variety, task 
identity, task significance, and feedback) influence employees’ psychological states and 
their performance-related behaviors. According to job characteristics theory, jobs in 
which employees enjoy greater autonomy in carrying out their work will lead to higher 
levels of job satisfaction, job involvement, and organizational commitment, as well as 
lower levels of work exhaustion, absenteeism, and turnover (Spector, 1985; Spector, 
1986; Fried and Ferris, 1987; Humphrey, Nahrgang and Morgeson, 2007).  
   Job characteristics theory has gained some empirical evidence in the educational 
research area. Educational researchers, especially those focusing on public schools, have 
studied how school-related factors affect the levels of teacher turnover. They have found 
that teachers who are granted higher levels of job autonomy are more satisfied with their 
jobs and are more likely to stay in their positions than teachers with less job discretion. 
Promoting job autonomy may boost teachers’ work satisfaction and decrease their 
turnover rates (Renzulli, Parrott and Beattie, 2011; Shen, Leslie, Spybrook and Ma, 2012; 
Stuit and Smith, 2012; Ladd, 2011; Boyd, Grossman, Ing, Lankford, Loeb and Wyckoff, 
2011; Johnson, 2006). 
1.2 Statement of the Problem and Research Questions 
  The empirical studies of job characteristics theory have not paid much attention 
to school principals. In contrast to the research on teacher turnover, the research on the 
mobility of school principals has been surprisingly scarce and unsystematic, with much 
of it involving individual case studies, small-scale qualitative studies, and small surveys. 
The research on principal autonomy has also been scarce, compared to the research 
examining teachers’ job autonomy. It is still unclear whether job autonomy also matters 
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to school principals and whether it is possible to lift principal retention rates by providing 
them with greater job autonomy. 
  Given that the limited previous research on principal autonomy and principal 
turnover provides insufficient information, this dissertation will try to answer these 
questions through conducting a partial empirical test for job characteristics theory. 
Instead of covering all the five core job characteristics (skill variety, task identity, task 
significance, autonomy, and feedback) mentioned by this theory, I will focus on one of 
them — job autonomy. I will investigate how the implementation of site-based 
management influences principals’ job autonomy and hence influences their turnover 
rates by examining whether and how charter schools, which generally implement site-
based management, differ from traditional public schools (TPSs) in their levels of 
principal autonomy and principal turnover. A much more thorough implementation of 
site-based management in charter schools should lead to higher levels of principal 
autonomy and hence lower principal turnover rates than in TPSs. 
  In addition to comparing charter schools with TPSs, I will distinguish between 
regular charter schools that are managed by local community members and those charter 
schools managed privately by management organizations (MOs), i.e., for-profit education 
management organizations (EMOs) and nonprofit charter management organizations 
(CMOs). Charter schools managed by MOs tend to centralize administrative functions 
into network offices. They are less likely than regular charter schools to implement site-
based management (Brown, Henig, Lacireno-Paquet and Holyoke, 2004; Morley, 2006). 
Thus, I will test, in this dissertation, whether principals working in EMO- and CMO-
managed charter schools perceive having lower levels of school-wide job autonomy and 
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show higher turnover rates than do principals who work in regular charter schools. 
Principals in MO-managed charter schools are expected to have similar levels of job 
autonomy and similar turnover rates as their counterparts working in TPSs.  
 Furthermore, I will test whether the implementation of site-based management 
affects the distribution of educational authority between principals and teachers. 
According to the previous research, teachers working in centrally managed schools just 
receive orders from principals in response to directives from the central offices. There are 
noticeable levels of power differential between principals and teachers. In contrast, site-
based management encourages democratic and collaborative decision-making processes 
between principals and teachers. Educational authority is considered to be more evenly 
distributed in site-based managed schools than in other schools (Bredeson, 2000; White, 
1992; Smylie, Lazarus and Brownlee-Conyers, 1996). Therefore, I expect that the power 
differential between principals and teachers is smaller in charter schools than in TPSs. 
1.3 Overview of the Methodology 
   The major data for this dissertation come from the 2011-12 Schools and Staffing 
Survey (SASS) and the 2012-13 Principal Follow-Up Survey (PFS). These surveys are 
conducted by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) on behalf of the U.S. 
Department of Education. They are large-scale sample surveys of K–12 school districts, 
schools, teachers, and principals.  
  Their sampling frame was built from the 2009-10 Common Core of Data (CCD) 
school survey. These surveys are based on a stratified probability proportional to size 
sample, so I will use the final sampling weights and the balanced-repeated replicate 
(BRR) weights within the study. These weights are provided by the NCES. They adjust 
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for oversampling and non-response. After using these sampling weights, the descriptive 
statistics and the estimates of the regression models can represent the population of 
public school principals rather than simply the sample. 
 In order to analyze the data and interpret the results, I will use several statistical 
tools in this study, such as descriptive statistics, summated rating scales, hypothesis 
testing, multiple linear regressions, multiple logit regressions, and so on. 
1.4 Organization of the Study 
 This dissertation includes seven chapters. Chapter one introduces the research 
topics and the research questions of this dissertation. Chapter two reviews the theoretical 
models and frameworks of turnover research, and discusses the theoretical considerations 
of this dissertation. It also summarizes the findings of the existing studies on principal 
autonomy and principal turnover. Chapter three introduces the data sources and methods 
of analysis, and also establishes the hypotheses and models of this dissertation. These 
models test whether the implementation of site-based management leads to higher levels 
of principal autonomy and lower levels of the power differential between principals and 
teachers in charter schools than in TPSs. These models also explore the relationships 
between principals’ job autonomy as well as their other working conditions and their 
turnover behaviors. Chapter four to chapter six report and explain the results of 
quantitative analyses. These three chapters answer the research questions that are raised 
in chapter one and also verify whether the hypotheses of this study are correct. Chapter 
seven includes the summary of the findings and also the conclusions of this study. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
 
 
2.1 Background 
 
   Turnover has been defined as an occurring when “employees in an organization 
leave and are replaced by other individuals who are employed by the organization” 
(Rinefort and Van Fleet, 1998: 10). Most of the existing studies on turnover, however, 
focus on employee exit rather than employee replacement. Turnover costs include both 
quantifiable ones, such as lost productivity, extra recruitment, and training, and 
unmeasured ones, such as damaged market reputation and credibility with customers 
(Winkler and Janger, 1998). 
   The previous scholars have developed a variety of theoretical frameworks and 
models for employee turnover (see Maertz and Campion, 1998; Holtom, Mitchell, Lee 
and Eberly, 2008 for a detailed review of turnover research). The earliest models were 
established in 1950s. They were mainly focused on employees’ attitudes, such as job 
satisfaction and organizational commitment, or the nature of the job and the employee. 
Brayfield and Crockett (1955) and Herzberg, Mausner, Peterson and Capwell (1957) 
found strong positive relationships between employees’ job dissatisfaction and their 
turnover and absenteeism behaviors. The meta-analysis conducted by Porter and Steers 
(1973) concluded that employees’ withdrawal behaviors (i.e., both turnover and 
absenteeism) were closely related to four categories of organizational factors: 
organization-wide factors (pay, organizational size, and promotion), immediate work 
environment factors (supervisory style, work unit size, and peer group interaction), job 
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content factors (overall reaction to job content, task repetitiveness, job autonomy and 
responsibility, and role clarity), and personal factors (age, tenure with organization, 
similarity of job with vocational interest, personality characteristics, and family 
considerations).  
  Distinct from the aforementioned turnover content research that focuses on 
turnover antecedents, turnover process research addresses how employees exit an 
organization. Mobley (1977) and Mobley, Griffeth, Hand and Meglino (1979) explained 
how a process including withdrawal cognitions and job-search behaviors linked job 
dissatisfaction to actual turnover behavior. Based on Mobley’s process model, Steers and 
Mowday (1981) attempted to incorporate all prior piecemeal models into a more 
comprehensive process model of employee turnover. Hom, Griffeth and Sellaro (1984) 
proposed an alternative process model that suggests two decision paths rather than one. 
Once employees intend to quit, they either undertake a job search and compare their 
available alternatives to their current job or directly resign. 
 From 1985 to 1995, the main focus of turnover content research experienced a 
shift from individual-level factors toward organizational-level ones. For instance, 
organizational culture and pay inequality were found to affect individual turnover 
(Abelson, 1993; Pfeffer and Davis-Blake, 1992). Turnover research also started to 
consider employees’ relationships with their co-workers, administrators, and the 
organization. The models investigating these relationships are generally called person-
environment fit models (see Edwards, 2008 for a detailed review of person-environment 
fit models). O’Reilly, Chatman and Caldwell (1991) revealed the importance of value 
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congruence between employees and the organization. Employees whose individual values 
do not match the organizational culture are more likely to leave. 
 Turnover process research was also extended in this period. Hulin (1991) 
established a new withdrawal process model, which states that turnover is a subset of 
employees’ adaptive behaviors. Job dissatisfaction triggers a sequence of cognitive and 
behavioral responses that lead to various adaptive behaviors. Employees’ adaptive 
behaviors include not only turnover but also lateness, absenteeism, retirement, attempts to 
improve job performance, and so on. Lee and Mitchell (1994) also developed a new 
model regarding the turnover process. The unfolding model of turnover proposes that 
turnover decisions may be triggered by an external shock through multiple possible paths 
rather than purely caused by accumulated job dissatisfaction. In other words, employee 
turnover may sometimes happen without much deliberation. 
 Turnover research since 1995 mostly focuses on testing, expanding, and 
improving the existing models. Scholars have conducted a variety of empirical studies on 
the unfolding model that argues precipitating events or shocks more often are the 
immediate cause of turnover than job dissatisfaction (Lee, Mitchell, Holtom, McDaniel 
and Hill, 1999; Holtom, Mitchell, Lee and Inderrieden, 2005; Donnelly and Quinn, 
2006), and have also increased the attention paid to organizational context, person-
environment fit and interpersonal relationships. Perceptions of organizational justice, 
including distributive, procedural, and interactional justice, have been found to be 
important for understanding withdrawal behaviors (Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter and 
Ng, 2001; Simons and Roberson, 2003; Tekleab, Takeuchi and Taylor, 2005; Cho and Sai, 
2013). Holtom, Lee and Tidd (2002) reported that the congruence between employees’ 
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scheduling preferences and the policies determined by the employer was negatively 
related to turnover. Arthur, Bell, Doverspike and Villado (2006) finished a meta-analysis 
on fit variables. The authors found that person-organization fit predicted employee 
turnover but its impact was partially mediated by job cognitions and job attitudes. Bauer, 
Erdogan, Liden and Wayne (2006) discussed the role of leader-member exchange in a 
longitudinal study, saying that harmonious relations between supervisors and employees 
have a negative effect on employee leaving. Stanley, Vandenberghe, Vandenberg and 
Bentein (2013) examined the effects of organizational commitment on employee turnover 
rates. The authors found that employees with high emotional attachment with the 
organizations displayed lower turnover rates than did other employees. 
2.2 Job Autonomy and Its Impact on Turnover 
   Job characteristics theory is among the most well-known and complete theories 
and frameworks of turnover content research. It explains how the core characteristics of a 
job affect employees’ work-related behaviors, emphasizing the negative impact of job 
autonomy on employees’ turnover behaviors (Torraco, 2005). It posits that five core 
characteristics of a job (skill variety, task identity, task significance, autonomy, and 
feedback) may enhance the positive psychological states of employees, such as feeling 
the work is meaningful, which, in turn, lead to favorable work-related outcomes: high 
work productivity and low absenteeism and turnover rates (Hackman and Oldham, 1976, 
1980). 
  A series of empirical studies have tested the hypothesized linkages between job 
characteristics and employees’ work-related performances. Hackman and Oldham (1976) 
showed that all five characteristics were correlated with employees’ internal motivation 
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(employees feel a great sense of personal satisfaction when doing the job well and feel 
unhappy when performing poorly on the job) and job satisfaction, but only skill variety 
and autonomy were correlated with absenteeism and turnover. Autonomy is the only one 
that had significant positive correlations with employee’s internal motivation, job 
satisfaction, and related work effectiveness, and had significant negative correlations with 
employee’s absenteeism and turnover. A meta-analysis conducted by Spector (1985) 
examined the relationships between the five job characteristics and some dimensions of 
employee response (pay satisfaction, promotion satisfaction, supervision satisfaction, 
work satisfaction, co-worker satisfaction, growth satisfaction, general satisfaction, 
internal motivation, job involvement, absenteeism, and work performance). The authors 
found that each of the five job characteristics was significantly correlated with some but 
not all of the employee behaviors. The meta-analysis conducted by Fried and Ferris 
(1987) found that all five job characteristics were moderately to strongly correlated with 
overall job satisfaction, growth satisfaction, internal work motivation, work performance, 
and absenteeism. The authors argued that the five job characteristics had moderate and 
meaningful effects on employee turnover but did not directly analyze these effects. They 
also suggested that developing job autonomy might reduce employee absenteeism and 
improve employee’s attitudinal or psychological outcomes. A third meta-analysis 
(Humphrey, Nahrgang and Morgeson, 2007) demonstrated that job characteristics had 
large impacts on worker attitudes and behaviors (internal work motivation, job 
satisfaction, organizational commitment, job involvement, work performance, 
absenteeism, and turnover). The authors also concluded that autonomy and social support 
were the two best predictors of employee job satisfaction and work performance. In 
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general, these empirical studies have suggested that job autonomy has the most consistent 
and significant negative effect on employee turnover among the five core characteristics. 
Breaugh and Becker (1987) asserted that job autonomy might be the most important 
characteristic of a job. 
2.3 Site-based Management and Principal Autonomy 
 Principal autonomy refers to “the ability of individual school principal to affect 
internal and external issues” (Gawlik, 2008: 786). It has also been conceptualized as the 
right of principals to act or move freely. Principal autonomy tells who has the main 
responsibility for any specific issues in schools (Verschelde, Hindriks, Rayp and Schoors, 
2012). Teachers and principals who perceive having higher levels of job autonomy tend 
to have higher organizational commitment, work motivation, and job satisfaction, as well 
as lower turnover rates (Humphrey, Nahrgang and Morgeson, 2007; Dysvik and Kuvaas, 
2010; Galletta, Portoghese and Battistelli, 2011; Roch and Sai, 2015; Roch and Sai, 
2016). On the other hand, principals who perceive having lower levels of job autonomy 
are more likely to leave their managerial positions (Wilson, 1994).  
 Principals’ perceived levels of job autonomy influence their ability to establish 
satisfying working conditions for teachers and staff. Principals who perceive having 
higher levels of job autonomy may also grant teachers higher levels of job autonomy and 
hence enhance teachers’ job satisfaction (Skinner, 2008). In contrast, lack of job 
autonomy is one of the main reasons that principals leave their positions (Whitaker, 
1995). Lack of autonomy obstructs principals’ ability to reward outstanding teachers and 
fire ineffective ones (Public Agenda, 2001). Nachmias and Rosenbloom (1977) found 
significant and inverse relationships between principals’ perceived power, which is 
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defined as “the capacity to achieve desired objectives or results” (Astley and Sachdeva, 
1984: 104), and their propensity to leave.  
   The levels of job autonomy delegated to school principals vary widely 
(Verschelde, Hindriks, Rayp and Schoors, 2012). They are closely associated with the 
manner in which schooling has been organized. Principals in rural and smaller schools 
have greater job autonomy, while principals working in schools with more poor and racial 
or ethnic minority students have less autonomy. The individual characteristics of 
principals such as race, gender, and work experience also affect the amount of autonomy 
a principal may enjoy. White, male, and more experienced principals are always granted 
higher levels of job autonomy (Gawlik, 2008).  
2.3.1 Site-based Management 
  In addition to the individual characteristics of principals and the attributes of 
schools, the degree of principal autonomy is highly determined by whether a school 
implements site-based management. Site-based management has been defined as “a form 
of decentralization that identifies the individual school as the primary unit of 
improvement and relies on the redistribution of decision-making authority as the primary 
means through which improvements might be stimulated and sustained” (Malen, Ogawa 
and Kranz, 1990: 290). Unlike the previous decentralization reforms that transferred 
authority from large, central boards to smaller, local boards, site-based management shifts 
power to individual school sites (White, 1989). School-level control over budgeting, 
personnel, and educational issues (e.g., curriculum) leads to “increased staff commitment 
and satisfaction, a strong professional culture, and more effective resource allocation” 
(Finnigan, 2007: 514; Wohlstetter and Chau, 2004).  
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  Site-based management sprouted in the public education system of the United 
States during the late 1980s. The public education system then was criticized for being 
highly centralized, which resulted in inertia, inefficiency, cynicism, and long delays for 
deciding small issues. Site-based management was developed partly as an antidote to 
bureaucracy and partly to encourage efficient use of resources at the school level (Cotton, 
1992; Whitaker, 2003). Its theoretical foundation is the belief that principals and teachers 
work harder when they have discretion in their daily work and that schools are better able 
to respond to family and student needs when they are freed from bureaucratic constraints 
(Cotton, 1992; Brown, Henig, Lacireno-Paquet and Holyoke, 2004; Brown, 1992). 
  Site-based management has changed the roles of all educational stakeholders, 
especially principals (Cotton, 1992; Rhinehart, Short, Short and Eckley, 1998). Site-
based management grants principals increased power of making decisions on school-
related issues such as budgeting, personnel, and curriculum (Whitaker, 2003; Ford, 1992; 
Wohlstetter and Mohrman, 1993). Many principals have asserted their enthusiasm for 
site-based management and power decentralization (Brown, 1992). On the other hand, the 
implementation of site-based management has also created uncertainty for school 
principals (Hoque, Alam, Ariff, Mishra and Rabby, 2011; Whitaker, 2003). The changes 
in the roles of a principal cause an increase in overall workloads and the feeling of 
emotional exhaustion which prompts them to leave their positions (Whitaker, 2003; 
Whitaker, 1995). Principals have to spend more time on formal and informal meetings 
with parents and the community, and also face pressure to be more accountable for 
student achievement (Valdivia, 2012; Whitaker, 2003). Sometime, making collaborative 
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decisions with teachers, staff, parents, and community members have left some principals 
feeling like they have less authority and decreased autonomy (Whitaker, 1995). 
  During the late 1980s, around one-third of all school districts initiated some 
version of site-based management (Ogawa and White, 1994). However, the effect of 
implementing site-based management was not obvious among public schools, because 
state and local rules inhibit flexible operation and management (Morley, 2006). Most of 
the school-related decisions were still made by the state board of education and the local 
school board. In 1991, only 5% of all school-related decisions were autonomously made 
by schools without consultation with other levels of governance (National Center for 
Education Statistics, 1994). Under this situation, some states started to authorize charter 
schools. Charter schools played an essential role in the decentralization reform that aimed 
to provide additional autonomy to individual schools (Bulkley and Wohlstetter, 2004). 
2.3.2 Charter Schools 
   Charter schools, by definition, are “public schools of choice that operate with 
more autonomy (and fewer regulations) under a charter or contract issued by a public 
entity, such as a local school board, a public university, or a state board of education” 
(Bulkley and Wohlstetter, 2004: 1). The number of charter schools has rapidly grown in 
the past two decades. In 2014, over 6,400 charter schools had been established (National 
Alliance for Public Charter schools, 2015). Charter schools have greater discretion and 
more decision-making responsibility in their operations than do TPSs (Bulkley and 
Wohlstetter, 2004). They are largely free from many constraints imposed by states and 
districts, allowing them to shape working and learning conditions that differ from those in 
TPSs. 
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 The physical background and the composition of the teacher and student body in 
charter schools also differ from those in TPSs. Charter schools are generally smaller than 
TPSs and are more likely to be elementary schools (Ni, 2012; Renzulli, Parrott and 
Beattie, 2011). They are also more likely to be located in urban areas and on average 
remain slightly segregated, enrolling more low-income and racial or ethnic minority 
students than TPSs (National Center for Education Statistics, 2012; Miron, Urschel, 
Mathis and Tornquist, 2010; Lacireno-Paquet, Holyoke, Moser and Henig, 2002; Rapp 
and Eckes, 2007).  
   Not all charter schools are operated by the members of the local community. 
Some states provide the qualifications of establishing and running charter schools to 
private management organizations (MOs). MOs are hired to operate charter schools and 
are also delegated a significant portion of decision-making authority (Vergari, 2007). 
MOs include both for-profit organizations (educational management organizations or 
EMOs) and nonprofit organizations (charter management organizations or CMOs). The 
number of charter schools managed by EMOs and CMOs largely increased over the past 
decade. As of 2012, there had been 840 EMO-managed charter schools and 1,206 CMO-
managed charter schools, which at that time took up 36% of all charter schools (Miron 
and Gulosino, 2013). MOs often pursue scale-based or even efficiency-oriented 
management strategies by simultaneously running multiple charter schools. Small-scale 
MOs manage 3 or fewer schools, but they only take up less than 20% of all MOs. Large-
scale MOs manage 10 or more schools (Molnar, Miron and Urschel, 2008; Miron and 
Urschel, 2008). The increasing use of contracts with MOs that take responsibility for a 
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wide range of school-related activities has been viewed as one of the most controversial 
aspects of the development of charter schools (Bulkley, 2004).  
  EMOs have private motives in their daily operations. They need to create profits 
for their owners, and external constraints imposed by outside investors also substantially 
affect the behavior of actors working in these organizations (Cooman, Gieter, Pepermans 
and Jegers, 2011). The actors working in CMOs, in contrast, are more closely tied to the 
mission and the service goals of their organizations. They are often focused on promoting 
the betterment of a needy population (Henig, Holyoke, Brown and Lacireno-Paquet, 
2005). Some CMOs receive grants from foundations, lessening the efficiency-seeking 
pressure within these organizations (Scott and DiMartino, 2010). Regular charter schools 
do not work under the umbrella of an MO, thus they do not have the same incentive to 
seek out scale-based efficiencies as EMO- or CMO-managed charter schools do. Many of 
regular charter schools operate in a stand-alone format, while a few work within the 
context of their local school districts. These schools have more localized missions and 
largely pursue the interests of a geographically defined group of citizens who share 
certain interests and values relating ethnicity, housing tenure, and socioeconomic class 
(Henig, Holyoke, Brown and Lacireno-Paquet, 2005). 
  MO-managed charter schools look somewhat different from regular charter 
schools. EMO-managed charter schools are often larger and more likely to be elementary 
schools, whereas CMO-managed charter schools are smaller but more likely to be at 
higher grades (Miron, Urschel, Aguilar and Dailey, 2012). Compared to regular charter 
schools, EMO-managed charter schools enroll fewer low-income, disabled, and limited 
English proficiency (LEP) students (Lacireno-Paquet, 2006; Wamba and Ascher, 2003; 
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Ertas and Roch, 2014), while CMO-managed charter schools accept more low-income 
and minority students than do their local district schools and charter schools nationally 
(Lake, Bowen, Demeritt, McCullough, Haimson and Gill, 2012). 
2.3.3 Principals Working in Charter Schools 
 The information on the demographic and professional statuses of charter school 
principals is very limited. The key differences separating charter school principals from 
TPS principals are their average age and administrative experiences. Charter school 
principals are generally younger and are slightly more likely to be racial or ethnic 
minority and female than TPS principals. They also have less administrative experiences 
than do TPS principals (Campbell and Gross, 2008; Bini, 2011). Bini (2011) has also 
found that the proportions of principals who hold at least a master’s degree are quite close 
between these two groups. Among the principals who responded to the survey, around 
98% of charter school principals hold at least a master’s degree, and around 96% of TPS 
principals hold at least a master’s degree. 
  Charter school principals also have different working conditions than those of 
TPS principals. Charter school principals are on average paid less. Their mean salary 
equals to only 81% of the mean salary for a TPS principal (Bodine, Fuller, González, 
Huerta, Naughton, Park and The, 2008; Fuller, Gawlik, Kuboyama-Gonzales and Park, 
2004). They also face heavier workloads and higher work-related stress (Whitaker, 2003). 
On the other hand, charter schools have more democratic and autonomous working 
environments than do TPSs, attracting teachers and principals to work there. Teachers and 
principals working in charter schools have been found to enjoy higher levels of job 
autonomy in their interactions with external actors and in the decision-making processes 
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within the schools (Malloy and Wohlstetter, 2003; Ni, 2012; Gawlik, 2007). The levels of 
parental involvement are also higher in charter schools than in TPSs in various activities, 
ranging from open houses to budget decisions (Bulkley and Fisler, 2003; Bifulco and 
Ladd, 2006). These higher levels of involvement may be achieved through using parent 
contracts, which have emerged as a common approach for charter schools to encourage 
parental involvement (Corwin and Becker, 1995; Smith, Wohlstetter, Kuzin and De 
Pedro, 2011), or through the creaming of more involved parents from TPSs (Bifulco and 
Ladd, 2006).  
2.3.4 Principal Autonomy in Charter Schools 
  There is a debate in educational policy research over the question of whether the 
benefits of site-based management can be achieved within the TPS systems or only 
through the introduction of more market-oriented alternatives, such as charter schools 
(Brown, Henig, Lacireno-Paquet and Holyoke, 2004). Traditional public schools face 
constraints imposed by governance structures on upper levels and rarely make 
independent decisions, while charter schools are actually site-based managed and less 
bureaucratically bound (David, 1995; Brown, Henig, Lacireno-Paquet and Holyoke, 
2004). Wohlstetter and Chau (2004) have stated that charter schools even have more 
school-level autonomy than do TPSs that have implemented site-based management. 
   Nathan (1996) has indicated that at the core of the charter school concept is site-
based management whereby key school-related decisions are determined at the school 
level. Wohlstetter, Smith and Farrell (2013) have also stated that autonomy from rules 
and regulations is central to the charter school concept. They pointed out that fourteen 
charter laws across the United States cite increased school-level autonomy as a key driver 
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behind the legislation. Charter school principals have reported keeping control over 
scheduling, hiring of teaching staff, budgeting, and purchasing of supplies and equipment 
(Triant, 2001; RPP International, 2001; SRI International, 2002). They have also reported 
sharing educational authority with their chartering agencies in areas such as instruction 
and curriculum, student assessment policies, and student discipline policies (SRI 
International, 2002). According to the research by Triant (2001), the lack of job autonomy 
in TPSs is an important reason for principals to move to charter schools. Charter school 
principals are granted the freedom to create schools that would not be possible if the 
charter law did not exist. The sense of freedom is viewed as one of the greatest parts of 
taking the principal positions in charter schools. 
  Much of the previous work examining the levels of principal autonomy in 
charter schools, however, has been based on theoretical analysis and case studies, with a 
few quantitative studies that compare the levels of principal autonomy in charter schools 
with those in TPSs. In a survey of the school principals in California, Zimmer and 
Buddin (2007) found that charter school principals had greater control over decision-
making processes than did their counterparts in TPSs. Gawlik (2008) conducted a 
comparative study using the 1999-2000 SASS data. The results show that charter school 
principals enjoy greater degrees of job autonomy in making decisions related to school 
standards, curriculum, professional development programs, teacher recruitment, school 
budgets, and discipline policy than do TPS principals. In this study, the author ignored the 
effect of school managers on the working conditions within charter schools, treating all 
charter schools as a homogeneous group. Adamowski, Therriault and Cavanna (2007) 
found that charter school principals felt they had greater autonomy with regard to key 
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school functions such as hiring teachers and designing curriculum than did principals 
working in district-operated public schools. The sample of this study included 30 TPS 
principals and 3 charter school principals; thus, the conclusions of this study may not be 
as convincing as those based on large samples. 
     Prior research has suggested that considerable variations exist in the levels of 
autonomy charter schools experience, depending on those schools’ relationships with 
their authorizers and their partnerships with MOs (Wohlstetter, Smith and Farrell, 2013). 
Differing MOs and their distinct educational philosophies lead charter schools to behave 
differently within their own working environments (Brown, Henig, Lacireno-Paquet and 
Holyoke, 2004). In general, charter schools managed by MOs have less school-level 
autonomy than do regular charter schools (Wohlstetter and Chau, 2004). From the 
organizational perspective, management organizations have to deal with the tensions 
between their needs for efficiency, control and some level of “brand-name” consistency, 
and the wishes of the school communities (Bulkley, 2004). The pursuit of efficiency gains 
induces MOs, which simultaneously take care of multiple charter schools, to centralize 
managerial functions into network offices. Network offices can centralize data collection, 
reporting, and accounting. Through centralizing the educational authority of decision-
making to network offices, MOs eliminate the need for each principal to invest time in 
becoming fully informed and weighing the options for each decision facing the school 
(Morley, 2006). Because MOs pursue more centralized approaches to management, they 
limit the autonomy of school-level actors in recruiting, training, and firing employees. 
They may require that all of their schools use the same curriculum and instructional 
approach (Bulkley, 2005; Scott and DiMartino, 2010; Horn and Miron, 2000). The 
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existence of MOs has important implications for school-level autonomy in that charter 
schools sacrifice some of their site-based control for the potential financial, technical, and 
educational benefits of corporate support (Bulkley, 2004). 
    Some researchers have examined the levels of principal autonomy in MO-
managed charter schools. Brown, Henig, Lacireno-Paquet and Holyoke (2004) compared 
EMO-managed charter schools with other types of charter schools without distinguishing 
between CMO-managed and regular charter schools. They found that EMO-managed 
charter schools exhibited significantly less control over school-level decision-making 
processes in the areas of curriculum, testing and standards, student discipline, facilities, 
and general administration, compared to more community- or mission-oriented charter 
schools. Gawlik (2007) has indicated that the levels of professional autonomy for 
teachers and principals working in CMO-managed charter schools are quite limited 
because most of the materials and methodologies are prescribed. However, there has been 
limited evidence that MOs have a negative effect on the levels of principal autonomy 
within charter schools. 
2.4 Turnover Rates of Public School Principals 
   Grusky (1960) is one of the first to recognize that leadership turnover can 
aggravate instability in an organization. He has pointed out that turnover is disruptive to 
organizations because it disturbs the traditional norms of an organization and promotes 
changes in the formal and informal relationships among members of the system. In 
addition, more costs will be incurred when the top management person leaves. Replacing 
a top manager disrupts communication, decision-making, and power processes. For most 
members of an organization, leader turnover leads to feelings of apprehension, 
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abandonment, loss or even fear, and it also sends a signal of turbulence to outside 
stakeholders (Hargreaves, Moore, Fink, Brayman and White, 2003; Harrison, Torres and 
Kukalis, 1988). In general, the departure of the leader of an organization has a negative 
effect on organizational effectiveness (Miskel and Cosgrove, 1985). 
   Principal turnover refers to “the change from one principal to another principal” 
(Partlow, 2007: 60). In the educational sector, principal stability is a crucial component of 
a healthy school. It ensures that the school can effectively provide a supportive 
environment for improving student learning (Weinstein, Jacobowitz, Ely, Landon and 
Schwartz, 2009; Useem, Christman, Gold and Simon, 1996). High rates of principal 
attrition may lead to high rates of teacher turnover and a dip in school performance 
(Miller, 2009; Akiba and Reichardt, 2004). Thus, policy initiatives aimed at increasing 
school effectiveness must consider ways by which schools can attract and retain highly 
qualified principals (Papa Jr., 2007). 
    Principal turnover is viewed as a serious problem for charter schools (Henig, 
Holyoke, Lacireno-Paquet and Moser, 2001); but no current research has quantitatively 
assessed the turnover rates among charter school principals. Some past research has 
evaluated the turnover rates among principals in all public schools without making a 
comparison between charter schools and TPSs. According to the limited evidence, the 
turnover rates among public school principals are high (Branch, Hanushek and Rivkin, 
2009; Weinstein, Jacobowitz, Ely, Landon and Schwartz, 2009). In the range of 14-30% 
of public school principals leave their jobs from one year to the next (Battle and Gruber, 
2010; DeAngelis and White, 2011; Cullen and Mazzeo, 2007; Ringel, Gates, Chung, 
Brown and Ghosh-Dastidar, 2004; Gates, Guarino, Santibanez, Brown, Ghosh-Dastidar 
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and Chung, 2004; Fuller, Young and Orr, 2007; Beteille, Kalogrides and Loeb, 2011). 
Only 20-40% of the newly hired principals will stay in their positions after six years 
(Gates, Ringel, Santibanez, Guarino, Ghosh-Dastidar and Brown, 2006). Using the data 
from Missouri schools, Baker, Punswick and Belt (2010) found that approximately half 
of principals left their positions within 5 years.  
2.5 Factors Associated with Principal Turnover 
    As I have reviewed at the beginning of this chapter, the turnover behavior of an 
employee has been found to be closely related to four categories of factors: personal 
characteristics (e.g., age and gender), organizational factors (e.g., organizational size), 
immediate work environment (e.g., supervisory style and peer group interaction), and job 
content (e.g., job autonomy) (Porter and Steers, 1973; Holtom, Mitchell, Lee and Eberly, 
2008). In this dissertation, I follow Ma, Ma and Bradley (2008) and Shen, Leslie, 
Spybrook and Ma (2012), dividing all the factors under control into three categories: the 
individual characteristics of principals, the contextual factors of schools which measure 
the physical background of schools and the composition of the student and teacher body, 
and the evaluative assessments of the working conditions of principals.  
  The previous sections of this chapter have discussed principal autonomy in 
details. Job autonomy is viewed as one of the most influential job characteristics to 
employee behaviors. It negatively affects the turnover rates of employees (Hackman and 
Oldham, 1976; Fried and Ferris, 1987; Wilson, 1994; Humphrey, Nahrgang and 
Morgeson, 2007; Dysvik and Kuvaas, 2010; Galletta, Portoghese and Battistelli, 2011). In 
addition to the levels of job autonomy, the turnover rates of principals are also correlated 
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with the individual characteristics of principals, the contextual factors of schools, and 
other working conditions of principals. 
  The findings on how the individual characteristics of principals affect their 
turnover rates appear to be mixed. Although there has been some different evidence 
(DeAngelis and White, 2011; Fuller, Young and Orr, 2007), a majority of the research has 
indicated that principals who are female and racial or ethnic minority are more likely to 
change their positions or to leave the system than principals who are male and non-
minority (Gates, Ringel, Santibanez, Guarino, Ghosh-Dastidar and Brown, 2006; Akiba 
and Reichardt, 2004; Papa Jr., 2007, Baker, Punswick and Belt, 2010). Akiba and 
Reichardt (2004) conjectured that the higher attrition rates of female principals might be 
associated with the likelihood of young female principals leaving their positions to raise 
families and with their earlier retirement. 
  The effect of age on the turnover rates of principals is still unclear. There has 
been no clear evidence about whether older principals are more mobile than young 
principals (Gates, Ringel, Santibanez, Guarino, Ghosh-Dastidar and Brown, 2006; 
DeAngelis and White, 2011; Papa Jr., 2007; Fuller, Young and Orr, 2007). Principals who 
have a master’s degree have been found to be less likely to change schools or positions 
(Gates, Ringel, Santibanez, Guarino, Ghosh-Dastidar and Brown, 2006; Akiba and 
Reichardt, 2004), while principals holding a doctoral degree have shown a greater 
propensity to leave than other principals (DeAngelis and White, 2011). Experience is also 
a predictor for principal departures. Most of the research states that more experienced 
principals are more likely to stay in one place and are less likely to move (Gates, Ringel, 
Santibanez, Guarino, Ghosh-Dastidar and Brown, 2006; Papa Jr., 2007; Baker, Punswick, 
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and Belt, 2010), but there has also been the evidence of an inverse relationship 
(DeAngelis and White, 2011).  
  The contextual factors of schools also play a pivotal role in predicting the 
turnover rates of principals. Schools with higher proportions of low-income, racial or 
ethnic minority, and low-achieving students tend to have higher turnover rates for 
principals (Clotfelter, Ladd, Vigdor and Wheeler, 2007; Branch, Hanushek and Rivkin, 
2009; Loeb, Kalogrides and Horng, 2010; Miller, 2013; Fuller and Young, 2008; Fuller 
and Young, 2009; Cullen and Mazzeo, 2007; Gates, Ringel, Santibanez, Guarino, Ghosh-
Dastidar and Brown, 2006; Baker, Punswick and Belt, 2010; DeAngelis and White, 2011; 
Clark, Martorell and Rockoff, 2009; Burkhauser, Gates, Hamilton and Ikemoto, 2012; 
Ringel, Gates, Chung, Brown and Ghosh-Dastidar, 2004; Gates, Guarino, Santibanez, 
Brown, Ghosh-Dastidar and Chung, 2004; Papa Jr., 2007). On the other hand, Akiba and 
Reichardt (2004) found some different evidence that the poverty levels and the 
proportions of minority students were independent from the turnover rates of school 
principals. Fuller, Young and Orr (2007) also found that there were few differences in the 
retention rates among principals working in schools with different proportions of 
minority and low-income students. 
   Partlow (2007) argued that building enrollment, student attendance, student 
mobility, pupil-teacher ratio, and teacher attendance had no effect on the turnover rates of 
principals. Although some scholars believe that larger schools have a greater degree of 
principal stability on average (Gates, Ringel, Santibanez, Guarino, Ghosh-Dastidar and 
Brown, 2006; Ringel, Gates, Chung, Brown and Ghosh-Dastidar, 2004), more scholars 
have found that schools with fewer students have lower levels of principal turnover 
28 
 
(Akiba and Reichardt, 2004; Papa, 2004; Papa Jr., 2007; Baker, Punswick and Belt, 
2010). Besides varying across school sizes, the turnover rates of principals also vary 
across school levels, with elementary schools having the lowest rates and high schools 
having the highest ones (Fuller and Young, 2009; Cullen and Mazzeo, 2007; Gates, 
Guarino, Santibanez, Brown, Ghosh-Dastidar and Chung, 2004; Fuller, Young, and Orr, 
2007; DeAngelis and White, 2011). In addition, schools being located in rural and small 
town districts and schools being located in urban areas both have higher principal 
turnover rates than do schools being located in suburban districts (Gates, Ringel, 
Santibanez, Guarino, Ghosh-Dastidar and Brown, 2006; Fuller and Young, 2009; Akiba 
and Reichardt, 2004; Baker, Punswick and Belt, 2010; DeAngelis and White, 2011). 
  The past research on principal turnover sometimes refers to the driving factors of 
teacher turnover. Aspects of working conditions that lead to high levels of teacher 
turnover (e.g., lack of student motivation, student discipline problems, lack of parental 
support, lack of influence over decision-making, and in particular low salaries) may also 
affect the turnover decisions of principals (Gates, Ringel, Santibanez, Guarino, Ghosh-
Dastidar and Brown, 2006; Clotfelter, Ladd, Vigdor and Wheeler, 2007; Liu and Ramsey, 
2008; Ingersoll, 2002; Ingersoll and Smith, 2003; Sheppard, 2010). Hertling (2001) 
maintains that lack of support from parents and the community along with negative 
comments from students and media contribute to high levels of principal turnover. 
Excessive workloads and other pressure also lead to high levels of principal turnover 
(Brooking, Collins, Court and O’Neill, 2003; Sheppard, 2010; Hertling, 2001). 
   Sheppard (2010) found that salary, compensation, and other benefits provided 
by the schools were significant factors in predicting the odds of principal turnover. 
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Principals are more likely to move to schools offering higher salaries (Papa Jr., 2007; 
Baker, Punswick and Belt, 2010). They are inclined to move when there is an expected 
increase in their compensation for transferring to another education-related position 
(Akiba and Reichardt, 2004). Baker, Punswick and Belt (2010) found that salary was the 
most consistent policy lever for affecting principal retention. Principals receiving higher 
salaries appear to be more likely to stay longer. Principals moving to other schools are 
able to increase their salaries, on average, by 5%. Papa Jr. (2007) indicated that the 
likelihood of principal retention would increase by 8.1% as a result of a $1,000 increase 
in salary.  
   Higher salaries sometimes may even offset the disadvantages of other working 
conditions. For instance, larger schools tend to have more problems, but the principals in 
larger schools are also paid more. The salary differentials are sometimes large enough to 
retain principals (Gates, Ringel, Santibanez, Ross and Chung, 2003). Higher salaries may 
also compensate for the disadvantages of schools with higher proportions of racial or 
ethnic minority students, LEP students, and less-qualified teachers (Papa Jr., 2007). In 
contrast, Papa Jr., Lankford and Wyckoff (2002) found that although principals working 
in the New York City and other urban areas typically received higher salaries than did 
principals working in suburban areas, they were still much more likely to leave the New 
York state public school system. 
    March and Simon (1958) have proposed that alternative employment 
opportunities play a critical role in affecting the turnover decisions of employees. Some 
research has found that the availability of alternative jobs can explain turnover variance 
(Griffeth, Hom and Gaertner, 2000). The school-related research, however, has paid little 
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attention to the labor market. Akiba and Reichardt (2004) and Papa Jr. (2007) examined 
how the density of schools and the amount of school leader positions in the local area 
influenced principal turnover, finding that neither of them had a significant effect on the 
turnover rates of principals. 
  To summarize, being female, being minority, and having a doctoral degree tend 
to increase the likelihood that principals leave their positions, while having a master’s 
degree may decrease this likelihood. The effects of age and administrative experiences on 
the turnover rates of principals are still unclear.  
   Principals working in larger schools and suburban schools are more likely to 
leave their positions than principals working in smaller schools and rural schools, while 
principals working in elementary schools and combined schools are both less likely to 
leave than principals working in secondary schools. Principals are also less likely to work 
in schools with higher proportions of low-income and minority students. 
  Among the working conditions, job autonomy negatively affects the turnover 
rates of principals. Besides, student motivation, parental support, and positive comments 
from students and colleagues also negatively affect the turnover rates of principals. On 
the other hand, student discipline problems, low salaries, and heavy workloads will lead 
to higher turnover rates for principals.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
    Building on the theoretical framework and the literature reviewed in chapter 2, 
this chapter introduces the methodology of this dissertation in details. It begins with an 
introduction of the hypotheses that correspond to each research question. This section is 
followed by an overview of the dataset, including the 2011-12 Schools and Staffing 
Survey (SASS) and the 2012-13 Principal Follow-up Survey (PFS). Then I will introduce 
the measures, the models, and the statistical tools used to test the hypotheses.  
3.1 Hypothesis 
    The hypotheses of this dissertation are built on the past research on principal 
autonomy and principal turnover and on the work that has studied the individual 
characteristics of school principals and the contextual factors and working conditions of 
charter schools and TPSs. The main purpose of this dissertation is to examine whether the 
principals in multiple types of charter schools enjoy higher levels of job autonomy when 
making decisions concerning school-related issues and therefore have lower turnover 
rates than do TPS principals. In this study, I first consider the current levels of job 
autonomy that are granted to principals working in different types of charter schools and 
to TPS principals based on principals’ perceptions of their school-wide influence. I also 
consider the levels of the power differential between principals and teachers in charter 
schools and in TPSs, seeing whether the distributions of power between principals and 
teachers are different in charter schools and in TPSs. Next, I consider the relationships 
between job autonomy, working conditions, and principal turnover, while continuing to 
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investigate the differences between each type of charter schools and TPSs. I examine 
whether differences in the turnover rates of principals between charter schools and TPSs, 
if there are any, are driven by the differences in the levels of principal autonomy and 
other working conditions of principals. 
3.1.1 Principal Autonomy 
  As I have discussed in chapter 2, charter schools are site-based managed, which 
ensures that the school-wide issues of charter schools are mostly decided at the school-
level. Traditional public schools, by contrast, face state- and federal-level constraints 
imposed by governance structures and make few independent decisions. Therefore, 
charter school principals should enjoy higher levels of job autonomy than do their 
counterparts working in TPSs. 
H1a: Charter school principals perceive that they have higher levels of job autonomy 
than do TPS principals. 
  EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools are more likely than regular charter 
schools to centralize administrative functions and reduce school-level autonomy. Thus, 
principals in these schools will likely have lower levels of job autonomy than do 
principals in regular charter schools.  
H1b: Principals in EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools perceive that they have 
lower levels of job autonomy than do principals in regular charter schools. 
   I also examine the differences between MO-managed charter schools and TPSs. 
The previous research on MOs, however, has not directly compared MO-managed charter 
schools with TPSs, providing me with no solid evidence that the working conditions 
within EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools differ from those in TPSs. For this 
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reason, I develop a more tentative hypothesis for MO-managed charter schools. 
Considering that principals in MO-managed charter schools and TPS principals are both 
expected to have lower levels of job autonomy than do principals in regular charter 
schools, I establish a hypothesis assuming that the levels of principal autonomy are 
similar in MO-managed charter schools and in TPSs. 
H1c: Principals in EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools perceive that they have 
similar levels of job autonomy as TPS principals. 
3.1.2 The Principal-teacher Power Differential 
   School principals have more power than do teachers (Bredeson, 2000). White 
(1992), however, has argued that educational authority is more evenly distributed in 
decentralized schools. In schools that implement site-based management, teachers are 
granted increased job autonomy and are more involved in making decisions on school-
related issues than teachers working in centrally managed schools, who just receive 
orders from principals in response to the directives from the central offices (Ford, 1992; 
Wohlstetter and Mohrman, 1993; White, 1992). Smylie, Lazarus and Brownlee-Conyers 
(1996) have also argued that site-based management encourages more collaborative 
decision-making processes between principals and teachers. On the other hand, the 
previous research on school principals has provided little evidence on how the individual 
characteristics of principals and the contextual factors of schools affect the levels of the 
principal-teacher power differential. Therefore, I expect to see that the levels of the 
power differential between principals and teachers should be lower in charter schools 
than in TPSs.  
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  Given that EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools are more likely than 
regular charter schools to centralize administrative functions and are less likely to 
implement site-based management, the levels of the power differential between principals 
and teachers should be higher in EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools than in 
regular charter schools. Again, I establish a hypothesis assuming that the levels of the 
principal-teacher power differential are similar in MO-managed charter schools and in 
TPSs since both MO-managed charter schools and TPSs are expected to have higher 
levels of the principal-teacher power differential than do regular charter schools. 
H2a: The levels of the power differential between principals and teachers are lower in 
charter schools than in TPSs. 
H2b: The levels of the power differential between principals and teachers are higher in 
EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools than in regular charter schools. 
H2c: The levels of the power differential between principals and teachers are similar in 
EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools and in TPSs. 
3.1.3 Principal Turnover 
  The main focus of this quantitative study is to conduct an empirical test for job 
characteristics theory, investigating how job autonomy and other school-related factors 
affect the levels of principal turnover. I use a multi-step model to better capture the 
effects of the individual, organizational, and environmental factors on principal turnover. 
The first step is to make a comparison between charter schools and traditional public 
schools by only controlling for the variable for charter schools. In the next steps, I add the 
individual characteristics of principals, the contextual factors of schools, and the working 
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conditions of principals to the model one group by one group. The fourth step is the full 
model for principal turnover, which controls for all the school-related factors. 
   As I have mentioned in chapter 2, the information on the individual 
characteristics of charter school principals is very limited. The only known differences 
between charter school principals and TPS principals are their ages and administrative 
experiences. The impacts of these two factors on the turnover rates of principals, 
however, are still controversial. Therefore, comparing the individual characteristics of 
charter school principals with those of TPS principals does not tell whether charter school 
principals are more likely than TPS principals to leave their jobs. 
  The total effect of the contextual factors of schools on the turnover rates of 
charter school principals appears to be mixed. Charter school principals may be less 
likely to leave their positions because a higher percentage of charter schools, compared to 
TPSs, are elementary schools, while the makeup of the student body may lead to higher 
turnover rates of principals in charter schools than in TPSs. 
   When looking at the working conditions of principals, the lower levels of 
income and union membership coverage and the higher workloads predict higher 
turnover rates for charter school principals than for TPS principals. Students in charter 
schools have been found to make smaller achievement gains than do TPS students, which 
should also lead to higher turnover rates for charter school principals. The positive effects 
of these factors on the turnover rates of principals, however, may be counteracted by the 
effect of the job autonomy of principals. According to prior research, the levels of the job 
autonomy of principals are significantly and inversely related to their turnover rates. 
Principals who perceive having higher levels of job autonomy may feel more satisfied 
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with their working conditions and are more likely to stay in their current positions. In 
addition, the higher levels of parental involvement and the more collaborative principal-
teacher relationships in charter schools may also have a negative effect on the turnover 
rates of principals. The effects of the classroom control and the school-wide influence of 
teachers on the turnover rates of principals are still unclear. In general, the total effect of 
the working conditions of principals should lead to lower turnover rates among charter 
school principals than among TPS principals.  
  Given that neither the individual characteristics of principals nor the contextual 
factors of schools can help distinguish the turnover rates of charter school principals from 
those of TPS principals, and given that the working conditions of principals have a 
negative total effect on the turnover rates of charter school principals, I expect that 
principals in charter schools have lower turnover rates than do principals in TPSs. 
H3a: Principals in charter schools have lower turnover rates than do TPS principals. 
   There has been no evidence indicating how the individual characteristics and the 
working conditions of principals in MO-managed charter schools differ from those in 
regular charter schools. The effects of the contextual factors of schools appear to be 
mixed. Compared to regular charter schools, EMO-managed charter schools are often 
larger but more likely to be elementary schools, while CMO-managed charter schools are 
often smaller but more likely to be at higher grades. The main difference between MO-
managed charter schools and regular charter schools is reflected in the levels of principal 
autonomy. Charter schools managed by MOs tend to centralize administrative functions 
into network offices and are less likely than regular charter schools to implement site-
based management. Therefore, both EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools are 
37 
 
expected to have lower levels of principal autonomy than do regular charter schools, 
which may lead to higher turnover rates of principals in EMO- and CMO-managed 
charter schools than in regular charter schools.  
H3b: Principals in EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools have higher turnover rates 
than do principals in regular charter schools. 
   Considering that both MO-managed charter schools and TPSs are expected to 
have higher turnover rates of principals than do regular charter schools, I expect to see 
similar turnover rates of principals in MO-managed charter schools and in TPSs. 
H3c: Principals in EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools have similar turnover rates 
as TPS principals. 
    After testing these hypotheses, I extend my analysis to control for the variables 
which describe the individual characteristics of principals. The total effect of the 
individual characteristics of principals on their turnover rates is still unclear, thus 
controlling for the individual characteristics of principals may not change the 
relationships described in hypotheses H3a-c. 
H4a: After controlling for their individual characteristics, charter school principals have 
lower turnover rates than do TPS principals. 
H4b: After controlling for their individual characteristics, principals in EMO- and CMO-
managed charter schools have higher turnover rates than do principals in regular charter 
schools. 
H4c: After controlling for their individual characteristics, principals in EMO- and CMO-
managed charter schools have similar turnover rates as TPS principals. 
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    The next step is to add the contextual factors of schools to the model. As I have 
mentioned, the total effect of the contextual factors of schools on the turnover rates of 
principals is also mixed, thus controlling for the contextual factors of schools should not 
change the relationships described in hypotheses H4a-c. 
H5a: After controlling for their individual characteristics and the contextual factors of 
their schools, charter school principals have lower turnover rates than do TPS principals. 
H5b: After controlling for their individual characteristics and the contextual factors of 
their schools, principals in EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools have higher 
turnover rates than do principals in regular charter schools. 
H5c: After controlling for their individual characteristics and the contextual factors of 
their schools, principals in EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools have similar 
turnover rates as TPS principals. 
     After finishing all these comparisons, I directly test the effect of principal 
autonomy on the turnover rates of principals by estimating a fully specified model that 
simultaneously controls for the individual characteristics of principals, the contextual 
factors of schools and the working conditions of principals. According to the previous 
research, the levels of principal autonomy are expected to have a negative effect on the 
turnover rates of principals.  
H6a: The levels of principal autonomy have a negative effect on the turnover rates of 
principals. 
  After accounting for the factors that measure the working conditions of 
principals, the negative effect of charter schools on the turnover rates of principals, which 
is expected to be driven by higher levels of principal autonomy, may disappear.  
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H6b: After controlling for their individual characteristics, the contextual factors of their 
schools, and their working conditions, charter school principals have similar turnover 
rates as TPS principals. 
 Triant (2001) has indicated that the sense of freedom is viewed as one of the 
greatest parts of taking the principal positions in charter schools, and the lack of job 
autonomy in TPSs is an important reason for principals to move to charter schools. 
Therefore, I conjecture that charter school principals are more concerned with their job 
autonomy than their counterparts working in TPSs. Each unit gain in the levels of the job 
autonomy of principals will have a larger negative effect on the turnover rates of 
principals for charter schools than for TPSs, that is, the interaction term between 
principal autonomy and charter schools should have a negative effect on the turnover 
rates of principals. 
H7: Principal autonomy has a larger negative impact on the turnover rates of principals in 
charter schools than in TPSs. 
3.2 Data 
    The hypotheses of this dissertation are tested using the data from the 2011-12 
SASS and the 2012-13 PFS surveys, which are conducted by the National Center for 
Education Statistics (NCES) on behalf of the U.S. Department of Education. The 2011-12 
SASS surveys are large-scale sample surveys of K-12 school districts, schools, teachers, 
and principals in the U.S. They provide a nationally representative dataset on educational 
issues of elementary and secondary schools. The 2012-13 PFS survey is an important 
component of the 2011-12 SASS surveys. It reveals the attrition rates of those principals 
who were interviewed by the 2011-12 SASS surveys. 
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   Sampling for the SASS and PFS surveys begins by selecting schools as the 
primary sampling unit, and then, including the school district, principal, and a relatively 
small sample of teachers within each selected school. Public schools selected for the 
SASS and PFS surveys are sampled from the Common Core of Data (CCD). The NCES 
collects data for the CCD annually from all state education agencies and modifies the list 
of schools from the CCD to meet the definition of a school as used by the SASS and PFS 
surveys. The sampling frame for the 2011-12 SASS and the 2012-13 PFS surveys was 
built on the preliminary 2009-10 CCD nonfiscal school universe data file. To make sure 
that the sample contains sufficient observations, the SASS and PFS surveys use a 
stratified probability sample design. The final sampling weights and the balanced-
repeated replicate (BRR) weights are used in the data analyses of this dissertation. These 
weights adjust for nonresponse and oversampling and are used so that estimates can 
represent the population of public school principals rather than simply the sample. 
    After merging the data of the 2011-12 SASS surveys and the data of the 2012-
13 PFS survey into one dataset, I excluded the special education schools which primarily 
serve students with disabilities and the career, technical, and vocational schools which 
primarily serve students being trained for occupations. I also excluded schools that are 
specifically for students who have been suspended or expelled, who have been dropped 
out, or who have been referred for behavioral or adjustment problems.  
  The school questionnaires of the 2011-12 SASS surveys include survey items 
that help distinguish among EMO-managed charter schools, CMO-managed charter 
schools, regular charter schools, and TPSs. Some schools, however, did not provide clear 
information on these items, thus I use the 2011-12 National Alliance for Public Charter 
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Schools (NAPCS) annual data to categorize these schools1. The dataset used in this 
dissertation includes 20 principals in EMO-managed charter schools, 70 principals in 
CMO-managed charter schools, 280 principals in regular charter schools, and 6,100 TPS 
principals (these numbers are rounded to the nearest 10th as requested by the NCES). 
After taking the final sampling weights and the BRR weights into consideration, the 
weighted sample includes 270 principals in EMO-managed charter schools, 740 
principals in CMO-managed charter schools, 2,600 principals in regular charter schools, 
and 73,800 TPS principals (These numbers again are rounded to the nearest 10th as 
requested by the NCES). 
    The numbers of the multiple types of charter schools that are included in the 
weighted sample are smaller than those reflected by national data, which shows that 
during the 2011-12 school year there were 840 EMO-managed charter schools, 1,206 
CMO-managed charter schools, 3,573 regular charter schools, and 90,753 TPSs in the 
U.S. (Miron and Gulosino, 2013; National Alliance for Public Charter schools, 2013). 
This is particularly true for EMO-managed charter schools. This may occur in part 
because I excluded virtual and technical schools.  
  The percentage of charter schools in the weighted sample is 4.7%, which is a 
little lower than the true percentage of 5.8% reported by the NAPCS. The percentages of 
                                                          
1 In the dataset, there are 10 charter schools that did not provide information on their 
governance structure (whether they are an EMO-managed, a CMO-managed, or a regular 
charter school) (this number is rounded to the nearest 10th as requested by the NCES). So 
I use the data provided by NAPCS to divide them into the EMO-managed, CMO-
managed, and regular charter school groups. It is worthwhile to note that there are some 
conflicts between the SASS data and the NAPCS data. For example, some schools 
identify themselves as CMO-managed charter schools but are marked as EMO-managed 
or regular charter schools in the NAPCS’s dataset. Under such circumstances, I follow 
the SASS data and use those schools’ own answers to categorize them. 
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EMO-managed, CMO-managed, and regular charter schools in the weighted sample are 
7.4%, 20.4%, and 72.2%, while the true percentages of these types of charter schools in 
the population are 14.9%, 21.5%, and 63.6%. It seems that this dataset under represents 
EMO-managed charter schools and over represents regular charter schools.  
     Among the EMO-managed charter schools included in the sample, 87% are 
managed by large-scale EMOs (managing 10 or more schools), and 13% are managed by 
small-scale EMOs (managing 3 or fewer schools)2. According to Miron and Gulosino 
(2013), in the 2011-12 school year, 75.3% of EMO-managed charter schools were 
managed by large-scale EMOs, 13.8% were managed by medium-scale EMOs, and 
10.9% were managed by small-scale EMOs. The sample appears to over represent the 
schools managed by large-scale EMOs and under represent the schools managed by 
medium-scale EMOs. It also slightly over represents the schools managed by small-scale 
EMOs. Among the CMO-managed charter schools included in the sample, 49% are 
managed by large-scale CMOs, 35.3% are managed by medium-scale CMOs, and 15.7% 
are managed by small-scale CMOs3.According to Miron and Gulosino (2013), in the 
2011-12 school year, 51% of CMO-managed charter schools were managed by large-
scale CMOs, 30.1% were managed by medium-scale CMOs, and 18.9% were managed 
by small-scale CMOs. We can see that in the sample the schools managed by large- and 
small-scale CMOs are slightly under represented, while the schools managed by medium-
scale CMOs are over represented. In general, the size distributions of EMOs and CMOs 
                                                          
2 In the sample, the managers of <10 EMO-managed charter school cannot be identified 
(this number is rounded to the nearest 10th as requested by the NCES). 
3 In the sample, the managers of 20 CMO-managed charter schools cannot be identified 
(this number is rounded to the nearest 10th as requested by the NCES). 
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cannot completely reflect the population, however, after using the final sampling weights 
and the BRR weights, the percentages of EMO-managed, CMO-managed, and regular 
charter schools are close to the true percentages of these different types of charter schools 
in the population. 
3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 Dependent Variables 
  I use three groups of dependent variables in this dissertation (see Appendix A). 
The first group (Table 17) includes eight variables. Seven of them are ordinal-level 
variables which evaluate the levels of job autonomy a principal may have on making 
decisions concerning (a) setting student performance standards, (b) establishing 
curriculum, (c) determining teacher professional development programs, (d) evaluating 
teachers, (e) hiring new teachers, (f) setting school discipline policy, and (g) deciding the 
school budgets. The eighth one is a summated rating scale that combines the seven 
dimensions of job autonomy. It measures the level of comprehensive job autonomy a 
principal may have in deciding school-related issues. 
 The second group (Table 18) also includes eight variables, which evaluate the 
levels of the power differential between a principal and those teachers who work in the 
same school with this principal. The dependent variables are calculated by deducting the 
school-level means of the job autonomy of teachers from the levels of the job autonomy 
of principal. Seven out of eight variables measure the levels of the principal-teacher 
power differential in (a) setting student performance standards, (b) establishing 
curriculum, (c) determining the professional development programs for teachers, (d) 
evaluating teachers, (e) hiring new teachers, (f) setting school discipline policy, and (g) 
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deciding the school budgets. The last one measures the level of the comprehensive power 
differential between the principal and the teachers. 
   The last group only includes one dichotomous dependent variable (Table 19), 
which indicates whether a principal left the school in which he or she was working during 
the 2011-12 school year. It equals to 1 if the principal worked at another school, worked 
on another position, or left the K-12 education system in the 2012-13 school year. It 
equals to 0 if the principal was still working in the same school as principal in the 2012-
13 school year. 
3.3.2 Control Variables 
   In this dissertation, I control for the variables which describe the individual 
characteristics of principals, the contextual factors of schools, and the working conditions 
of principals. The variables that describe the individual characteristics of principals (see 
Table 20) include gender (whether the principal is a female), race or ethnicity (whether 
the principal is racial or ethnic minority), age, length of administrative experiences, and 
the highest level of educational degree (whether the highest degree of the principal is a 
master’s degree or a doctoral degree).  
   The variables that describe the contextual factors of schools (Table 21) include 
whether the school is a charter school, whether the school is an EMO-managed or a 
CMO-managed charter school, whether the school is a regular charter school, whether the 
school is an elementary or a combined elementary and secondary school, and whether the 
school is located in an urban or a suburban area. These variables also include the 
enrollment size of the school, the percentage of minority teachers, and the percentages of 
minority and low-income students. 
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  In addition to the individual characteristics of principals and the contextual 
factors of schools, I also include the variables that describe the working conditions of 
principals (see Table 22) when examining the levels of principal turnover. These working 
conditions are factors that prior research has suggested are likely to differ between charter 
schools and TPSs and may explain differing turnover rates of principals between charter 
schools and TPSs. I include the measures of school-related income for each year, hours 
worked per week, and union membership (whether the principal is represented under a 
meet-and-confer agreement or a collective bargaining agreement). I also include the 
responses of principals to questions asking them to rate the levels of student discipline 
behaviors and parental involvement. In addition, I include the evaluations of teachers on 
student motivation, the degree of autonomy they have within classrooms, the levels of 
school-wide influence they have, and their perceptions of the performance of the 
principal. These working conditions, which are rated by teachers, are measured at the 
school-level. I also include a dummy variable indicating whether the school was 
identified for improvement at the end of the 2010-11 school year due to failing to make 
adequate yearly progress for two or more consecutive school years. This variable can 
measure the overall level of school performance. 
3.3.3 Method of Analysis 
  This study makes multiple types of comparisons, including comparisons between 
charter schools and TPSs and comparisons between each type of charter schools and 
TPSs. These comparisons are conducted by both Wald-tests and regressions. The results 
of the Wald-tests are introduced in chapter 4. The results of the regressions are introduced 
in chapter 5 and chapter 6 along with the results of other models. 
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  The full models for examining the levels of principal autonomy and the 
principal-teacher power differential are as below: 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦𝑖
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽2
∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 𝑖 + 𝛽3
∙ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦𝑖
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐸𝑀𝑂 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖
+ 𝛽3 ∙ 𝐶𝑀𝑂 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽4
∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 𝑖 + 𝛽5
∙ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 − 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽2
∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 𝑖 + 𝛽3
∙ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 − 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐸𝑀𝑂 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖
+ 𝛽3 ∙ 𝐶𝑀𝑂 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽4
∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 𝑖 + 𝛽5
∙ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
    I use seven ordinal-level variables to evaluate the levels of principal autonomy. 
These variables are four-level measures indicating whether a principal has (1) no 
influence, (2) a minor influence, (3) a moderate influence, or (4) a major influence in 
making decisions concerning school-related issues. They are used as dependent variables 
in the models which examine how the levels of principal autonomy in each dimension are 
influenced by different factors. Winship and Mare (1984) have pointed out that ordered 
logit model “can be implemented with widely available statistical software. Most of the 
literature on these methods focuses on estimating equations with ordinal dependent 
47 
 
variables (pp. 513).” Therefore, I use ordered logit regression models to estimate the 
relationships between the levels of principal autonomy and those control variables. 
     The variable evaluating the levels of comprehensive principal autonomy is a 
summated rating scale. Summated rating scales are obtained by adding up the values of 
all the relevant items of a latent variable and then calculating the average value, thus are 
widely treated as interval-level variables. Similarly, the school-level means of the job 
autonomy of teachers and the levels of the principal-teacher power differential (deducting 
the school-level means of the job autonomy of teachers from the levels of the job 
autonomy of principals) are also treated as interval-level variables. I use multiple linear 
regressions to examine the effects of those control factors on the levels of comprehensive 
principal autonomy and on the levels of the principal-teacher power differential. 
   The full model for examining the turnover rates of principals are as below: 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽3
∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽4
∙ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽5
∙  𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖
+ 𝛽3 ∙ 𝐸𝑀𝑂 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽4 ∙ 𝐶𝑀𝑂 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖 +  𝛽5
∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽6
∙ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽7
∙  𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
  The dependent variable for the models which investigate the effects of those 
control factors on the turnover rates of principals is a dichotomous variable. These 
models are estimated using multiple logit regressions, seeing whether and how the 
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individual characteristics of principals, the contextual factors of schools, and the working 
conditions of principals affect the turnover rates of principals. 
3.3.4 Diagram of Regression Models 
   Figure 1 describes the hypothesized relationships among different groups of 
variables. The levels of principals’ job autonomy and the levels of the principal-teacher 
power differential are expected to be determined by the individual characteristics of 
principals (gender, race, age, educational status, and administrative experiences) and the 
contextual factors of schools (governance structure, enrollment size, grade levels, 
location, and the composition of the student and teacher body). The dummy variable of 
charter schools should positively affect the levels of principals’ job autonomy and 
negatively affect the levels of the principal-teacher power differential.  
  The levels of principal turnover are expected to be determined by the individual 
characteristics of principals, the contextual factors of schools, and the working conditions 
of principals. The working conditions of principals include principals’ job autonomy, 
income, workload, union membership, teachers’ classroom control and school-wide 
influence, teachers’ evaluation on the principal, student discipline behaviors and student 
motivation, parental support, and school performance. According to my hypotheses, 
principals’ job autonomy should have a substantial negative effect on the probability of 
principal turnover. Besides, the dummy variable of charter schools should negatively 
affect the probability of principal turnover, but this negative effect should disappear after 
I control for the working conditions of principals. 
 
 
49 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The Relationships among Dependent, Independent, and Control Variables 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
RESULTS - DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
 
 
   The following three chapters present the results of statistical analyses. Chapter 4 
describes the descriptive statistics of variables, providing a general overview of the 
sampled principals and their working environments. Chapter 5 and chapter 6 display the 
results of those regression models and hypothesis tests which examine the levels of 
principal autonomy, the principal-teacher power differential and principal turnover in 
different types of charter schools as well as in TPSs.  
4.1 Charter Schools vs. Traditional Public Schools 
  Table 1 lists the mean values of variables and makes a comparison between 
charter schools and TPSs. In the column of charter schools, the asterisks next to the mean 
values show the significance levels of the differences between charter schools and TPSs. 
Three asterisks signify that the difference between charter schools and TPSs is significant 
at the 0.01 level. Two asterisks signify a significance level of 0.05, and one asterisk 
signifies a significance level of 0.1, which is always mentioned as a marginal significance 
level. The colors of those asterisks indicate the directions of differences. Black asterisks 
tell that the mean values of charter schools are higher than those of TPSs, while red 
asterisks tell that the mean values of charter schools are lower than those of TPSs. 
  Compared to TPSs, charter schools hire higher proportions of minority 
principals. Around 32 percent of charter school principals are members of a minority 
group, compared to 18 percent of TPS principals. Charter school principals are younger 
and less experienced than TPS principals. On average, charter school principals are 46.67  
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  Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Charter Schools vs. TPSs 
Variable CSs TPSs 
Individual Characteristics of Principal 
Female 0.53 0.51 
Minority 0.32*** 0.18 
Age 46.67** 48.05 
Master’s Degree 0.59 0.62 
Doctoral Degree 0.27** 0.37 
Principal Experience (yrs) 5.84*** 7.28 
   
Contextual Factors of School 
Enrollment 425.73*** 577.94 
Elementary 0.55*** 0.73 
Combined 0.23*** 0.05 
Urban 0.54*** 0.23 
Suburban 0.23 0.27 
% Minority Teachers 27.97*** 13.64 
% Minority Students 61.59*** 39.52 
% Low-income Students 50.93 49.05 
   
Working Conditions of Principal 
Weekly Work Hours 59.14 58.45 
Annual Salary ($) 81233*** 90936 
Union Membership 0.27*** 0.47 
Student Discipline Behaviors 0.67 0.72 
Parental Involvement 2.35 2.24 
Student Motivation 2.77** 2.88 
Classroom Control of Teachers 3.28 3.25 
School-wide Influence of Teachers 2.31*** 2.17 
Teachers’ Evaluations of Principal 3.16 3.16 
Identified for Improvement 0.26 0.23 
Principal Autonomy 3.71*** 3.64 
Principal Turnover Rates 
Turnover 0.28** 0.22 
  *** p<0.01;        ** p<0.05;        * p<0.1 
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years of age and have 5.8 years of administrative experiences, while TPS principals are 
48.05 years of age and have 7.3 years of administrative experiences. Charter school 
principals are also less likely to have a doctoral degree. Around 27 percent of charter 
school principals have a doctoral degree, compared to 37 percent of TPS principals. The 
percentages of female principals and principals who have a master’s degree are similar in 
charter schools and in TPSs. In charter schools, 53 percent of principals are female, and 
59 percent of principals have a master’s degree, which are close to those percentages of 
TPS principals (51 percent are female, and 62 percent have a master’s degree). 
    As for the contextual factors of schools, charter schools in general are smaller 
than TPSs. Charter schools on average enroll 426 students, compared to the 578 students’ 
size of TPSs. Compared to TPSs, charter schools are less likely to be an elementary 
school and more likely to be a combined school. Among charter schools, 55 percent are 
elementary schools, and 23 percent are combined schools. In contrast, 73 percent of TPSs 
are elementary schools, and 5 percent are combined schools. Charter schools are also 
more likely to be located in urban areas (54 percent vs. 23 percent). The proportions of 
minority teachers and minority students are both higher in charter schools than in TPSs. 
In charter schools, 28 percent of teachers and 62 percent of students are members of a 
minority group; In TPSs, 14 percent of teachers and 40 percent of students are members 
of a minority group. The percentages of low-income students are similar in charter 
schools and in TPSs. In charter schools, 51 percent of students are classified as low-
income students, compared to 49 percent of students in TPSs. The proportions of schools 
that are located in suburban areas are also similar in charter schools and in TPSs. Around 
23 percent of charter schools and 27 percent of TPSs are located in suburban areas. 
53 
 
    Charter school principals are less likely to be protected by a contract union. 
Around 27 percent of charter school principals are union members, compared to 47 
percent of TPS principals. Therefore, charter school principals in general receive lower 
annual salaries than do TPS principals ($81,233 for charter school principals vs. $90,936 
for TPS principals). The workloads of principals are similar in charter schools and in 
TPSs. Charter school principals on average work for 59 hours per week, and TPS 
principals work for 58 hours per week.  
   I also compare the working conditions of principals in charter schools with 
those in TPSs. The mean levels of principal autonomy and school-wide influence of 
teachers are both higher in charter schools than in TPSs. Compared to principals and 
teachers working in TPSs, principals and teachers working in charter schools perceive 
themselves as more influential to the decision-making processes of school-related issues. 
The mean level of student motivation, however, is lower in charter schools than in TPSs, 
which means that the students in charter schools in general are less motivated.  
  The mean levels of student discipline behaviors, parental involvement, 
classroom control of teachers, and teachers’ evaluations of the principal are similar in 
charter schools and in TPSs. Besides, the mean value of the percentages of charter 
schools that are identified by the states for improvement is similar to that of TPSs. 
Around 26 percent of charter schools and 23 percent of TPSs are identified for 
improvement because of dissatisfying performance. We can also see that charter schools 
have higher principal turnover rates than do TPSs. Around 28 percent of charter schools 
experience principal turnover in the survey year, compared to 22 percent of TPSs. 
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   Table 2: Principal Autonomy: Charter Schools vs. TPSs 
Variable CSs TPSs 
Student Performance Standards  3.81*** 3.63 
Curriculum 3.53*** 3.17 
Teacher Professional Development  3.73*** 3.63 
Teacher Evaluation 3.90*** 3.96 
Teacher Recruitment 3.88 3.81 
Discipline Policy 3.82 3.78 
School budgets 3.30*** 3.54 
   *** p<0.01;        ** p<0.05;        * p<0.1 
 
 
 
  Table 2 compares the mean levels of principal autonomy in charter schools with 
those in TPSs. The levels of principal autonomy are measured by a group of Likert-type 
scales. The values of these scales are between 1 and 4. Each scale evaluates the level of 
influence a principal may have on deciding one type of school-related issues. I find that 
charter school principals have higher levels of autonomy in setting student performance 
standards, establishing curriculum, and determining teacher professional development 
programs than do TPS principals. On the other hand, charter school principals have lower 
levels of autonomy in evaluating teachers and deciding school budgets than do TPS 
principals. The levels of autonomy in recruiting teachers and setting discipline policy are 
similar among charter school principals and TPS principals.  
   Table 3 compares the mean levels of teachers’ school-wide influence in charter 
schools with those in TPSs. Charter school teachers have higher levels of school-wide 
influence in establishing curriculum, evaluating teachers, and setting school discipline 
policy than do TPS teachers. The levels of influence in setting student performance 
standards, determining teacher professional development programs, recruiting teachers, 
and deciding school budgets are similar in charter schools and in TPSs.  
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   Table 3: School-wide Influence of Teachers: Charter Schools vs. TPSs 
Variable CSs TPSs 
Student Performance Standards  2.69 2.58 
Curriculum 2.94*** 2.61 
Teacher Professional Development  2.42 2.37 
Teacher Evaluation 1.93*** 1.63 
Teacher Recruitment 1.99 1.87 
Discipline Policy 2.55*** 2.38 
School budgets 1.70 1.74 
    *** p<0.01;        ** p<0.05;        * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
   Table 4 compares the mean levels of the principal-teacher power differential 
between charter schools and TPSs. The levels of the principal-teacher power differential 
are measured by the levels of job autonomy a principal may have deducting the school-
level mean values of the school-wide influence of teachers. We can see that the levels of 
the principal-teacher power differential are positive in both charter schools and TPSs, 
which means that principals are always more influential to school-related issues than 
teachers. The levels of the principal-teacher power differential are lower in charter 
schools than in TPSs when evaluating teachers, deciding school budgets, and setting 
school discipline policy. The overall level of the principal-teacher power differential is 
also lower in charter schools than in TPSs. In other words, charter schools distribute 
power more evenly between principals and teachers than do TPSs. 
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    Table 4: Principal-Teacher Power Differential: Charter Schools vs. TPSs      
Variable CSs TPSs 
Student Performance Standards  1.12 1.05 
Curriculum 0.59 0.56 
Teacher Professional Development Programs  1.31 1.26 
Teacher Evaluation 1.98*** 2.33 
Teacher Recruitment 1.89 1.93 
Discipline Policy 1.27* 1.40 
School budgets 1.60*** 1.81 
Principal-Teacher Autonomy Differential 1.40* 1.48 
    *** p<0.01;        ** p<0.05;        * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Each Type of Charter Schools vs. Traditional Public Schools 
  Table 5 distinguishes among EMO-managed, CMO-managed, and regular 
charter schools. It lists the mean values of variables for each type of charter schools and 
compares between each type of charter schools and TPSs. The proportions of minority 
principals are higher in all types of charter schools than in TPSs, and principals in all 
types of charter schools are less experienced than TPS principals. Principals in CMO-
managed charter schools are generally younger and are less likely to have a doctoral 
degree than TPS principals, while principals in EMO-managed and regular charter 
schools have similar ages and similar likelihoods to have a doctoral degree as TPS 
principals. 
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    Table 5: Descriptive Statistics: Each Type of Charter Schools vs. TPSs 
Variable EMOs CMOs REGULARs TPSs 
Individual Characteristics of Principal 
Female 0.54 0.49 0.54 0.51 
Minority 0.43** 0.30** 0.32*** 0.18 
Age 44.53 45.13* 47.31 48.05 
Master’s Degree 0.71 0.58 0.58 0.62 
Doctoral Degree 0.23 0.13*** 0.32 0.37 
Principal Experience (yrs) 5.67* 4.67*** 6.18* 7.28 
     
Contextual Factors of School 
Enrollment 672.48 435.06*** 400.10*** 577.94 
Elementary 0.68 0.54*** 0.53*** 0.73 
Combined 0.21* 0.27*** 0.22*** 0.05 
Urban 0.61*** 0.52*** 0.53*** 0.23 
Suburban 0.32 0.23 0.22* 0.27 
% Minority Teachers 19.99 31.95*** 27.59*** 13.64 
% Minority Students 59.06** 72.82*** 58.64*** 39.52 
% Low-income Students 65.22*** 64.93*** 45.62 49.05 
     
Working Conditions of Principal 
Weekly Work Hours 60.81 60.78 58.52 58.45 
Annual Salary ($) 84973 81283*** 80870*** 90936 
Union Membership 0.25* 0.23*** 0.29*** 0.47 
Student Discipline Behaviors 0.72 0.65 0.67 0.72 
Parental Involvement 2.55** 2.37 2.32 2.24 
Student Motivation 2.75 2.68** 2.80 2.88 
Classroom Control of Teachers 3.04** 3.21 3.33 3.25 
School-wide Influence of Teachers 2.22 2.17 2.36*** 2.17 
Teachers’ Evaluations of Principal 3.21 3.07 3.18 3.16 
Identified for Improvement 0.49** 0.26 0.23 0.23 
Principal Autonomy 3.69 3.66 3.73*** 3.64 
     
Principal Turnover Rates 
Turnover 0.17 0.42*** 0.25 0.22 
    *** p<0.01;        ** p<0.05;        * p<0.1 
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   CMO-managed and regular charter schools always enroll fewer students than do 
TPSs. They are also less likely to be elementary schools. All types of charter schools are 
more likely to be combined elementary and secondary schools and are more likely to be 
located in urban areas than TPSs. Regular charter schools are less likely to be located in 
suburban areas than TPSs. Compared to TPSs, CMO-managed and regular charter 
schools have higher proportions of minority teachers, EMO- and CMO-managed charter 
schools have higher proportions of low-income students, and all three types of charter 
schools have higher proportions of minority students.  
  Principals in all types of charter schools have similar weekly workloads as TPS 
principals, while principals in CMO-managed and regular charter schools earn less 
money each year than do TPS principals. It may partially be caused by the lower 
proportions of contract union members among the principals in CMO-managed and 
regular charter schools. Principals in EMO-managed charter schools also have lower 
proportions of union members than do TPS principals, however, their average salary is 
similar as that of TPS principals. 
   As for the external working environments of principals, EMO-managed charter 
schools have higher levels of parental involvement than do TPSs. Regular charter schools 
have higher levels of principal autonomy and school-wide influence of teachers than do 
TPSs, while EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools have similar levels of principal 
autonomy and school-wide influence of teachers as TPSs. On the other hand, students of 
CMO-managed charter schools are less motivated than TPS students, and teachers of 
EMO-managed charter schools have lower levels of classroom control than do TPS 
teachers. The general performance of EMO-managed charter schools is worse than that of 
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TPSs. EMO-managed charter schools are more likely to be identified for improvement 
because of a continuing dissatisfying performance. Besides, CMO-managed schools have 
higher principal turnover rats than do TPSs. That is why we see higher turnover rates 
among charter school principals than among TPS principals. The turnover rates of 
principals in EMO-managed and regular charter schools are similar as the ones in TPSs. 
  
 
  Table 6: Principal Autonomy: Each Type of Charter Schools vs. TPSs 
Variable EMOs CMOs REGULARs TPSs 
Student Performance Standards  3.79** 3.80*** 3.81*** 3.63 
Curriculum 3.53*** 3.40* 3.57*** 3.17 
Professional Development Programs 3.66 3.71 3.74*** 3.63 
Teacher Evaluation 3.91 3.87* 3.91*** 3.96 
Teacher Recruitment 3.95*** 3.96*** 3.85 3.81 
Discipline Policy 3.82 3.81 3.82 3.78 
School budgets 3.15* 3.10*** 3.38** 3.54 
  *** p<0.01;        ** p<0.05;        * p<0.1 
 
 
 
   Table 6 compares the levels of each dimension of principal autonomy between 
each type of charter schools and TPSs. Compared to TPS principals, principals in all 
types of charter schools have higher levels of autonomy in setting student performance 
standards and establishing curriculum but have lower levels of autonomy in deciding 
school budgets. Principals in regular charter schools have higher levels of autonomy in 
determining teacher professional development programs, and principals in EMO- and 
CMO-managed charter schools have higher levels of autonomy in recruiting teachers. On 
the other hand, principals in CMO-managed and regular charter schools have lower levels 
of autonomy in evaluating teachers than do TPS principals. In general, principals in 
different types of charter schools enjoy different levels of job autonomy.  
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  Table 7: School-wide Influence of Teachers: Each Type of Charter Schools vs. TPSs 
Variable EMOs CMOs REGULARs TPSs 
Student Performance Standards  2.65 2.63 2.71 2.58 
Curriculum 2.40 2.84** 3.01*** 2.61 
Professional Development Programs  2.33 2.26 2.48 2.37 
Teacher Evaluation 1.87 1.87*** 1.95*** 1.63 
Teacher Recruitment 2.17*** 1.85 2.01 1.87 
Discipline Policy 2.35 2.31 2.63*** 2.38 
School budgets 1.76 1.46*** 1.76 1.74 
  *** p<0.01;        ** p<0.05;        * p<0.1 
 
 
 
     According to Table 7, compared to TPS teachers, teachers working in EMO-
managed charter schools have higher levels of influence in recruiting teachers, and 
teachers working in regular charter schools have higher levels of influence in setting 
school discipline policy. Teachers working in CMO-managed and regular charter schools 
have higher levels of influence in establishing curriculum and evaluating teachers than do 
TPS teachers, but teachers working in CMO-managed charter schools have lower levels 
of influence in deciding school budgets than do TPS teachers.  
  Table 8 shows that the levels of the principal-teacher power differential in 
establishing curriculum are higher in EMO-managed charter schools than in TPSs, and 
the levels of the power differential in determining teacher professional development 
programs and recruiting teachers are higher in CMO-managed charter schools than in 
TPSs. On the other hand, the levels of the power differential in teacher evaluation are 
lower in CMO-managed and regular charter schools than in TPSs, and the levels of the 
power differential in setting discipline policy and deciding school budgets are lower in 
regular charter schools than in TPSs. In general, regular charter schools distribute power 
more evenly than do TPSs since the levels of the comprehensive principal-teacher power 
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differential are lower in regular charter schools than in TPSs. The levels of the 
comprehensive principal-teacher power differential in EMO- and CMO-managed charter 
schools, however, are not different from the ones in TPSs. 
 
 
 
   Table 8: Principal-Teacher Power Differential: Each Type of Charter Schools vs. TPSs 
Variable EMOs CMOs REGULARs TPSs 
Student Performance Standards  1.14 1.18 1.10 1.05 
Curriculum 1.14*** 0.56 0.55 0.56 
Professional Development Programs  1.32 1.45*** 1.27 1.26 
Teacher Evaluation 2.04 1.99*** 1.97*** 2.33 
Teacher Recruitment 1.78 2.11* 1.84 1.93 
Discipline Policy 1.47 1.50 1.19** 1.40 
School budgets 1.39 1.64 1.62** 1.81 
Principal-Teacher Autonomy Differential 1.47 1.49 1.36* 1.48 
   *** p<0.01;        ** p<0.05;        * p<0.1 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
RESULTS – PRINCIPAL AUTONOMY 
 
 
 
  This chapter includes two sections that examine the levels of principal autonomy 
and the levels of the principal-teacher power differential in different types of charter 
schools and in TPSs. In each section, I first separately examine the levels of principal 
autonomy and the levels of the principal-teacher power differential across different 
dimensions (setting student performance standards, establishing curriculum, determining 
teacher professional development programs, evaluating teachers, hiring teachers, setting 
school discipline policy, and deciding school budgets). Then I examine the levels of 
comprehensive principal autonomy and the levels of the comprehensive principal-teacher 
power differential, which are summated rating scales combining all the dimensions.  
    I establish four regression models for examining the levels of principal 
autonomy and the levels of the principal-teacher power differential. The first model only 
controls for a dummy variable that indicates whether the school is a charter school. This 
model directly compares charter schools with TPSs, seeing whether charter school 
principals enjoy higher levels of job autonomy than do TPS principals and whether the 
levels of the principal-teacher power differential are smaller in charter schools than in 
TPSs. The second model is the fully specified model. The coefficients for the newly 
added variables show how the individual characteristics of principals and the contextual 
factors of schools may affect the levels of principal autonomy and the levels of the 
principal-teacher power differential. Models 3 and 4 are similar to the first two models 
except that the dummy variable for charter schools are replaced by three dummy 
63 
 
variables which indicate whether the school is an EMO-managed, a CMO-managed, or a 
regular charter school. These three dummy variables separate all schools into four groups: 
EMO-managed charter schools, CMO-managed charter schools, regular charter schools, 
and TPSs (the reference group). Models 3 and 4 show how the differences in the 
individual characteristics of principals and the contextual factors of schools help drive the 
different levels of principal autonomy and the differentials in the power between 
principals and teachers in each type of charter schools than those in TPSs. 
    The results of these models are reported in Tables 9 to 14. The coefficients for 
the models which examine the levels of principal autonomy in different dimensions 
(Tables 9 to 10) show how the probabilities (percentage points) for principals to report 
that they have a major influence in deciding the school-related issues will change as each 
control variable increases by one unit (holding other control variables at their mean 
values). These coefficients are calculated based on the estimates of the ordered logit 
regression models using the prchange command in Stata (see the original coefficients for 
the ordered logit regression models in Appendix B). The prchange command helps 
calculate discrete and marginal changes in the predicted outcomes. In the models which 
measure the levels of principals’ job autonomy, the outputs of the prchange command 
report the effects of control variables on the probability for principals to report that they 
have a major influence in deciding school-related issues. For dummy variables, the 
results indicate how the probability of having a major influence will change as the value 
of control variables increases from 0 to 1. For interval-level variables, the outputs 
indicate how the probability will change as the value of control variables has a marginal 
increase.  
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  The coefficients for the models which examine the levels of comprehensive 
principal autonomy and the levels of the principal-teacher power differential (Tables 11 to 
14) show how the dependent variables (the levels of comprehensive principal autonomy, 
the levels of the principal-teacher power differential in different dimensions, and the 
levels of the comprehensive principal-teacher power differential) will change as each 
control variable increases by one unit (holding other control variables unchanged).  
 
 
5.1 Influential Factors of Principal Autonomy 
5.1.1 The Levels of Principal Autonomy in Separate Dimensions 
  In this dissertation, the levels of principal autonomy are measured across seven 
separate dimensions: setting student performance standards, establishing curriculum, 
determining teacher professional development programs, evaluating teachers, hiring 
teachers, setting discipline policy, and deciding school budgets. I first examine the levels 
of autonomy a principal may have in each dimension. 
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Table 9: The Percentage Points for Principals to Report That They Have a Major 
Influence in Deciding School-related Issues: Charter Schools vs. TPSs 
Variable D1 D2 D3 D4 
Model 1     
Charter School 14.4*** 22*** 8.4*** -5.5*** 
     
     
     
Model 2     
Charter School 13.9*** 20.5*** 7** -3.7*** 
     
Individual Characteristics of Principal 
Female 0.8 2.7 6.9*** 1* 
Minority 3.5 4.8** -1.6 1.1 
Age (+10) -2.1** 2.0* -2 1 
Master’s Degree 6.9 -5.7 -2.6 1.7 
Doctoral Degree 8.4 -6.2 -1 1.9 
Experience (yrs) (+10) 2.6* -1 -1 0 
     
Contextual Factors of School 
Enrollment (+100) -0 -0.63*** 0.5*** -0 
Elementary -1.9 -11.1*** 0.2 0.7 
Combined -3.4 2.6 4.1 0.3 
Urban 1.4 -13.4*** 0.9 -3.2*** 
Suburban -0.03 -11.6*** -6.9*** -4.2*** 
% Minority Teachers 0.12** 0.2*** 0.0 -0.0 
% Minority Students -0.0 -0.07*** 0.0 0.02* 
% Low-income Students -0.0 -0.0 -0.07*** -0.03** 
*** p<0.01;        ** p<0.05;        * p<0.1 
Notes: N = 6,420 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS. 
 
 
D1: Setting Student Performance Standards 
D2: Establishing Curriculum 
D3: Determining the Teacher Professional Development Programs 
D4: Evaluating Teachers 
D5: Deciding School Budgets 
D6: Hiring New Teachers 
D7: Setting Discipline Policy 
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Table 9 (continued) 
Variable D5 D6 D7 
Model 1    
Charter School -13.7*** 3.1 1.9 
    
    
    
Model 2    
Charter School -10.9** 5.1 4.1 
    
Individual Characteristics of Principal 
Female 3.3* 1.6 0.4 
Minority -2.1 -5.4*** -3.7* 
Age (+10) 3*** 1 2.5** 
Master’s Degree 6.8 -0.0 7.3 
Doctoral Degree 8.6 -10.1 6.1 
Experience (yrs) (+10) -1 -115 0 
    
Contextual Factors of School 
Enrollment (+100) 0.67*** 0.21* -0.24* 
Elementary 7.7*** -2.6** 1.2 
Combined -9.8*** -5.1 -0.2 
Urban 5** -4.6** -0.3 
Suburban -2.1 -6.7*** -0.8 
% Minority Teachers 0.0 0.0 -0.0 
% Minority Students 0.08** -0.0 -0.0 
% Low-income Students -0.12*** -0.05* -0.0 
*** p<0.01;        ** p<0.05;        * p<0.1 
Notes: N = 6,420 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS. 
 
 
D1: Setting Student Performance Standards 
D2: Establishing Curriculum 
D3: Determining the Teacher Professional Development Programs 
D4: Evaluating Teachers 
D5: Deciding School Budgets 
D6: Hiring New Teachers 
D7: Setting Discipline Policy 
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5.1.1.1 Charter Schools vs. Traditional Public Schools 
  According to Table 9, charter school principals have higher levels of autonomy 
in setting student performance standards, establishing curriculum, and determining 
teacher professional development programs than do TPS principals. Charter school 
principals are 14.4 percentage points more likely than TPS principals to report having a 
major influence in setting student performance standards. They are also 22 and 8.4 
percentage points more likely to report having a major influence in establishing 
curriculum and determining teacher professional development programs. On the other 
hand, charter school principals have lower levels of autonomy in evaluating teachers and 
deciding school budgets. They are 5.5 and 13.7 percentage points less likely than TPS 
principals to report that they have a major influence in evaluating teachers and in 
deciding school budgets. The levels of autonomy in hiring new teachers and setting 
school discipline policy are similar between charter school principals and TPS principals. 
  After adding the individual characteristics of principals and the contextual 
factors of schools to the model, the significances of the coefficients for charter schools do 
not change4. Compared to TPS principals, charter school principals have higher levels of 
autonomy in setting student performance standards (13.9 percentage points higher), 
establishing curriculum (20.5 percentage points higher) and determining teacher 
professional development programs (7 percentage points higher), and have lower levels 
                                                          
4 I have also run a series of models that include the square terms of principal’s age and 
length of administrative experiences to see whether the relationships between the levels 
of principal autonomy and principal’s age and length of administrative experience follow 
a U-shape curve. The results show that the two square terms are insignificant, and the 
significant coefficients for age and length of administrative experiences will become 
insignificant once I control for their square terms. Therefore, I have decided not to 
include the square terms when examining the levels of principal autonomy.   
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of autonomy in evaluating teachers (3.7 percentage points lower) and deciding school 
budgets (10.9 percentage points lower). 
   Female principals have higher levels of autonomy in determining teacher 
professional programs, evaluating teachers, and deciding school budgets. They are more 
likely than male principals to report that they have a major influence in these issues. 
Minority principals have higher levels of autonomy in establishing curriculum than white 
principals, and they have lower levels of autonomy in hiring new teachers and setting 
school discipline policy. Age affects the levels of principal autonomy in some 
dimensions. Older principals have higher levels of autonomy in establishing curriculum, 
deciding school budgets, and setting discipline policy than younger principals, but 
younger principals have higher levels of autonomy in setting student performance 
standards. Principals’ educational level has no significant effects on the levels of principal 
autonomy. The length of administrative experience only affects principals’ autonomy in 
setting student performance standards. Principals gain higher levels of autonomy in 
setting student performance standards as they gain more administrative experiences. 
   As for the contextual factors of schools, principals working in larger schools 
have higher levels of autonomy in determining teacher professional development 
programs, deciding school budgets, and hiring new teachers than do principals working in 
smaller schools. But they have lower levels of autonomy in establishing curriculum and 
setting school discipline policy. Compared to principals in secondary schools, principals 
in elementary schools have higher levels of autonomy in deciding school budgets and 
have lower levels of autonomy in establishing curriculum and setting discipline policy; 
principals in combined elementary and secondary schools have lower levels of autonomy 
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in deciding school budgets. Principals working in urban and suburban schools have lower 
levels of autonomy than principals working in rural schools except in deciding school 
budgets. Principals working urban schools have lower levels of autonomy in establishing 
curriculum, evaluating teachers, and hiring new teachers but have higher levels of 
autonomy in deciding school budgets. Principals in suburban schools have lower levels of 
autonomy in establishing curriculum, determining teacher professional development 
programs, evaluating teachers, and hiring new teachers.  
   The proportions of minority teachers positively affect principal autonomy. 
Principals working in schools with higher percentages of minority teachers have higher 
levels of autonomy in setting student performance standards and establishing curriculum. 
In contrast, the proportions of low-income students negatively affect principal autonomy. 
Principals in schools with higher percentages of low-income students have lower levels 
of autonomy in determining teacher professional development programs, evaluating 
teachers, deciding school budgets, and hiring new teachers. The proportions of minority 
students have both positive and negative effects on principal autonomy. Principals 
working in schools with higher percentage of minority students have higher levels of 
autonomy in evaluating teachers and deciding school budgets but have lower levels 
autonomy in establishing curriculum. 
5.1.1.2 Each Type of Charter Schools vs. Traditional Public Schools 
   Table 10 distinguishes among different types of charter schools and compares 
each type of charter schools with TPSs. Principals in EMO-managed charter schools have 
lower levels of autonomy in deciding school budgets than do TPS principals. They are 
27.9 percentage points less likely than TPS principals to report having a major influence  
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Table 10: The Percentage Points for Principals to Report That They Have a Major 
Influence in Deciding the School-related Issues: Each Type of Charter Schools vs. TPSs 
Variable D1 D2 D3 D4 
Model 3     
EMO Charter  15.7 18.5 3.8 -5.3 
CMO Charter  14.6** 16.2** 7.9 -7.2 
Regular Charter 14.2*** 24*** 9* -5*** 
     
     
     
Model 4     
EMO Charter 15.5 24.3 2.2 -2.6 
CMO Charter 14.9** 14.6** 6.6 -3.4 
Regular Charter 13.5*** 21.7*** 7.7* -4** 
     
Individual Characteristics of Principal 
Female 0.8 2.7 6.9*** 1* 
Minority 3.5 4.8* -1.6 1.1 
Age (+10) -2.1** 1.9* -2 1 
Master’s Degree 6.9 -6.1 -2.6 1.7 
Doctoral Degree 8.4 -6.7 -1 1.9 
Experience (yrs) (+10) 2.6* -1 -1 0 
     
Contextual Factors of School 
Enrollment (+100) -0 -0.63*** 0.5*** -0 
Elementary -1.9 -11.1*** 0.3 0.7 
Combined -3.4 2.6 4.1 0.3 
Urban 1.4 -13.4*** 0.9 -3.2*** 
Suburban -3.3 -11.6*** -6.9*** -4.2*** 
% Minority Teachers 0.12** 0.2*** 0.0 -0.0 
% Minority Students -0.0 -0.07*** 0.0 0.02* 
% Low-income Students -0.0 0.0 -0.07** -0.03** 
*** p<0.01;        ** p<0.05;        * p<0.1 
Notes: N = 6,420 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS. 
 
 
D1: Setting Student Performance Standards 
D2: Establishing Curriculum 
D3: Determining the Teacher Professional Development Programs 
D4: Evaluating Teachers 
D5: Deciding School Budgets 
D6: Hiring New Teachers 
D7: Setting Discipline Policy 
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Table 10 (continued) 
Variable D5 D6 D7 
Model 3    
EMO Charter  -27.9*** 4.9 -1.5 
CMO Charter  -23.2*** 9.9 2.3 
Regular Charter -9.6* 1 2.1 
    
    
    
Model 4    
EMO Charter -25.4** 7.8 1.3 
CMO Charter -18.1** 10.9 5.9 
Regular Charter -7.6* 3 3.8 
    
Individual Characteristics of Principal 
Female 3.3* 1.5 0.4 
Minority -2.1 -5.4*** -3.7* 
Age (+10) 3.2*** 1 2.5*** 
Master’s Degree 6.3 -9.1 7.4 
Doctoral Degree 8.1 -10.4 6.3 
Experience (yrs) (+10) -1 -0 0 
    
Contextual Factors of School 
Enrollment (+100) 0.69*** 0.2* -0.24* 
Elementary 7.8*** -2.6** 1.2 
Combined -9.7*** -5.2 -0.2 
Urban 5** -4.5** -0.3 
Suburban -2 -6.7*** -0.8 
% Minority Teachers 0.0 0.0 -0.0 
% Minority Students 0.08** -0.0 -0.0 
% Low-income Students -0.11*** -0.05** -0.0 
*** p<0.01;        ** p<0.05;        * p<0.1 
Notes: N = 6,420 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS. 
 
 
D1: Setting Student Performance Standards 
D2: Establishing Curriculum 
D3: Determining the Teacher Professional Development Programs 
D4: Evaluating Teachers 
D5: Deciding School Budgets 
D6: Hiring New Teachers 
D7: Setting Discipline Policy 
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in deciding school budgets. Principals in CMO-managed charter schools have higher 
levels of autonomy in setting student performance standards and establishing curriculum 
but have lower levels autonomy in deciding school budgets than do TPS principals. They 
are 14.6 and 16.2 percentage points more likely than TPS principals to report having a 
major influence in setting student performance standards and establishing curriculum. 
They are also 23.2 percentage points less likely than TPS principals to report having a 
major influence in deciding school budgets.  
   Principals working in regular charter schools have higher levels of autonomy in 
setting student performance standards, establishing curriculum, and determining teacher 
professional programs than do TPS principals. They are 14.2, 24, and 9 percentage points 
more likely than TPS principals to report than they have a major influence in these issues. 
On the other hand, principals in regular charter schools have lower levels of autonomy in 
evaluating teachers and deciding school budgets. They are 5 and 9.6 percentage points 
less likely than TPS principals to report that they have a major influence in these two 
issues. We can see that principals working in EMO-managed, CMO-managed, and 
regular charter schools all have lower levels of autonomy in deciding school budgets than 
do TPS principals, that is why we see lower levels of principal autonomy in deciding 
school budgets in charter schools than in TPSs.  
  After adding in the individual characteristics of principals and the contextual 
factors of schools, the significances of the variables for comparing between each type of 
charter schools and TPSs do not change. The effects of other control variables (the 
individual characteristics of principals and the contextual factors of schools) are similar 
to what we see in the models for comparing charter schools with TPSs. 
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5.1.2 The Comprehensive Levels of Principal Autonomy 
   Table 11 examines the levels of overall job autonomy principals have. The 
dependent variable is a summated rating scale which combines all the seven dimensions 
of principal autonomy. The coefficients show how the dependent variable, the levels of 
comprehensive principal autonomy, will change as each control variable increases by one 
unit when holding other control variables unchanged. 
   Model 1 compares the levels of principal autonomy in charter schools with 
those in TPSs. We can find that the coefficient for charter schools (0.06) is positive and is 
significant at the 0.01 level, which means that charter school principals have higher levels 
of job autonomy than do TPS principals. The levels of principal autonomy are between 1 
(no influence) and 4 (a major influence). The average value of the levels of principal 
autonomy in charter schools is 3.71, which is higher than the value in TPSs (3.64). This 
finding is in accordance with my hypothesis and also the quantitative research by Gawlik 
(2008) and Adamowski, Therriault and Cavanna (2007).  
  Model 2 is the fully specified model for principal autonomy that also controls for 
the individual characteristics of principals and the contextual factors of schools. In this 
model, the positive coefficient for charter schools (0.07) is still significant at the 0.01 
level, indicating that the levels of principal autonomy are higher in charter schools than in 
TPSs even after controlling for the individual characteristics of principals and the 
contextual factors of schools. The average level of principal autonomy in charter schools 
is 0.07 higher than the one in TPSs. The positive coefficient for female principals (0.03) 
is significant, which indicates that the average level of the job autonomy of female 
principals is 0.03 higher than that of male principals.  
74 
 
 
Table 11: Comprehensive Principal Autonomy: Charter Schools vs. TPSs & Each Type of 
Charter Schools vs. TPSs 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Charter School 0.06*** 0.07***   
     
     
EMO Charter   0.02 0.05 
CMO Charter   0.03 0.06 
Regular Charter   0.08*** 0.08*** 
     
     
Individual Characteristics of Principal   
Female  0.03***  0.03*** 
Minority  0.01  0.01 
Age (+10)  0.01  0.01 
Master’s Degree  0.04  0.03 
Doctoral Degree  0.03  0.03 
Principal Experience (yrs) (+10)  -0.0003  -0.0003 
     
Contextual Factors of School   
Enrollment (+100)  0.001  0.001 
Elementary  -0.02**  -0.02** 
Combined  -0.03*  -0.03* 
Urban  -0.04**  -0.04** 
Suburban  -0.08***  -0.08*** 
% Minority Teachers  0.001  0.001 
% Minority Students  -0.0002  -0.0002 
% Low-income Students  -0.001**  -0.001** 
     
Constant   
Constant 3.64*** 3.63*** 3.64*** 3.63*** 
*** p<0.01;        ** p<0.05;        * p<0.1 
Notes: N = 6,480 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS. 
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   Among the contextual factors of schools, the negative coefficient for elementary 
schools (-0.02) is significant. It shows that the average level of principal autonomy in 
elementary schools is 0.02 lower than the one in secondary schools. The coefficient for 
combined schools (-0.03) is also negative and significant. The average level of principal 
autonomy in combined schools is 0.03 lower than the one in secondary schools. Besides, 
the negative coefficients for urban schools (-0.04) and suburban schools (-0.08) are both 
significant. Compared to the average level of principal autonomy in rural schools, the one 
in urban schools is 0.04 lower, and the one in suburban schools is 0.08 lower. In addition, 
the proportion of low-income students (-0.001) negatively affects the levels of 
comprehensive principal autonomy. Holding other control variables unchanged, as the 
percentage of low-income students increases by 1 percent, the levels of principal 
autonomy will decrease by 0.001.  
  Models 3-4 try to figure out whether and how MOs influence the levels of 
principal autonomy within charter schools. These two models are similar to Models 1-2 
except that I replace the dummy variable for charter schools with three dummy variables: 
EMO-managed, CMO-managed, and regular charter schools. These three variables 
compare the levels of principal autonomy in each type of charter schools with those in 
TPSs, seeing whether principals working in each type of charter schools enjoy higher 
levels of job autonomy than do principals working in TPSs. In Model 3, the coefficients 
for EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools (0.02 and 0.03) are both insignificant. It 
seems that there are no obvious differences in the levels of comprehensive principal 
autonomy between EMO- or CMO-managed charter schools and TPSs. The coefficient 
for regular charter schools (0.08) is significant at the 0.01 level, which indicates that the 
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levels of principal autonomy tend to be higher in regular charter schools than in TPSs. 
The average level of principal autonomy in regular charter schools is 3.72, which is 0.08 
higher than the one in TPSs (3.64). I can say that charter school principals seem to enjoy 
higher levels of job autonomy than do TPS principals is only because those working 
regular charter schools are granted higher levels of job autonomy. 
  In Model 4, the positive coefficient for regular charter schools (0.08) is still 
significant, indicating that the levels of principal autonomy are higher in regular charter 
schools than in TPSs even after controlling for the individual characteristics of principals 
and the contextual factors of schools. The coefficients for EMO- and CMO-managed 
charter schools, however, are both insignificant in this model. The results of other control 
variables are similar to the ones we see in Model 2. Female principals have higher levels 
of job autonomy than do male principals. Principals in elementary or combined schools 
have lower levels of job autonomy than do principals in secondary schools, and principals 
in urban or suburban schools have lower levels of job autonomy than do principals in 
rural schools. It seems that principals working in secondary schools and rural schools 
have the greatest degrees of freedom. The proportion of low-income students also 
negatively affects the levels of comprehensive principal autonomy. Holding all the other 
control variables unchanged, as the percentage of low-income students increases, the 
levels of principal autonomy will decrease. 
 
 
5.2 Influential Factors of the Principal-Teacher Power Differential 
5.2.1 The Levels of the Principal-teacher Power Differential in Separate Dimensions 
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  This section examines the levels of the perceived power differential between 
principals and teachers who work in the same schools. I want to figure out whether 
principals are more influential to the decision-making processes of school-related issues 
and what factors may enlarge or shrink the principal-teacher power differential. I also 
want to examine whether site-based management encourages more collaborative 
decision-making processes between principals and teachers in charter schools than in 
TPSs, that is, whether the levels of the principal-teacher power differential are lower in 
charter schools than in TPSs. 
    The regression models are similar to the ones used in the last section. For each 
dimension and also the comprehensive measure of the power differential, I establish four 
regression models. Models 1-2 compare between charter schools and TPSs, examining 
whether the decision-making powers are more evenly distributed in charter schools than 
in TPSs. These models also show whether the individual characteristics of principals and 
the contextual factors of schools affect the distributions of power between principals and 
teachers. Models 3-4 replace the dummy variable for charter schools with three dummy 
variables: EMO-managed, CMO-managed, and regular charter schools. These two 
models show us how the individual characteristics of principals and the contextual factors 
of schools lead to different levels of the principal-teacher power differential in each type 
of charter schools than those in TPSs.  
5.2.1.1 Charter Schools vs. Traditional Public Schools 
 The results reported in Table 12 indicate how the levels of the power differential 
in different dimensions will change as each control variable increases by one unit 
(holding other control variables unchanged). The levels of the power differential in 
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evaluating teachers, deciding school budgets, and setting discipline policy are lower in 
charter schools than in TPSs. In other words, the decision-making powers in these issues 
are more evenly distributed between principals and teachers in charter schools than in 
TPSs. Charter schools have more collaborative processes for principals and teachers to 
make decisions. This is what the advocates of charter schools expect to see. The levels of 
the power differential in other dimensions are similar in charter schools and TPSs. 
   After I add the individual characteristics of principals and the contextual factors 
of schools to the model, the differences, between charter schools and TPSs, in the power 
differential in deciding school budgets and setting discipline policy disappear. It seems 
that the differences in the power differential in these dimensions are driven by the 
individual characteristics of principals and the contextual factors of schools. Only the 
difference in the power differential in evaluating teachers maintains significant, 
indicating that charter school principals are more likely than TPS principals to share the 
power of teacher evaluation with teachers.  
  The effects of gender and race on the levels of the power differential are not in 
accordance with our intuitions. The levels of the power differential for female principals 
are higher than those for male principals in setting student performance standards, 
establishing curriculum, determining teacher professional development programs, 
evaluating teachers, and deciding school budgets. Female principals are more likely than 
male principals to dominate these decision-making processes. Minority principals are 
more likely than white principals to dominate the processes for setting student 
performance standards and establishing curriculum. The levels of the power differential 
in these two dimensions are higher for minority principals than for white principals.  
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Table 12: Principal-teacher Power Differential in Deciding the School-related Issues: 
Charter Schools vs. TPSs 
Variable D1 D2 D3 D4 
Model 1     
Charter School 0.06 0.03 0.05 -0.35*** 
     
     
     
Model 2     
Charter School 0.08 0.03 0.004 -0.33*** 
     
Individual Characteristics of Principal 
Female 0.08** 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.04* 
Minority 0.10* 0.14** 0.02 0.01 
Age (+10) -0.04 0.07** -0.001 0.02 
Master’s Degree 0.13 0.08 -0.13 0.13 
Doctoral Degree 0.16 0.03 -0.2 0.11 
Experience (yrs) (+10) 0.03 -0.06** -0.02 -0.002 
     
Contextual Factors of School 
Enrollment (+100) 0.02*** 0.002 0.01*** 0.004 
Elementary 0.04 0.14*** -0.01 0.1*** 
Combined -0.11* 0.02 -0.03 0.02 
Urban 0.08 -0.08 0.01 0.03 
Suburban -0.07* -0.17 -0.11*** 0.02 
% Minority Teachers 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
% Minority Students -0.001 -0.00 0.001* 0.001 
% Low-income Stu. 0.001 0.003*** -0.001 -0.001 
*** p<0.01;        ** p<0.05;        * p<0.1 
Notes: N = 6,420 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS. 
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Table 12 (continued) 
Variable D5 D6 D7 
Model 1    
Charter School -0.19*** -0.04 -0.13* 
    
    
    
Model 2    
Charter School -0.06 -0.01 -0.05 
    
Individual Characteristics of Principal 
Female 0.07** 0.04 0.04 
Minority 0.06 -0.01 0.004 
Age (+10) 0.01 0.02 0.03* 
Master’s Degree 0.29* -0.14 0.32* 
Doctoral Degree 0.32* -0.18 0.26* 
Experience (yrs) (+10) 0.03 -0.01 0.02 
    
Contextual Factors of School 
Enrollment (+100) 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 
Elementary 0.1*** -0.05* -0.09*** 
Combined -0.19*** -0.01 -0.12** 
Urban -0.08* -0.14*** -0.07* 
Suburban -0.07* -0.07* -0.08** 
% Minority Teachers -0.001 0.001 0.001 
% Minority Students 0.001 -0.00 0.00 
% Low-income Stu. -0.00 0.002** 0.001 
*** p<0.01;        ** p<0.05;        * p<0.1 
Notes: N = 6,420 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS. 
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  The age of principals positively affects the levels of the power differential in 
establishing curriculum and setting discipline policy. As principals’ age increases, the 
levels of the power differential in these two dimensions will also increase. Having a 
master’s degree and having a doctoral degree positively affect the levels of the principal-
teacher power differential in deciding school budgets and setting discipline policy. The 
levels of the power differential in these two issues are higher for principals who have a 
master’s or a doctoral degree than for those who have a bachelor’s degree. The finding on 
how principals’ administrative experiences affect the power differential in establishing 
curriculum also deviates from the intuition. The levels of the power differential in 
establishing curriculum are lower for more experienced principals than for less 
experienced principals. As the length of administrative experiences increases, the levels 
of the power differential will decrease.  
  Among the contextual factors of schools, enrollment size has a positive effect on 
the levels of the principal-teacher power differential in setting student performance 
standards, determining teacher professional development programs, deciding school 
budgets, hiring new teachers, and setting discipline policy. As schools enroll more 
students, the levels of the power differential in these dimensions will increase. The 
decision-making processes are more collaborative and democratic in combined schools 
than in secondary schools. The levels of the principal-teacher power differential in setting 
student performance standards, deciding school budgets and setting discipline policy are 
all lower in combined schools than in secondary schools. On the other hand, the levels of 
the power differential in establishing curriculum, evaluating teachers and deciding school 
budgets are higher in elementary schools than in secondary schools, while the ones in 
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hiring new teachers and setting discipline policy are lower in elementary schools than in 
secondary schools. 
   Compared to rural schools, urban and suburban schools in general have more 
collaborative and democratic decision-making processes. Urban schools have lower 
levels of the power differential in deciding school budgets, hiring new teachers and 
setting discipline policy, and suburban schools have lower levels of the power differential 
in setting student performance standards, determining teacher professional development 
programs, deciding school budgets, hiring new teachers, and setting discipline policy. 
   The composition of the student body also affects the levels of the principal-
teacher power differential. As the proportion of minority students increases, the levels of 
the power differential in determining professional development programs will also 
increase. As the proportion of low-income students increases, the levels of the power 
differential in establishing curriculum and hiring new teachers will increase. 
   The differences in the power differential in deciding school budgets and setting 
discipline policy are driven by the control factors. These differences will disappear if I 
add the control variables to the model. According to the descriptive statistics of variables, 
charter school principals in general are younger than TPS principals (46.67 years of age 
vs. 48.05 years of age) and are less likely than TPS principals (27% vs. 37%) to have a 
doctoral degree. Besides, charter schools are smaller than TPSs (426 students vs. 578 
students). They are also less likely to be elementary schools (55% vs. 73%) and more 
likely to be combined (23% vs. 5%) and urban schools (54% vs. 23%). These factors lead 
to lower levels of the power differential in deciding school budgets and setting discipline 
policy in charter schools than in TPSs.  
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Table 13: Principal-teacher Power Differential in Deciding the School-related Issues: 
Each Type of Charter Schools vs. TPSs 
Variable D1 D2 D3 D4 
Model 3     
EMO Charter  0.08 0.49*** 0.08 -0.33* 
CMO Charter  0.13 -0.01 0.22*** -0.31*** 
Regular Charter 0.04 -0.01 -0.003 -0.36*** 
     
     
     
Model 4     
EMO Charter 0.01 0.45*** 0.02 -0.35* 
CMO Charter 0.17 -0.04 0.15 -0.26*** 
Regular Charter 0.07 0.003 -0.04 -0.34*** 
     
Individual Characteristics of Principal 
Female 0.08** 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.04* 
Minority 0.10* 0.14** 0.02 0.01 
Age (+10) -0.04 0.07** -0.001 0.02 
Master’s Degree 0.14 0.06 -0.12 0.14 
Doctoral Degree 0.17 0.02 -0.18 0.11 
Experience (+10 yrs) 0.03 -0.06** -0.02 -0.002 
     
Contextual Factors of School 
Enrollment (+100) 0.02*** 0.002 0.01*** 0.004 
Elementary 0.04 0.14*** -0.01 0.1*** 
Combined -0.11* 0.01 -0.03 0.02 
Urban 0.08 -0.08 0.01 0.03 
Suburban -0.07* -0.17 -0.11*** 0.02 
% Minority Teachers 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
% Minority Students -0.001 -0.0004 0.001* 0.001 
% Low-income Stu. 0.001 0.003*** -0.001 -0.001 
*** p<0.01;        ** p<0.05;        * p<0.1 
Notes: N = 6,420 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS. 
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Table 13 (continued) 
Variable D5 D6 D7 
Model 3    
EMO Charter  -0.47* -0.13 0.02 
CMO Charter  -0.14 0.2** 0.11* 
Regular Charter -0.17** -0.1 -0.22** 
    
    
    
Model 4    
EMO Charter -0.43* -0.13 0.04 
CMO Charter 0.04 0.19* 0.23* 
Regular Charter -0.05 -0.05 -0.14 
    
Individual Characteristics of Principal 
Female 0.07** 0.04 0.04 
Minority 0.06 -0.01 0.01 
Age (+10) 0.01 0.02 0.04* 
Master’s Degree 0.30* -0.12 0.35* 
Doctoral Degree 0.33** -0.16 0.3* 
Experience (+10 yrs) 0.03 -0.01 0.02 
    
Contextual Factors of School 
Enrollment (+100) 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 
Elementary 0.10*** -0.05* -0.09*** 
Combined -0.18*** -0.01 -0.12** 
Urban -0.08* -0.14*** -0.07* 
Suburban -0.07* -0.07* -0.09** 
% Minority Teachers -0.001 0.001 0.001 
% Minority Students 0.001 -0.0003 0.0003 
% Low-income Stu. -0.00 0.001** 0.001 
*** p<0.01;        ** p<0.05;        * p<0.1 
Notes: N = 6,420 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS. 
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5.2.1.2 Each Type of Charter Schools vs. Traditional Public Schools 
   According to Table 13, compared to TPSs, EMO-managed charter schools have 
higher levels of the power differential in establishing curriculum, and have lower levels 
of the power differential in evaluating teachers and deciding school budgets. CMO-
managed charter schools have higher levels of the power differential in determining 
professional development programs, hiring new teachers and setting discipline policy, 
and have lower levels of the power differential in evaluating teachers. Regular charter 
schools in general have more collaborative and democratic decision-making processes 
than do TPSs. They have lower levels of the power differential in evaluating teachers, 
deciding school budgets, and setting discipline policy. 
  The effects of the individual characteristics of principals and the contextual 
factors of schools on the levels of the principal-teacher power differential are all similar 
to what we observe in the models for charter schools (see Table 12). After controlling for 
these factors, some coefficients for CMO-managed and regular charter schools become 
insignificant. The positive coefficient for CMO-managed charter schools on determining 
teacher professional development programs becomes insignificant in model 4. The 
descriptive statistics of variables show that CMO-managed charter schools on average 
have higher proportions of minority students (72.82% vs. 39.52%), leading to higher 
levels of the principal-teacher power differential in CMO-managed charter schools than 
in TPS. The negative coefficients for regular charter schools on deciding school budgets 
and setting discipline policy also become insignificant once I control for the individual 
characteristics of principals and the contextual factors of schools. The descriptive 
statistics of variables show that regular charter schools are more likely than TPSs to be 
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combined schools (22% vs. 5%) and urban schools (53% vs. 23%) and are less likely to 
be elementary schools (53% vs. 73%). Besides, regular charter schools are often smaller 
than TPSs (400 students vs. 578 students). These factors lead to lower levels of the 
principal-teacher power differential in regular charter schools than in TPSs. 
           
5.2.2 Comprehensive Ratings of the Principal-Teacher Power Differential 
  Table 14 examines the comprehensive levels of the principal-teacher power 
differential. The dependent variable combines all the seven dimensions of the principal-
teacher power differential. Model 1 only controls for the dummy variable for charter 
schools. We can find that the coefficient for charter schools (-0.08) is marginally 
significant at the 0.1 level, which means that the overall levels of the principal-teacher 
power differential are lower in charter schools than in TPSs. It seems that site-based 
management does reduce the levels of the power differential between principals and 
teachers, and charter school principals are more likely than TPS principals to share 
educational authority with teachers who work in their schools. 
   Model 2 is the fully specified model. In this model, the coefficient for charter 
schools (-0.05) becomes insignificant, which indicates that the levels of the principal-
teacher power differential are similar in charter schools and in TPSs after I control for the 
individual characteristics of principals and the contextual factors of schools. The 
coefficients for female principals (0.08) and minority principals (0.05) are positive and 
significant. The levels of the principal-teacher power differential for female principals 
and minority principals are higher than those for male and white principals. 
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Table 14: Comprehensive Principal-Teacher Power Differential: Charter Schools vs. TPSs 
& Each Type of Charter Schools vs. TPSs 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Charter School -0.08* -0.05   
     
     
EMO Charter   -0.04 -0.06 
CMO Charter   0.03 0.07 
Regular Charter   -0.12** -0.08 
     
     
Individual Characteristics of Principal   
Female  0.08***  0.08*** 
Minority  0.05*  0.05* 
Age (+10)  0.02  0.02 
Master’s Degree  0.11  0.13 
Doctoral Degree  0.09  0.1 
Principal Experience (+10 yrs)  0.0002  0.0002 
     
Contextual Factors of School   
Enrollment (+100)  0.01***  0.01*** 
Elementary  0.03  0.03 
Combined  -0.06**  -0.06** 
Urban  -0.03  -0.03 
Suburban  -0.08***  -0.08*** 
% Minority Teachers  0.0004  0.0004 
% Minority Students  0.0003  0.0003 
% Low-income Students  0.001  0.001 
     
Constant   
Constant 1.47*** 1.13*** 1.47*** 1.12*** 
*** p<0.01;        ** p<0.05;        * p<0.1 
Notes: N = 6,480 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS. 
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   Among the contextual factors of schools, the negative coefficients for combined 
schools (-0.06) and suburban schools (-0.08) are significant. It shows that the levels of 
the principal-teacher power differential are lower in combined schools and suburban 
schools than in secondary schools and rural schools. In addition, the enrollment size of 
schools has a positive effect on the levels of the principal-teacher power differential. As 
schools enroll more students, the levels of the comprehensive principal-teacher power 
differential will increase.  
     Charter school principals are more likely than TPS principals to be minority, 
which may lead to higher levels of the principal-teacher power differential in charter 
schools than in TPSs. On the other hand, charter schools are generally smaller and more 
likely to be combined schools, which lead to lower levels of the principal-teacher power 
differential in charter schools than in TPSs. It seems that the negative effect of the 
contextual factors of schools on the levels of the principal-teacher power differential 
within charter schools outnumber the positive effect of the individual characteristics of 
principals. So the lower levels of the principal-teacher power differential in charter 
schools than in TPSs, which we observe in Model 1, should be explained by the 
differences in the contextual factors of schools between charter schools and TPSs. 
     Models 3-4 examine whether and how MOs influence the levels of the 
comprehensive principal-teacher power differential within charter schools. These two 
models compare the levels of the principal-teacher power differential in each type of 
charter schools with those in TPSs, seeing whether the distributions of power between 
principals and teachers are more balanced in each type of charter schools than in TPSs. In 
Models 3 and 4, the coefficients for EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools are all 
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insignificant. The coefficient for regular charter schools (-0.12) is significant in Model 3. 
The levels of the principal-teacher power differential tend to be lower in regular charter 
schools than in TPSs, indicating that principals in regular charter schools are more likely 
than TPS principals to share powers with teachers.  
  This negative effect of regular charter schools, however, disappears in Model 4 
after controlling for the individual- and school-related factors. The coefficients for EMO- 
and CMO-managed charter schools are still insignificant in model 4. There are no 
obvious differences in the levels of the principal-teacher power differential between each 
type of charter schools and TPSs in this model. The results of other control variables are 
similar to what we observe in Model 2. The levels of the power differential are higher for 
female principals and minority principals than for male principals and white principals. 
Besides, the levels of the power differential are lower in combined schools and suburban 
schools than in secondary schools and rural schools and are higher in larger schools than 
in smaller schools.  
   According to the descriptive statistics, principals in regular charter schools are 
more likely than TPS principals to be minority (32% vs. 18%), and regular charter 
schools are less likely than TPSs to be suburban schools (22% vs. 27%). These two 
factors may lead to higher levels of the power differential in regular charter schools than 
in TPSs. On the other hand, regular charter schools are smaller than TPSs (400 students 
vs. 578 students) and are more likely to be combined schools, which may lead to lower 
levels of the principal-teacher power differential in regular charter schools than in TPSs. 
The total effect of these factors seems to be negative, that is why we observe lower levels 
of the principal-teacher power differential in regular charter schools in Model 3. 
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5.3 Summary of This Chapter 
  In this chapter, I have examined the levels of principal autonomy in each type of 
charter schools and in TPSs. I find that charter school principals, compared to TPS 
principals, have higher levels of autonomy in setting student performance standards, 
establishing curriculum, and determining teacher professional development programs. In 
addition, charter school principals also enjoy higher levels of comprehensive job 
autonomy than do TPS principals. These higher levels of autonomy are significant even 
after I control for the individual characteristics of principals and the contextual factors of 
schools, indicating that these differences are driven by the implementation of site-based 
management rather than by the control variables. On the other hand, charter school 
principals have lower levels of autonomy in evaluating teachers and deciding school 
budgets, which deviate from my expectations. 
     I also find that the difference in the levels of comprehensive principal 
autonomy between charter schools and TPSs is caused by the difference between regular 
charter schools and TPSs. Principals in regular charter schools have higher levels of 
comprehensive job autonomy than do TPS principals, while principals working in EMO- 
and CMO-managed charter schools have similar levels of comprehensive job autonomy 
as principals working in TPSs. 
    I have also examined the levels of the principal-teacher power differential in 
each type of charter schools and in TPSs. I find that charter school principals are more 
likely than TPS principals to share the decision-making authority of evaluating teachers, 
deciding school budgets, and setting discipline policy with teachers. And they are also 
more likely to share the comprehensive decision-making powers with teachers. Most of 
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these differences in the levels of the principal-teacher power differential, however, are 
driven by the contextual factors of schools between charter schools and TPSs rather than 
by the implementation of site-based management. 
   Like the levels of comprehensive principal autonomy (see Table 11), the lower 
levels of the comprehensive principal-teacher power differential in charter schools than in 
TPSs are also caused by regular charter schools (see Table 14). In general, principals in 
regular charter schools are more likely than TPS principals to share power with teachers, 
while principals in EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools do not obviously differ 
from TPS principals. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
RESULTS – PRINCIPAL TURNOVER 
 
 
 
  This chapter reports the results of the multiple logit regression models which 
examine the levels of principal turnover in charter schools and in TPSs. As I have 
introduced in chapter 3, the dependent variable for these models is a dichotomous 
variable indicating whether schools experienced a principal turnover in the survey year 
(the 2012-13 school year). It equals to 1 if principals who worked in the 2011-12 school 
year left their positions and equals to 0 if principals were still working in the same 
positions during the survey year.  
    I establish two sets of models. The first set (Table 15) compares the levels of 
principal turnover in charter schools with those in TPSs, examining whether charter 
school principals leave their positions at higher rates than do TPS principals. The other 
set (Table 16) distinguishes among EMO-managed, CMO-managed and regular charter 
schools, comparing the levels of principal turnover in each type of charter schools with 
those in TPSs. This set of models may tell whether management organizations affect the 
levels of principal turnover within charter schools. The coefficients reported in these 
tables show how the probabilities (percentage points) for principals to leave their jobs 
will change as each control variable increases by one unit (holding other control variables 
at their mean values). These coefficients are also calculated using the prchange command 
in Stata (see the original coefficients for the logit regression models in Appendix C). 
Compared to odds ratios, these “changes in probabilities” provide more intuitive and 
direct comparisons between different types of charter schools and TPSs.  
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Table 15: Principal Turnover: Charter Schools vs. TPSs 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  
Charter School 6.4*** 5.7** 1.9 1.6  
      
Principal Autonomy    -4.6**  
      
      
Individual Characteristics of Principal    
Female  -2.3 -2.5 -2.8*  
Minority  3.9** -0.4 -1.2  
Age  -2.6*** -2.5*** -2.5***  
Age2  0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***  
Master’s Degree  3.9 4.7 5.6  
Doctoral Degree  4.8 6.1 8  
Principal Experience (yrs)  0.7** 0.8*** 1***  
Principal Experience2  -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.04***  
      
Contextual Factors of School    
Enrollment (+100)   -0.5*** -0.5**  
Elementary   -2.3* -2.5  
Combined   2.2 0.7  
Urban   0.0 1.3  
Suburban   -0.1 2.4  
% Minority Teachers   0.05 0.04  
% Minority Students   0.09** 0.09**  
% Low-income Students   -0.01 -0.03  
      
Working Conditions of Principal  
Teachers’ Classroom Control    -0.9  
Teachers’ School-wide Influence    -0.9  
Teachers’ Evaluation of Principal    -9.5***  
Student Discipline Problems    2.8  
Student Motivation    0.2  
Parental Involvement    0.3  
Poor School Performance    -1.7  
Annual Salary (+$1000)    -0.15***  
Weekly Workload (hrs)    0.09*  
Union Membership    -1.2  
*** p<0.01;        ** p<0.05;        * p<0.1 
Notes: N = 6,470 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS. 
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Table 15 (continued) 
Variable Model 5 Model 6 
Charter School 69.3* 41*** 
   
Principal Autonomy -3.7* -4.4** 
   
   
Individual Characteristics of Principal 
Female -2.8* -2.9* 
Minority -1.1 -1.2 
Age -2.5*** -2.5*** 
Age2 0.04*** 0.04*** 
Master’s Degree 6.2 8 
Doctoral Degree 8.8 10.6 
Principal Experience (yrs) 1*** 1*** 
Principal Experience2 -0.04*** -0.04*** 
   
Contextual Factors of School 
Enrollment (+100) -0.47** -0.47** 
Elementary -2.5 -2.5 
Combined 0.7 1.1 
Urban 1.2 0.9 
Suburban 2.4 2.1 
% Minority Teachers 0.04 0.04 
% Minority Students 0.09** 0.09** 
% Low-income Students -0.04 -0.03 
   
Working Conditions of Principal 
Teachers’ Classroom Control -0.8 -0.7 
Teachers’ School-wide Influence -0.8 -0.9 
Teachers’ Evaluation of Principal -9.6*** -9.6*** 
Student Discipline Problems 2.8 2.9 
Student Motivation 0.3 0.4 
Parental Involvement 0.3 0.3 
Poor School Performance -1.6 -1.7 
Annual Salary (+$1000) -0.14*** -0.12*** 
Weekly Workload (hrs) 0.1* 0.1* 
Union Membership -1.2 -1.3 
Interaction Terms  
Principal Autonomy * Charter -16.6*  
Annual Salary (+$1000) * Charter  -0.4*** 
*** p<0.01;        ** p<0.05;        * p<0.1 
Notes: N = 6,470 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS. 
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   I start from the first set of models. In Model 1, I include the dichotomous 
variable for charter schools as the only predictor variable, directly comparing the levels 
of principal turnover in charter schools with those in TPSs. Charter school principals 
have higher turnover rates than do TPS principals. They are 6.4 percentage points more 
likely than TPS principals to leave their positions. This finding is in accordance with the 
descriptive statistics of variables. The descriptive statistics show that 28% of charter 
school principals left their positions during the survey year and this average rate is 
significantly higher than that of TPS principals (22%). 
   In Model 2, I add the individual characteristics of principals to the model. The 
previous research on teacher turnover has pointed out that age is one of the most reliable 
predictors of the turnover rates of teachers and it follows a U-shape relationship. Younger 
teachers who are under 30 and older teachers who are greater than 50 both exit at higher 
rates than do middle-aged teachers. Similarly, the relationship between the teaching 
experiences of teachers and the turnover rates of teachers follows a U-shape distribution. 
New teachers who have less than five years of teaching experiences have high turnover 
rates. Turnover rates, however, decline through the mid-career period and then rise again 
in the years close to retirement (please see Roch and Sai (2015) for a more detailed 
literature review on teacher turnover). As I have mentioned in chapter 2, the existing 
quantitative research on principal turnover has been scarce, thus I have to refer to the 
research on teacher turnover to establish models. Basing on the findings of the research 
on teacher turnover, I conjecture that the relationship between age and the turnover rates 
of principals and the relationship between the lengths of administrative experiences and 
the turnover rates of principals both follow a U-shape distribution. Therefore, I add the 
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square terms of the age of principals and the administrative experiences of principals to 
the model.  
   The results of Model 2 show that charter school principals still have higher 
turnover rates than do TPS principals. The positive coefficient for charter schools in 
Model 2 is slightly smaller than the one in Model 1, but is still significant. Minority 
principals are more likely to leave their positions than white principals. The turnover 
rates of minority principals are 3.9 percentage points higher than those of white 
principals. Both the negative coefficient for age and the positive coefficient for age 
square are significant. It seems that young principals have high turnover rates. As age 
increases, turnover rates will decrease until principals become 43 (42.72) years old. Once 
principals are older than 43 years, their turnover rates will start to increase as age 
increases. Similarly, the two coefficients for principal experiences and experiences square 
are both significant, indicating that turnover rates will increase as the working 
experiences of principals increase and then will decline once principals gain more than 14 
(14.36) years of administrative experiences. 
  In Model 3, I also include the contextual factors of schools. I find that the 
positive coefficient for charter schools become insignificant, that is, the turnover rates are 
similar among charter school principals and among TPS principals after controlling for 
the school context. I also find that several contextual factors significantly drive the 
likelihood that principals will leave their positions. Principals working in larger schools 
are less likely to leave than their counterparts working in smaller schools. As schools 
enroll 100 more students, principals will become 0.5 percentage points less likely to leave 
their positions. Principals in elementary schools are 2.3 percentage points less likely than 
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principals in secondary schools to leave their positions. Besides, the proportion of 
minority students positively affects the turnover rates of principals. As the percentage of 
minority students increases by 1 percent, principals will become 0.09 percentage points 
more likely to leave their positions.  
    According to the descriptive statistics, charter schools are generally smaller 
than TPSs (426 students vs. 578 students) and are less likely to be elementary schools 
(55% vs. 73%). They also have higher proportions of minority students (61.59% vs. 
39.52%). Given that principals are more likely to stay in larger schools, elementary 
schools and schools with less minority students, the differences in the contextual factors 
of schools between charter schools and TPSs appear to explain why we see higher 
turnover rates among charter school principals than among TPS principals. The results for 
the individual characteristics of principals are similar to what we observe in Model 2 
except that the coefficient for minority principals becomes insignificant. 
   In Model 4, I expand the model and also control for the working conditions of 
principals. This is the fully specified model for principal turnover. I find that the levels of 
principal autonomy and teachers’ evaluations of the principal negatively affect the 
turnover rates of principals. As the levels of principal autonomy and teachers’ evaluations 
of the principal increases by 1 level, the turnover rates of principals will decrease by 4.6 
and 9.5 percentage points. Annual salaries also negatively affect the turnover rates of 
principals. As principals earn $1000 more, their turnover rates will decrease by 0.15 
percentage points. In contrast, weekly workloads positively affect the turnover rates of 
principals. As principals work for 1 more hour in each week, their turnover rates will 
increase by 0.09 percentage points.  
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   The results of other control variables are similar to the ones we observe in 
Model 3 except for two variables. The negative coefficient for elementary schools 
becomes insignificant, while the negative coefficient for female principals becomes 
significant. The turnover rates of female principals are 2.8 percentage points lower than 
those of male principals. Compared to Model 3, we see a decrease in the coefficient for 
charter schools in Model 4, signifying that the higher turnover rates among charter school 
principals can be partially explained by the differences in the working conditions of 
principals. Charter school principals have higher levels of job autonomy than do TPS 
principals, leading to lower turnover rates among charter school principals. The negative 
effect of principal autonomy, however, is outnumbered by the effect of annual salaries. 
Charter school principals receive lower levels of payment than do TPS principals, thus 
tend to have higher turnover rates. 
     In Models 5 and 6, I examine whether differences exist between charter 
schools and TPSs in the effects of working conditions on the turnover rates of principals, 
considering both the factor that helps increase their turnover rates (weekly workloads) 
and those that help decrease their turnover rates (principal autonomy, teachers’ 
evaluations of the principal, annual salaries). I have run a series of models that I do not 
report here in which I add in the interaction terms between charter schools and the 
working conditions of principals one by one. I find that only two of these interaction 
terms are significant. In Model 5, I control for the interaction term between charter 
schools and the levels of principal autonomy, seeing whether the slopes of principal 
autonomy are different for charter school principals and for TPS principals. I find a 
negative and significant interaction between charter schools and the levels of principal 
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autonomy, signifying that principal autonomy has a greater effect on the turnover rates of 
principals in charter schools than in TPSs. We can say that the levels of principal 
autonomy are more influential to charter school principals than to TPS principals. This 
finding can substantiate my hypothesis. In Model 6, I find a negative interaction between 
charter schools and annual salaries, indicating that payment has a greater effect on the 
turnover rates of charter school principals than that of TPS principals. 
    The results of the second set of models are reported in Table 16. This set of 
models is the same as the first set, but I replace the charter school variable with three 
dichotomous variables that indicate whether the school is a regular charter school or 
managed by an EMO or a CMO. In Model 1, the coefficients for EMO-managed and 
regular charter schools are insignificant, which means that principals in EMO-managed 
and regular charter schools have similar turnover rates as TPS principals. The turnover 
rates among principals in CMO-managed charter schools, however, appear to be higher 
than those among TPS principals. Principals in CMO-managed charter schools are 19.9 
percentage points more likely than TPS principals to leave their positions. 
    In Models 2 and 3, we can still see higher turnover rates among principals in 
CMO-managed charter schools than among TPS principals, and the turnover rates of 
principals in EMO-managed and regular charter schools are similar to those in TPSs. 
Minority principals, the square term of age, and administrative experiences positively 
affect the turnover rates of principals, while age and the square term of administrative 
experiences negatively affect turnover rates. Among the contextual factors of schools, 
enrollment size and elementary schools negatively affect turnover rates, and the 
proportion of minority students positively affects the turnover rates of principals.  
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Table 16: Principal Turnover: Each Type of Charter Schools vs. TPSs 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
EMO Charter 3.3 3 2.4 2 
CMO Charter 19.9*** 19.3*** 13.3*** 12** 
Regular Charter 2.9 2.6 -0.9 -1.1 
     
Principal Autonomy    -4.6** 
     
     
Individual Characteristics of Principal   
Female  -2.3 -2.5 -2.8* 
Minority  4** -0.2 -1 
Age  -2.4*** -2.4*** -2.4*** 
Age2  0.04*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 
Master’s Degree  5.6 6.2 7 
Doctoral Degree  6.6 7.7 9.6 
Principal Experience (yrs)  0.7** 0.8*** 1*** 
Principal Experience2  -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.04*** 
     
Contextual Factors of School   
Enrollment (+100)   -0.5*** -0.5** 
Elementary   -2.3* -2.5 
Combined   2.1 0.6 
Urban   0.1 1.4 
Suburban   -0.2 2.4 
% Minority Teachers   0.05 0.04 
% Minority Students   0.09** 0.09** 
% Low-income Students   -0.01 -0.04 
     
Working Conditions of Principal 
Teachers’ Classroom Control    -0.9 
Teachers’ School-wide Influence    -0.8 
Teachers’ Evaluation of Principal    -9.5*** 
Student Discipline Problems    2.8 
Student Motivation    0.2 
Parental Involvement    0.2 
Poor School Performance    -1.6 
Annual Salary (+$1000)    -0.15*** 
Weekly Workload (hrs)    0.09* 
Union Membership    -1.2 
*** p<0.01;        ** p<0.05;        * p<0.1 
Notes: N = 6,470 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS. 
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Table 16 (continued) 
Variable Model 5 
EMO Charter  121.7** 
CMO Charter 45.9** 
Regular Charter 27.8* 
  
Principal Autonomy -4.6* 
  
Individual Characteristics of Principal 
Female -3.1* 
Minority -1 
Age -2.4*** 
Age2 0.03*** 
Master’s Degree 8* 
Doctoral Degree 10.3** 
Principal Experience (yrs) 1*** 
Principal Experience2 -0.04*** 
  
Contextual Factors of School 
Enrollment (+100) -0.47*** 
Elementary -2.5 
Combined 1.1 
Urban 0.9 
Suburban 2 
% Minority Teachers 0.04 
% Minority Students 0.09** 
% Low-income Students -0.03 
  
Working Conditions of Principal 
Teachers’ Classroom Control -0.8 
Teachers’ School-wide Influence -0.8 
Teachers’ Evaluation of Principal -10.3*** 
Student Discipline Problems 2.9 
Student Motivation 0.5 
Parental Involvement 0.3 
Poor School Performance -1.7 
Annual Salary (+$1000) -0.12*** 
Weekly Workload (hrs) 0.09 
Union Membership -1.4 
  
Interaction Terms 
Annual Salary (+$1000) * EMO Charter -1*** 
Annual Salary (+$1000) * CMO Charter -0.39 
Annual Salary (+$1000) * Regular Charter -0.35* 
*** p<0.01;        ** p<0.05;        * p<0.1 
Notes: N = 6,470 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS. 
102 
 
   Model 4 is the fully specified model which also controls for the working 
conditions of principals. In Model 4, principals in CMO-managed charter schools still 
exit at higher rates than do their counterparts working in TPSs. Principals working in 
EMO-managed and regular charter schools and TPS principals appear to have similar 
turnover rates. Principal autonomy and teachers’ evaluations of the principal both have a 
negative effect on the turnover rates of principals. As the levels of principal autonomy 
and teachers’ evaluations of the principal increase by 1 level, the turnover rates of 
principals will decrease by 4.6 and 9.5 percentage points. Besides, annual salaries 
negatively affect the turnover rates of principals, while weekly workloads positively 
affect their turnover rates. As principals earn $1000 more, their turnover rates will 
decrease by 0.15 percentage points. In contrast, as the weekly workloads increase by 1 
hour, their turnover rates will increase by 0.09 percentage points. The results of the 
individual characteristics of principals and the contextual factors of schools are similar to 
the ones we observe in the fully specified model in Table 15.  
     The positive coefficient for CMO-managed charter schools keeps decreasing 
from Model 1 to Model 4. We can see that the higher turnover rates among principals in 
CMO-managed charter schools than among TPS principals can be partially explained by 
the differences in the individual characteristics of principals, the contextual factors of 
schools, and the working conditions of principals. Compared to TPS principals, principals 
in CMO-managed charter schools are much younger and more likely to be minority. They 
also earn less than do TPS principals. Besides, CMO-managed charter schools are smaller 
than TPSs and are less likely to be elementary schools. They also enroll higher 
proportions of minority students. All these differences will lead to higher turnover rates 
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among principals in CMO-managed charter schools than among TPS principals. These 
observed factors, however, cannot explain all of the differences in the turnover rates of 
principals. The turnover rates of principals still appear to be higher in CMO-managed 
charter schools than in TPSs even after I control for all these visible factors. There must 
be some unobservable or immeasurable factors that help drive the higher turnover rates 
among principals in CMO-managed charter schools.   
   Similarly, I examine whether differences exist between each type of charter 
schools and TPSs in the effects of the working conditions of principals on their turnover 
rates. I have run another series of models in which I add in the interaction terms between 
each type of charter schools and the working conditions of principals one by one. I find 
that only the interaction term between EMO-managed charter schools and the annual 
salaries of principals and the one between regular charter schools and the annual salaries 
of principals are significant. These two negative coefficients signify that annual salaries 
have greater effects on the turnover rates of principals working in EMO-managed and 
regular charter schools than those of principals working in TPSs. We can say that annual 
salaries are more influential to principals in EMO-managed and regular charter schools 
than to TPS principals. The interaction term between CMO-managed charter schools and 
annual salaries, however, is insignificant. As for principal autonomy, I have examined the 
interaction terms between the levels of principal autonomy and each type of charter 
schools. Although the interaction term between principal autonomy and charter school is 
significant in the first set of principal turnover models, the interaction terms between 
principal autonomy and EMO-managed, CMO-managed and regular charter schools are 
insignificant in this set of models. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
   In this dissertation, I have explored the levels of principal autonomy in charter 
schools and compared them with those in TPSs. I have also explored the levels of the 
principal-teacher power differential in charter schools and in TPSs. I have observed 
whether implementing site-based management may grant a more even distribution of 
power between principals and teachers in charter schools than in TPSs. In addition, I have 
explored the turnover rates of public school principals. I have investigated whether and 
how the individual characteristics and the working conditions of principals as well as the 
contextual factors of schools affect the turnover rates of school principals. I have 
conducted comparisons between charter schools and TPSs, examining whether charter 
school principals are more likely than TPS principals to leave their positions.  
  Besides comparing charter schools with TPSs, I have also distinguished among 
for-profit EMO-managed charter schools, nonprofit CMO-managed charter schools and 
regular charter schools. I have examined whether management organizations decrease the 
levels of principal autonomy and increase the levels of the principal-teacher power 
differential within charter schools. I have also examined whether principals in EMO- and 
CMO-managed charter schools exit at higher rates than do principals in regular charter 
schools and TPSs. 
7.1 Charter School Principals Enjoy Higher Levels of Job Autonomy 
 I have explored the levels of principal autonomy in both charter schools and 
TPSs. I find that charter school principals perceive that they have higher levels of job 
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autonomy than do TPS principals. Compared to TPS principals, charter school principals 
have higher levels of autonomy in setting performance standards for students, 
establishing curriculum, and determining professional development programs for 
teachers. Although they also have lower levels of autonomy in evaluating teachers and 
deciding school budgets than do TPS principals, the levels of comprehensive principal 
autonomy appear to be higher in charter schools than in TPSs. The levels of 
comprehensive principal autonomy are measured by a summated rating that combines 
multiple dimensions of principal autonomy, including setting performance standards for 
teachers, establishing curriculum, determining professional development programs for 
teachers, evaluating teachers, hiring new teachers, setting discipline policy, and deciding 
school budgets. The higher levels of comprehensive principal autonomy in charter 
schools than in TPSs maintain even after I control for the individual characteristics of 
principals and the contextual factors of schools.  
   I have also distinguished among for-profit EMO-managed charter schools, 
nonprofit CMO-managed charter schools and regular charter schools. I find that 
principals in CMO-managed charter schools have higher levels of autonomy in setting 
performance standards for students and establishing curriculum and have lower levels of 
autonomy in deciding school budgets than do TPS principals. Principals in EMO-
managed charter schools have lower levels of job autonomy in deciding the school 
budgets than do TPS principals. The levels of their autonomy in other dimensions of 
principal autonomy are similar to those of TPS principals. Principals in regular charter 
schools have higher levels of autonomy in setting performance standards for students, 
establishing curriculum and determining professional development programs for teachers 
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than do TPSs, and they have lower levels of autonomy in evaluating teachers and 
deciding school budgets. As for the levels of comprehensive principal autonomy, 
principals in regular charter schools perceive that they have higher levels of job 
autonomy than do TPS principals. The levels of comprehensive principal autonomy in 
EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools, however, are not obviously different from 
those in TPSs. In other words, among all charter school principals, those who work in 
regular charter schools enjoy higher levels of job autonomy than do TPS principals, and 
those who work in MO-managed charter schools have similar levels of job autonomy as 
their counterparts working in TPSs. We have observed higher levels of principal 
autonomy in charter schools than in TPSs because principals in regular charter schools, 
who take up the majority of charter school principals, have higher levels of job autonomy 
than do TPS principals. 
  The individual characteristics of principals and the contextual factors of schools 
also affect the levels of principal autonomy. I find that female principals on average have 
higher levels of job autonomy than do male principals. On the other hand, principals in 
elementary schools and combined schools both have lower levels of job autonomy than 
do principals in secondary schools. Principals in urban schools and suburban schools both 
have lower levels of job autonomy than do principals in rural schools. The proportions of 
low-income students in the schools negatively affect the levels of principal autonomy. As 
the percentage of low-income students increases, the levels of principal autonomy will 
decrease.  
   The findings of this dissertation are generally in accordance with those of prior 
research on the job autonomy of principals. According to Gawlik (2008), principals 
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working in rural schools have more job autonomy, while principals working in schools 
with more poor and minority students have less job autonomy. I find, in this study, that 
principals in rural schools have greater job autonomy than do principals in urban and 
suburban schools, and principals working in schools with higher proportions of low-
income students tend to have lower levels of job autonomy. Gawlik (2008) has also found 
that white, male and more experienced principals are granted higher levels of job 
autonomy; however, I find that female principals perceive that they have higher levels of 
job autonomy than do their male counterparts. Compared to male principals, female 
principals have higher levels of influence in determining professional development 
programs for teachers, evaluating teachers and deciding school budgets, and they also 
have higher levels of comprehensive job autonomy. 
   As I have reviewed in chapter 2, the existing studies examining the levels of 
principal autonomy in charter schools have been scarce, and only a few are quantitative 
studies that compare the levels of principal autonomy in charter schools with those in 
TPSs. Gawlik (2008) found that charter school principals, compared to TPS principals, 
were granted greater degrees of autonomy in making decisions related to school 
standards, curriculum, professional development programs, teacher recruitment, school 
budgets, and discipline policy. Adamowski, Therriault and Cavanna (2007) found that 
charter school principals perceived that they had greater autonomy in hiring teachers and 
designing curriculum than did TPS principals.  
     In this dissertation, I find that charter school principals have higher levels of 
autonomy in making decisions related to student performance standards, school 
curriculum and teacher professional development programs but have lower levels of job 
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autonomy in determining teacher evaluation and school budgets than do TPS principals. I 
also find that the levels of comprehensive principal autonomy are higher in charter 
schools than in TPSs, which is in accordance with the results of Gawlik (2008) and 
Adamowski, Therriault and Cavanna (2007).  
     The findings of this dissertation also fill a gap in the research on principal 
autonomy. Prior research has not provided a clear evidence that whether MO-managed 
charter schools have lower levels of principal autonomy than do regular charter schools 
and TPSs. Brown, Henig, Lacireno-Paquet and Holyoke (2004) compared the levels of 
school autonomy of EMO-managed charter schools with those of CMO-managed and 
regular charter schools, finding that EMO-managed charter schools have less autonomy 
with regard to curriculum, testing and standards, student discipline, facilities and general 
administration. Their research, however, does not directly focus on principal autonomy 
but examines school-level autonomy instead. In this dissertation, I have directly 
measured the levels of principal autonomy in each type of charter school, finding that the 
levels of principal autonomy in EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools are similar to 
those in TPSs and are lower than those in regular charter schools. 
  Gross (2011) has discussed how the greater degrees of school-level autonomy in 
charter schools affect the roles of principals. Charter schools offer their principals the 
opportunity to focus on a specific student group, hire the teachers they want and 
sometimes dismiss those they do not want, work with their staff to determine the best 
curriculum, and restructure the school day. These practices are not easy or even possible 
for TPS principals. Charter school principals not only play the role of instructional 
leadership, but also provide strong organizational management and act as the political 
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buffer between the schools and broader educational communities. These principals have 
considerable room to both rethink the way the staffs and communities engage in 
leadership activities and develop new partnerships to help support the schools. On the 
other hand, Gross (2011) has also mentioned that the new opportunities unlocked by 
autonomy also encounter new challenges. With greater autonomy come more tasks and 
responsibilities. Charter school principals need to create and support a vision, build a 
staff, manage budgets, deal with payroll and facilities management, and take care of the 
school’s marketing and student recruitment. These practices bring a host of added 
responsibilities, and many charter school principals are struggling with these demands. To 
support these principals, authorizers of charter schools need to look closely for building 
and implementing a clear and achievable mission. Training programs need to be scaled up 
to provide specialized and sufficient training for school principals who are faced with 
increasing demands. Besides, states need to improve the reliability and stability of charter 
school funding, taking the burden of fund raising off the hands of charter school 
principals. 
   How the higher levels of school-level autonomy affect student achievement has 
not been determined (Wohlstetter, Smith and Farrell, 2013). Adamowski, Therriault and 
Cavanna (2007) found that two-thirds of charter school principals reported that having 
autonomy was necessary in raising student achievement. Zimmer and Buddin (2007), 
however, stated that the differences in school-level autonomy between charter schools 
and TPSs did not translate into differences in high school test scores. Based on the 
findings of the previous research on principal autonomy and also the findings of this 
dissertation, a critical question can be raised. Are principals and teachers in charter 
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schools truly utilizing the higher levels of autonomy as a tool for improving student 
achievement, or are higher levels of autonomy only granted but not used? Wohlstetter, 
Smith and Farrell (2013) have mentioned that although state laws grant charter schools 
greater degrees of autonomy, not all schools take advantage of this freedom to conduct 
school business in innovative ways. The relationships between autonomy and 
accountability and between autonomy and the growth of charter districts, how to react to 
potential barriers inhibiting autonomy, and how to link the higher levels of school-level 
autonomy to better student performance need further investigations.  
7.2 The Principal-teacher Power Differential Is Smaller in Charter Schools 
  In this study, I have also explored the levels of the principal-teacher power 
differential in charter schools and in TPSs. I find that the levels of the principal-teacher 
power differential in evaluating teachers, setting discipline policy and deciding school 
budgets are lower in charter schools than in TPSs. Most of these differences, however, 
disappear once I control for the individual characteristics of principals and the contextual 
factors of schools. Only the differences in teacher evaluation remain after I add in the 
control variables. The levels of the comprehensive principal-teacher power differential 
are lower in charter schools than in TPSs, but these differences also become insignificant 
in the fully specified model. It seems that the differences in the contextual factors of 
schools between charter schools and TPSs help drive the lower levels of the principal-
teacher power differential in charter schools than in TPSs. 
     Among the controlled principal- and school-related factors, the levels of the 
comprehensive principal-teacher power differential tend to be higher for female and 
minority principals than for male and white principals. Female principals are more 
111 
 
dominating than male principals in the processes of setting performance standards for 
students, establishing curriculum, determining professional development programs for 
teachers, evaluating teachers and deciding school budgets; minority principals are more 
dominating than white principals in the processes of setting student performance 
standards and establishing curriculum. The enrollment size of schools positively affects 
the levels of the comprehensive principal-teacher power differential. Larger schools have 
higher levels of power differential than do small schools. Besides, the levels of the 
comprehensive principal-teacher power differential appear to be lower in combined 
elementary and secondary schools and suburban schools than in secondary schools and 
rural schools.  
    In the models comparing the levels of the comprehensive principal-teacher 
power differential in charter schools with those in TPSs, the negative coefficient for 
charter schools is marginally significant in Model 1 but becomes insignificant in the fully 
specified model which also controls for the individual characteristics of principals and the 
contextual factors of schools. As I have mentioned in chapter 4, charter schools on 
average are smaller and more likely to be combined schools than TPSs (see the 
descriptive statistics of variables), which may lead to lower levels of the comprehensive 
principal-teacher power differential in charter schools than in TPSs. So the lower levels 
of the comprehensive principal-teacher power differential in charter schools, which are 
observed in Model 1, appear to be driven by the differences in the contextual factors of 
schools. 
  After distinguishing between MO-managed and regular charter schools, I find 
that the levels of the comprehensive principal-teacher power differential in regular 
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charter schools appear to be lower than those in TPSs, while the ones in EMO- and 
CMO-managed charter schools are both similar to those in TPSs. Like the negative 
coefficient for charter schools, the negative coefficient for regular charter schools also 
becomes insignificant in the fully specified model that controls for the individual 
characteristics of principals and the contextual factors of schools. We can say that the 
lower levels of the comprehensive principal-teacher power differential in charter schools, 
which are compared with those in TPSs, are led by the lower levels of the comprehensive 
principal-teacher power differential in regular charter schools.  
  The previous research has argued that educational authority is more evenly 
distributed in site-based managed schools than in schools that strictly follow the 
instructions coming from the local school boards and the state boards of education 
(White, 1992; Smylie, Lazarus and Brownlee-Conyers, 1996). Charter schools are 
designed to implement site-based management, thus are expected to have more 
collaborative and democratic processes of deciding school-related issues. Among all 
charter schools, EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools are often centrally managed 
by network offices and are less likely than regular charter schools to implement site-
based management, thus the levels of the principal-teacher power differential are 
expected to be higher in MO-managed charter schools than in regular charter schools.  
   The findings of this dissertation support these hypotheses. I see lower levels of 
the principal-teacher power differential in charter schools than in TPSs, indicating that 
charter school principals are more likely than TPS principals to share educational 
authority with teachers, in particular in evaluating teachers, setting discipline policy and 
deciding school budgets. I also see that the levels of the principal-teacher power 
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differential in EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools are similar to those in TPSs and 
are higher than the ones in regular charter schools. The only problem is that the 
differences in the levels of the principal-teacher power differential between charter 
schools and TPSs become unobvious if I control for the individual characteristics of 
principals and the contextual factors of schools. It seems that the differences in the levels 
of the principal-teacher power differential are not caused by the differences in school 
philosophy or governance structure but by the differences in principals’ demographic 
statuses and schools’ contextual factors. According to this finding, the decision making 
processes of TPSs can become as collaborative and democratic as the ones of charter 
schools once TPSs enroll fewer students, enroll students at lower grades and locate 
themselves in suburban areas. 
   Prior research on charter schools has found that charter school teachers have 
higher levels of job autonomy than do TPS teachers (Renzulli, Parrott and Beattie, 2011; 
Ni, 2012; Wohlstetter, Smith and Farrell, 2013; Gross, 2011; Roch and Sai, 2015; Roch 
and Sai, 2016). The findings of this dissertation are in accordance with this previous 
research. Principals and also teachers who work in charter schools enjoy higher levels of 
job autonomy than do their counterparts working in TPSs, that is why we see lower levels 
of the principal-teacher power differential in charter schools than in TPSs. Principals are 
granted higher levels of job autonomy in charter schools, and they become more likely to 
share school-level educational authority with teachers. At the same time, teachers are also 
granted higher levels of job autonomy in charter schools and are more engaged in making 
decisions on school-related issues. As a result, we see a more even distribution of school-
level educational authority between principals and teachers in charter schools than in 
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TPSs, leading to more collaborative and democratic decision-making processes. This 
finding also supports the statements of the previous scholars. Wohlstetter, Smith and 
Farrell (2013) found that charter school teachers became more involved, than TPS 
teachers, in making decisions related to schooling. Malloy and Wohlstetter (2003: 235) 
state that charter school teachers feel involved in school decision making when the 
principals create a “sense of team”. Such perception, as Wohlstetter, Smith and Farrell 
(2013) have argued, may translate into positive behaviors such as greater teacher 
commitment to charter schools.  
7.3 Charter School Principals Exit at Higher Rates 
    In this dissertation, I have also explored the turnover rates of principals who 
work in different types of charter schools and in TPSs. I find that charter school 
principals are more likely than TPS principals to leave their positions. The differences in 
turnover rates between charter school principals and TPS principals, however, become 
insignificant once I control for the individual characteristics of principals and the 
contextual factors of schools. It seems that the differences in the individual characteristics 
of principals and the contextual factors of schools drive the higher turnover rates among 
charter school principals than those among principals in traditional public schools.  
   After controlling for the individual characteristics of principals, the positive 
coefficient for charter schools decreases but is still significant, which indicates that the 
individual characteristics of principals help explain a small aspect of the turnover 
behaviors of principals. According to the results of the turnover models, minority 
principals are more likely than white principals to leave their positions. The relationship 
between age and the turnover rates of principals follows a U-shape distribution. Young 
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principals have high turnover rates. As age increases, turnover rates will decrease until 
principals become 43 (42.72) years old. Then, the turnover rates will increase as the age 
of principals increases. On the other hand, the relationship between the length of 
administrative experiences and the turnover rates of principals follows an inverse U-
shape distribution. Turnover rates are relatively low for inexperienced principals. 
Principals will become more and more likely to leave their positions as they gain more 
administrative experiences. Then turnover rates will start to decline along with the 
increase of their administrative experiences once they have gained more than 14 (14.36) 
years of administrative experiences. Compared to TPS principals, charter school 
principals are younger and more likely to be minority, which may lead to higher turnover 
rates among charter school principals than among TPS principals. But they are also less 
experienced, which may lead to lower turnover rates among charter school principals 
than among TPS principals. It is possible that there exists a self-selection process among 
public school principals. We observe higher turnover rates among charter school 
principals is because those principals who have higher probabilities of turnover (minority 
principals, young principals) are more likely to work in charter schools than in TPSs. 
  After I control for the contextual factors of schools, I find that the positive 
coefficient for charter schools becomes insignificant, that is, the contextual factors of 
schools explain the main differences in the turnover rates of principals. Principals 
working in larger schools are less likely to leave than their counterparts working in 
smaller schools. Principals in elementary schools are less likely than principals in 
secondary schools to leave their positions. Besides, principals working in schools with 
higher proportions of minority students are more likely to exit than principals working in 
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schools with low proportions of minority students. Charter schools on average are smaller 
than TPSs and are less likely to be elementary schools. They also have higher proportions 
of minority students than do TPSs. Therefore, the differences in the school context 
between charter schools and TPSs appear to explain why we can see higher turnover rates 
among charter school principals than among TPS principals.  
  The working conditions also help explain an aspect of the exits of principals. I 
find that the levels of principals’ job autonomy negatively affect their turnover rates. 
Principals’ turnover rates are also affected by the evaluations they receive from the 
teachers working in their schools. Teachers’ evaluations show whether teachers think 
principals are supportive and encouraging. Principals are less likely to leave their 
positions if they are granted higher levels of job autonomy and receive better evaluations 
from teachers. The levels of principals’ payment also negatively affect their turnover 
rates. In contrast, principals’ weekly workloads positively affect their turnover rates. 
Principals will become more likely to stay in their positions if they get higher payments 
and lower workloads. After I control for the working conditions of principals, I see a 
decrease in the positive and insignificant coefficient for charter schools, signifying that 
the higher turnover rates among charter school principals than among TPS principals can 
be partially explained by the differences in the working conditions of principals. Charter 
school principals do enjoy higher levels of job autonomy than do TPS principals. This 
negative effect on turnover rates, however, is outnumbered by the positive effect of the 
payment of principals since charter school principals receive lower salaries than do TPS 
principals. 
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  In this dissertation, I have also run a series of models which include the 
interaction terms between charter schools and the working conditions of principals. I find 
a negative interaction term between charter schools and the levels of principal autonomy, 
indicating that principal autonomy has a greater negative effect on the turnover rates 
among charter school principals than on those among TPS principals. The levels of 
principal autonomy are more influential to charter school principals than to TPS 
principals. I also find a negative interaction term between charter schools and the annual 
salary of principals, signifying that payment also has a greater negative effect on the 
turnover rates among charter school principals than on those among TPS principals. 
   After distinguishing among EMO-managed, CMO-managed and regular charter 
schools, I find that principals in CMO-managed charter schools exit at higher rates than 
do TPS principals, that is why we see higher turnover rates among charter school 
principals than among TPS principals. As for other charter school principals who work in 
EMO-managed and regular charter schools, their turnover rates do not obviously differ 
from those of TPS principals. The size of the positive coefficient for CMO-managed 
charter schools keeps decreasing as I add in the control variables step by step, signifying 
that those principal- and school-related factors can explain a part of the differences in the 
turnover rates of principals. However, the positive coefficient for CMO-managed charter 
schools is still significant in the fully specified model. Some invisible factors that are not 
controlled for by my models help drive the differences in the turnover rates of principals 
between CMO-managed charter schools and TPSs. The uncontrolled factors may be 
related to the cultural context of schools. CMO-managed charter schools sometimes have 
school cultures that support and encourage long work hours such as 60 hours to 80 hours 
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per week. They also require employees to focus on meeting the mission and the goals of 
the school. This type of culture may be attractive to some principals with high levels of 
passion on the mission of the school, but may also facilitate the burnout and turnover of 
other principals (Torres, 2014; Lake, Dusseault, Bowen, Demeritt and Hill, 2010). 
    Similarly, I have run another series of models in which I add in the interaction 
terms between each type of charter schools and the working conditions of principals. I 
find significant negative interaction terms between EMO-managed charter schools and 
the annual salaries of principals and between regular charter schools and the annual 
salaries of principals. It seems that payment has a greater negative effect on the turnover 
rates among principals in EMO-managed and regular charter schools than among TPS 
principals. Annual salaries are more influential to principals in EMO-managed and 
regular charter schools than to TPS principals. 
  As I have mentioned in chapter 2, no current research has quantitatively assessed 
the turnover rates among charter school principals. Past research has only evaluated the 
turnover rates among principals in all public schools without distinguishing between 
charter schools and TPSs. This previous research has found that in the range of 14-30% 
of principals in public schools leave their jobs each year (Battle and Gruber, 2010; 
DeAngelis and White, 2011; Cullen and Mazzeo, 2007; Ringel, Gates, Chung, Brown 
and Ghosh-Dastidar, 2004; Gates, Guarino, Santibanez, Brown, Ghosh-Dastidar and 
Chung, 2004; Fuller, Young and Orr, 2007; Beteille, Kalogrides and Loeb, 2011). In this 
dissertation, I find that around 28% of charter school principals and 22% of TPS 
principals leave their jobs from one year to the next. This trend is in accordance with the 
findings of prior research.  
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  There has been much more research that is focused on teacher retention. Some of 
this research has compared the turnover rates among charter school teachers with those 
among TPS teachers, finding that charter school teachers are more likely to leave their 
positions than do TPS teachers (Renzulli, Parrott and Beattie, 2011; Stuit and Smith, 
2009; Stuit and Smith, 2012; Cannata, 2010). Roch and Sai (2015) found that teachers 
working EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools had higher levels of turnover 
intention than did teachers working in regular charter schools. In this dissertation, I find 
that charter school principals are more likely than TPS principals to leave their positions. 
I also find that principals in CMO-managed charter schools have higher turnover rates 
than do principals in EMO-managed and regular charter schools as well as TPS 
principals.  
   Gross (2011) has mentioned that starting a new charter school involves many 
challenges such as creating and supporting a vision, acquiring facilities, designing 
instructional programs, recruiting teachers and staff, managing budgets and payroll, and 
enrolling students, which bring added responsibilities to charter school principals. 
Operating an existing charter school is also a tough task for principals. Traditional public 
systems provide vital guidance and resources to school principals, which may help 
lighten the burden of school principals. Charter school principals, in contrast, have to rely 
more on themselves and are faced with demanding workloads. It is not surprising that we 
see higher turnover rates among charter school principals than among TPS principals. 
Charter school principals appear to be more mobile than TPS principals, but we are 
unclear about whether charter school principals are less embedded in the public education 
system and are more likely to move to the private sector than TPS principals. Prior 
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research on principal turnover does not provide useful information, and the data of this 
dissertation cannot answer this question either. It would be helpful if future versions of 
the Principal Follow-up Survey (PFS) included a question asking whether principals 
leave for a position in the private education system or private sector generally. 
7.4 The Contributions and Limitations of This Study 
     This comprehensive quantitative study contributes to the literature on principal 
autonomy, the principal-teacher power differential, and principal turnover. My findings 
support and supplement the previous research on principal autonomy. I have shown that 
charter school principals, in particular those of regular charter schools, are granted higher 
levels of job autonomy than TPS principals. I have also shown that charter schools 
provide both principals and teachers with higher levels of job autonomy and charter 
school principals are more likely than TPS principals to share the decision-making 
powers with teachers and engage teachers in decision-making processes.  
    In addition, this dissertation provides job characteristics theory with empirical 
evidence, showing that the levels of job autonomy negatively affect the turnover rates of 
principals. Charter school principals enjoy higher levels of job autonomy than do TPS 
principals; however, they still exit at higher rates than do TPS principals because other 
principal- and school-related factors in general lead to higher turnover rates among 
charter school principals than among TPS principals. I have also demonstrated the role 
that salary and workloads play in determining the turnover rates of principals. Principals 
will be more likely to leave their jobs if they receive lower salaries and have higher 
weekly workloads. Besides, charter school principals are more concerned with job 
autonomy and salary than TPS principals. The levels of principal autonomy and annual 
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salaries both have a larger negative effect on the turnover rates among charter school 
principals than on those among TPS principals.  
   In this study, I find that principals in CMO-managed charter schools exit at 
higher rates than do principals in EMO-managed and regular charter schools and TPS 
principals. The models I have established in this dissertation, however, provide little 
evidence of which factors appear most important in driving the higher turnover rates 
among principals in CMO-managed charter schools. The significant and positive 
coefficient reflects these uncontrolled for factors. I conjecture that some factors are 
related to school philosophy and school culture, which I cannot measure in this study, 
may help explain the differences we observe in the turnover rates of principals between 
CMO-managed charter schools and TPSs. We need more comprehensive models, which 
can control for culture-related factors, to explore what factors help drive the higher 
turnover rates among principals in CMO-managed charter schools. 
    Besides, the sample of this study includes a relatively small number of EMO- 
and CMO-managed charter schools since MO-managed charter schools only make up a 
small proportion of existing public schools in reality. As I have mentioned in chapter 3, 
the sample of this study over represents the schools managed by large-scale EMOs and 
under represents the schools managed by medium-scale EMOs. It also slightly over 
represents the schools managed by small-scale EMOs. On the other hand, the sample of 
this study slightly under represents the schools managed by large- and small-scale CMOs 
and over represents the schools managed by medium-scale CMOs. Therefore, the 
conclusions about EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools may not be as solid as the 
ones about regular charter schools and TPSs.  
122 
 
   This study suggests that policy makers should pay careful attention to the levels 
of job autonomy that are offered to school principals if they plan to decrease the turnover 
rates among public school principals. They may also need to consider carefully the 
payment they offer to school principals and the relationships between school principals 
and teachers. Higher levels of payment and more harmonious relationships between 
principals and teachers may help restrain the higher turnover rates among public school 
principals. I believe that future work should continue to explore and assess how CMO-
managed charter schools differ from EMO-managed and regular charter schools in school 
philosophy and school culture as well as in other principal- and school-related factors, 
seeing why principals in CMO-managed charter schools show higher turnover rates than 
do their counterparts working in other charter schools and in TPSs. Future work should 
also work on verifying my conclusions about EMO- and CMO-managed charter schools 
as those conclusions of this study may be relatively tentative. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
VARIABLES INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSES 
 
 
 
Table 17: Dependent Variables: Principal Autonomy 
 
How much actual influence do you think you have as a principal on decision concerning 
the following activities? 
Variable Survey Item Coded Value 
Student Performance  
Standards  
A0083: Setting performance 
standards for students of this 
school 
1 = No influence 
2 = Minor influence 
3 = Moderate influence 
4 = Major influence 
Curriculum A0084: Establishing 
curriculum at this school 
1 = No influence 
2 = Minor influence 
3 = Moderate influence 
4 = Major influence 
Teacher Professional  
Development  
A0085: Determining the 
content of in-service 
professional development 
programs for teachers of this 
school 
1 = No influence 
2 = Minor influence 
3 = Moderate influence 
4 = Major influence 
Teacher Evaluation A0086: Evaluating teachers 
of this school 
1 = No influence 
2 = Minor influence 
3 = Moderate influence 
4 = Major influence 
Teacher Recruitment A0087: Hiring new full-time 
teachers of this school 
1 = No influence 
2 = Minor influence 
3 = Moderate influence 
4 = Major influence 
Discipline Policy A0088: Setting discipline 
policy at this school 
1 = No influence 
2 = Minor influence 
3 = Moderate influence 
4 = Major influence 
School budgets A0089: Deciding how your 
school budgets will be spent 
1 = No influence 
2 = Minor influence 
3 = Moderate influence 
4 = Major influence 
Principal Autonomy Summated rating scale that 
combines A0083 ~ A0089 
(alpha=0.57) 
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Table 18: Dependent Variables: Principal-Teacher Power Differential 
 
How much actual influence do you think you have as a principal on decision concerning 
the following activities? 
 
How much actual influence do you think teachers have over school policy at this school 
in each of the following areas? 
 
Variable Survey Item Coded Value 
Power Differential in  
Student Performance 
Standards 
Setting performance 
standards for students of 
this school 
A0083 - the school-level 
mean of T0420 
Power Differential in 
Curriculum 
Establishing curriculum at 
this school 
A0084 - the school-level 
mean of T0421 
Power Differential in  
Teacher Professional 
Development  
Determining the content of 
in-service professional 
development programs for 
teachers of this school 
A0085 - the school-level 
mean of T0422 
Power Differential in  
Teacher Evaluation 
Evaluating teachers of this 
school 
A0086 - the school-level 
mean of T0423 
Power Differential in  
Teacher Recruitment 
Hiring new full-time 
teachers of this school 
A0087 - the school-level 
mean of T0424 
Power Differential in 
Discipline Policy 
Setting discipline policy at 
this school 
A0088 - the school-level 
mean of T0425 
Power Differential in  
School budgets 
Deciding how your school 
budgets will be spent 
A0089 - the school-level 
mean of T0426 
The Principal-Teacher 
Power Differential  
 Principal Autonomy - the 
school-level mean of the 
School-wide Influence of 
Teachers 
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Table 19: Dependent Variable: Principal Turnover  
Variable Survey Item Coded Value 
Turnover Which of the following best 
describes the current 
occupational status of last 
year’s Principal? 
1 =    Still working as a Principal, but 
not at this school 
OR    Still working in a K-12 school, 
but not as a Principal 
OR    Still working in K-12 Education, 
but not in a K-12 school 
OR    Working at a job outside of K-12 
Education 
OR    Other (Retired, On leave, 
Deceased, etc.) 
0 =    Still working as Principal of this 
school 
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Table 20: Independent Variables: Individual Characteristics of Principal 
Variable Survey Item Coded Value 
Female Are you male or female? 1 = Female 
0 = Male 
Minority What is your race? 1 = Minority 
0 = Non-Hispanic 
white 
Age What is your year of birth? ___ Years old 
Master’s 
Degree 
Is the highest degree you have earned a 
master’s degree (M.A., M.A.T., M.B.A., 
M.Ed., M.S., etc.)? 
1 = Yes 
0 = No 
Doctoral 
Degree 
Is the highest degree you have earned an 
educational specialist or a professional diploma 
(at least one year beyond master’s level) OR a 
doctorate or first professional degree (Ph.D., 
Ed.D., M.D., L.L.B., J.D., D.D.S.)? 
1 = Yes 
0 = No 
Principal 
Experience  
Prior to this school year, how many years did 
you serve as the principal of this or any other 
school? 
___ Years 
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Table 21: Independent Variables: Contextual Factors of School 
Variable Survey Item Coded 
Value 
CHARTER Is this school a public charter school? 1 = Yes 
0 = No 
EMO Is this charter school a part of a for-profit charter 
management organization or network of schools 
that are managed by a central agency? 
1 = Yes 
0 = No 
CMO  Is this charter school a part of a non-profit charter 
management organization or network of schools 
that are managed by a central agency? 
1 = Yes 
0 = No 
REGULAR Is this charter school an independent or stand-
alone charter school OR a part of a traditional 
public school district? 
1 = Yes 
0 = No 
Enrollment Around the first of October, how many students in 
grades K-12 and comparable ungraded levels were 
enrolled in this school? 
___Students 
Elementary Is this school an elementary school? 1 = Yes 
0 = No 
Combined Is this school a combined elementary and 
secondary school? 
1 = Yes 
0 = No 
Urban Is this school in a city? 1 = Yes 
0 = No 
Suburban Is this school in a suburban area? 1 = Yes 
0 = No 
% Minority 
Teachers 
How many percentages of teachers at this school 
are racial or ethnic minorities? 
___% 
% Minority 
Students 
How many percentages of students at this school 
are racial or ethnic minorities? 
___% 
% Low-income 
Students 
How many percentages of students at this school 
are approved for free or reduced-price lunches? 
___% 
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Table 22: Independent Variables: Working Conditions of Principal 
Variable Survey Item Coded Value 
Weekly Work Hours Including hours spent during the school 
day, before and after school, and on the 
weekends, how many hours do you 
spend on all school-related activities 
during a typical full week at this school? 
___ Total weekly 
hours spend on 
school-related 
activities 
Annual Salary What is your current annual salary for 
your position in this school before taxes 
and deduction? 
$___ per year  
Union Membership Are you represented under a meet-and-
confer agreement or a collective 
bargaining agreement? 
1 = Yes 
0 = No 
Student Discipline 
Behaviors 
To the best of your knowledge, how 
often do the following types of problems 
occur at this school? 
a. Physical conflicts among students 
b. Robbery or theft 
c. Vandalism 
d. Student use of alcohol 
e. Student use of illegal drugs 
f. Student possession of weapons 
g. Physical abuse of teachers 
h. Student racial tensions 
i. Student bullying 
j. Student verbal abuse of teachers 
k. Widespread disorder in classrooms 
l. Student acts of disrespect for teachers 
m. Gang activities 
0 = Never happens 
1 = Happens on 
occasion 
2 = Happens at least 
once a month 
3 = Happens at least 
once a week 
4 = Happens daily 
 
Parental Involvement Last school year (2010-11), what 
percentage of students had at least one 
parent or guardian participating in the 
following events? 
a. Open house or back-to-school night 
b. All regularly scheduled school-wide 
parent-teacher conferences 
c. Special subject-area events (e.g., 
science fair, concerts) 
d. Parent education workshops or 
courses 
e. Signing of a school-parent compact 
f. Volunteer in the school as needed or 
on a regular basis 
g. Involvement in school instructional 
issues (e.g., planning classroom learning  
 
1 = 0 – 25% 
2 = 25 – 50% 
3 = 51 – 75% 
4 = 76 – 100% 
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Table 22 (continued)   
Variable Survey Item Coded Value 
 activities, providing feedback on 
curriculum) 
h. Involvement in governance (e.g., 
PTA or PTO meetings, school board, 
parent booster clubs) 
i. Involvement in budget decisions 
 
Student Motivation To what extent is each of the following 
a problem in this school? 
a. Student tardiness 
b. Student absenteeism 
c. Student class cutting 
e. Student dropping out 
f. Student apathy 
i. Students come to school unprepared to 
learn 
1 = Serious problem 
2 = Moderate 
problem 
3 = Minor problem 
4 = Not a problem 
Classroom Control of 
Teachers 
How much actual control do you have in 
your classroom at this school over the 
following areas of your planning and 
teaching? 
a. Selecting textbooks and other 
instructional materials 
b. Selecting content, topics, and skills to 
be taught 
c. Selecting teaching techniques 
d. Evaluating and grading students 
e. Disciplining students 
f. Determining the amount of homework 
to be assigned 
1 = No control 
2 = Minor control 
3 = Moderate 
control 
4 = A great deal of 
control 
School-wide 
Influence of Teachers 
How much actual influence do you think 
teachers have over school policy at this 
school in each of the following areas? 
a (T0420). Setting performance 
standards for students at this school 
b (T0421). Establishing curriculum 
c (T0422). Determining the content of 
in-service professional development 
programs 
d (T0423). Evaluating teachers 
e (T0424). Hiring new full-time teachers 
f (T0425). Setting discipline policy 
g (T0426). Deciding how the school 
budgets will be spent 
1 = No influence 
2 = Minor influence 
3 = Moderate 
influence 
4 = A great deal of 
influence 
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Table 22 (continued)   
Variable Survey Item Coded Value 
Teachers’ 
Evaluations of 
Principal 
To what extent do you agree or disagree 
with each of the following statements? 
a. The school administration’s behavior 
towards the staff is supportive and 
encouraging. 
g. My principal enforces school rules for 
student conduct and backs me up when 
U need it. 
j. The principal knows what kind of 
school he or she wants and has 
communicated it to the staff. 
o. I am given the support I need to teach 
students with special needs. 
1 = Strongly 
disagree 
2 = Somewhat 
disagree 
3 = Somewhat agree 
4 = Strongly agree 
 
Identified for 
Improvement 
At the end of the last school year (2010-
11), was this school identified for 
improvement due to Adequate Yearly 
Progress (AYP) requirements? 
(A school is identified for improvement 
if it does not make Adequate Yearly 
Progress for two consecutive years or 
more in the same content area) 
1 = Yes 
0 = No 
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APPENDIX B 
 
ORDERED LOGIT MODELS OF PRINCIPAL AUTONOMY 
 
 
Table 23: Each Dimension of Principal Autonomy: Charter Schools vs. TPSs 
Variable D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 
Model 1        
Charter 0.96*** 0.91*** 0.44*** -1.01*** -0.57*** 0.29 0.12 
 (0.21) (0.19) (0.15) (0.24) (0.18) (0.47) (0.17) 
Cut1 -3.62*** -3.07*** -4.71*** -6.31*** -4.48*** -4.42*** -5.39*** 
 (0.11) (0.09) (0.23) (0.57) (0.15) (0.18) (0.29) 
Cut2 -2.53*** -1.33*** -2.80*** -5.26*** -2.30*** -3.14*** -3.86*** 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.08) (0.25) (0.05) (0.10) (0.11) 
Cut3 -0.98*** 0.34*** -0.81*** -3.39*** -0.60*** -1.80*** -1.41*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
*** p<0.01;   ** p<0.05;   * p<0.1 
Note: N = 6,420 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS. 
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Table 24: Each Dimension of Principal Autonomy (Full Model): CSs vs. TPSs 
Variable D1 D2 D3 D4 
Model 2     
Charter 0.925*** 0.878*** 0.364** -0.782** 
 (0.213) (0.200) (0.151) (0.313) 
     
Individual Characteristics of Principal 
Female 0.0425 0.116 0.357*** 0.336* 
 (0.0953) (0.0774) (0.0851) (0.199) 
Minority 0.188 0.207** -0.0751 0.390 
 (0.132) (0.104) (0.113) (0.277) 
Age (+10) -0.106** 0.0832* -0.0759 0.210 
 (0.0538) (0.0487) (0.0546) (0.143) 
Master’s 0.394 -0.252 -0.124 0.670 
 (0.392) (0.300) (0.378) (0.510) 
Doctoral 0.492 -0.277 -0.0492 0.797 
 (0.393) (0.276) (0.377) (0.525) 
Experience (+10) 0.133* -0.0277 -0.0610 0.0233 
 (0.0796) (0.0670) (0.0619) (0.195) 
     
Contextual Factors of School 
Enrollment (+100) -0.00785 -0.0251*** 0.0239*** -0.0176 
 (0.00701) (0.00678) (0.00786) (0.0154) 
Elementary -0.0957 -0.504*** 0.0116 0.233 
 (0.0818) (0.0695) (0.0801) (0.173) 
Combined -0.171 0.113 0.203 0.0837 
 (0.128) (0.138) (0.125) (0.318) 
Urban 0.0746 -0.618*** 0.0419 -0.699*** 
 (0.122) (0.109) (0.111) (0.269) 
Suburban -0.165 -0.533*** -0.314*** -0.847*** 
 (0.0993) (0.0881) (0.0991) (0.229) 
% Minority Teachers 0.00608** 0.00821*** 0.00179 -0.00652 
 (0.00287) (0.00241) (0.00303) (0.00623) 
% Minority Students -0.00128 -0.00425*** 0.00102 0.00678* 
 (0.00196) (0.00162) (0.00204) (0.00404) 
% Low-income Students -0.000801 -1.01e-06 -0.00326*** -0.00894** 
 (0.00162) (0.00153) (0.00136) (0.00375) 
Cut1 -3.724*** -3.782*** -5.093*** -5.046*** 
 (0.509) (0.409) (0.504) (0.811) 
Cut2 -2.638*** -2.015*** -3.180*** -3.992*** 
 (0.498) (0.403) (0.453) (0.660) 
Cut3 -1.078** -0.270 -1.172** -2.116*** 
 (0.503) (0.393) (0.448) (0.683) 
*** p<0.01;   ** p<0.05;   * p<0.1 
Note: N = 6,420 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS. 
133 
 
Table 24 (continued) 
Variable D5 D6 D7 
Model 2    
Charter -0.468** 0.521 0.283 
 (0.189) (0.463) (0.196) 
    
Individual Characteristics of Principal 
Female 0.150* 0.138 0.0286 
 (0.0813) (0.127) (0.0946) 
Minority -0.0920 -0.403*** -0.223* 
 (0.109) (0.148) (0.123) 
Age (+10) 0.136*** 0.0935 0.147** 
 (0.0475) (0.0743) (0.0591) 
Master’s 0.321 -0.687 0.554 
 (0.359) (0.462) (0.422) 
Doctoral 0.411 -0.765 0.449 
 (0.355) (0.457) (0.421) 
Experience (+10) -0.0366 -0.00733 0.0198 
 (0.0706) (0.116) (0.0872) 
    
Contextual Factors of School 
Enrollment (+100) 0.0294*** 0.0212* -0.0133* 
 (0.00706) (0.0119) (0.00735) 
Elementary 0.367*** -0.207** 0.0752 
 (0.0705) (0.102) (0.0915) 
Combined -0.422*** -0.384 -0.0140 
 (0.107) (0.245) (0.127) 
Urban 0.230** -0.345** -0.0175 
 (0.113) (0.160) (0.113) 
Suburban -0.0914 -0.483*** -0.0482 
 (0.0939) (0.146) (0.107) 
% Minority Teachers 0.00102 0.00108 -0.00149 
 (0.00261) (0.00384) (0.00321) 
% Minority Students 0.00357** -0.00302 -0.000095 
 (0.00179) (0.00304) (0.00226) 
% Low-income Students -0.00507*** -0.00524* -0.000349 
 (0.00144) (0.00277) (0.00194) 
Cut1 -3.157*** -5.406*** -4.292*** 
 (0.430) (0.596) (0.582) 
Cut2 -0.965** -4.112*** -2.759*** 
 (0.433) (0.554) (0.445) 
Cut3 0.776* -2.753*** -0.294 
 (0.436) (0.557) (0.448) 
*** p<0.01;   ** p<0.05;   * p<0.1 
Note: N = 6,420 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS. 
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Table 25: Each Dimension of Principal Autonomy: Each Type of CSs vs. TPSs 
Variable D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 
Model 1        
EMO 1.09 0.75 0.19 -0.99 -1.15*** 0.49 -0.09 
 (2.43) (0.56) (0.57) (6.81) (0.44) (5.74) (1.79) 
CMO 0.98** 0.66** 0.41 -1.21 -0.95*** 1.34 0.16 
 (0.45) (0.31) (0.45) (1.75) (0.32) (3.58) (0.43) 
Regular 0.94*** 1.00*** 0.47* -0.95*** -0.40* 0.08 0.14 
 (0.25) (0.25) (0.24) (0.30) (0.23) (0.53) (0.20) 
Cut1 -3.62*** -3.07*** -4.71*** -6.31*** -4.48*** -4.43*** -5.39*** 
 (0.11) (0.09) (0.23) (0.57) (0.15) (0.18) (0.29) 
Cut2 -2.53*** -1.33*** -2.80*** -5.26*** -2.30*** -3.14*** -3.86*** 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.08) (0.25) (0.05) (0.10) (0.11) 
Cut3 -0.98*** 0.34*** -0.81*** -3.39*** -0.60*** -1.80*** -1.41*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
*** p<0.01;   ** p<0.05;   * p<0.1 
Note: N = 6,420 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS. 
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Table 26: Principal Autonomy (Full Model): Each Type of CSs vs. TPSs 
Variable D1 D2 D3 D4 
Model 2     
EMO 1.074 1.055 0.107 -0.597 
 (2.508) (0.554) (0.599) (7.030) 
CMO 1.013** 0.622** 0.340 -0.724 
 (0.461) (0.315) (0.466) (1.807) 
Regular 0.885*** 0.934*** 0.400* -0.822** 
 (0.253) (0.262) (0.237) (0.352) 
     
Individual Characteristics of Principal 
Female 0.0425 0.116 0.357*** 0.335* 
 (0.0952) (0.0771) (0.0852) (0.199) 
Minority 0.188 0.203* -0.0745 0.390 
 (0.132) (0.105) (0.113) (0.280) 
Age (+10) -0.106** 0.0825* -0.0763 0.212 
 (0.0539) (0.0485) (0.0548) (0.145) 
Master’s 0.398 -0.272 -0.123 0.678 
 (0.397) (0.300) (0.375) (0.518) 
Doctoral 0.496 -0.298 -0.0494 0.806 
 (0.396) (0.277) (0.375) (0.527) 
Experience (+10) 0.133* -0.0275 -0.0609 0.0224 
 (0.0798) (0.0669) (0.0620) (0.196) 
Contextual Factors of School 
Enrollment (+100) -0.00795 -0.0252*** 0.0240*** -0.0181 
 (0.00706) (0.00679) (0.00786) (0.0157) 
Elementary -0.0962 -0.505*** 0.0123 0.231 
 (0.0819) (0.0696) (0.0802) (0.175) 
Combined -0.172 0.114 0.205 0.0788 
 (0.128) (0.137) (0.125) (0.322) 
Urban 0.0748 -0.620*** 0.0424 -0.699*** 
 (0.122) (0.109) (0.111) (0.270) 
Suburban -0.165 -0.532*** -0.313*** -0.848*** 
 (0.0994) (0.0881) (0.0997) (0.230) 
% Minority Teachers 0.00609** 0.00823*** 0.00175 -0.00645 
 (0.00287) (0.00241) (0.00303) (0.00621) 
% Minority Students -0.00128 -0.00422*** 0.00101 0.00679* 
 (0.00196) (0.00162) (0.00204) (0.00404) 
% Low-income Students -0.000823 0.0000370 -0.00323** -0.00903** 
 (0.00162) (0.00152) (0.00137) (0.00378) 
Cut1 -3.721*** -3.804*** -5.091*** -5.042*** 
 (0.511) (0.409) (0.504) (0.821) 
Cut2 -2.635*** -2.037*** -3.179*** -3.988*** 
 (0.502) (0.404) (0.450) (0.679) 
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Table 26 (continued)     
Variable D1 D2 D3 D4 
Cut3 -1.076** -0.291 -1.171** -2.112*** 
 (0.506) (0.393) (0.445) (0.715) 
*** p<0.01;   ** p<0.05;   * p<0.1 
Note: N = 6,420 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS. 
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Table 26 (continued) 
Variable D5 D6 D7 
Model 2    
EMO -1.076** 0.914 0.0870 
 (0.442) (5.647) (1.716) 
CMO -0.767** 1.640 0.434 
 (0.354) (3.597) (0.508) 
Regular -0.327* 0.281 0.264 
 (0.232) (0.523) (0.213) 
    
Individual Characteristics of Principal 
Female 0.149* 0.136 0.0286 
 (0.0817) (0.126) (0.0946) 
Minority -0.0912 -0.399*** -0.221* 
 (0.110) (0.149) (0.123) 
Age (+10) 0.135*** 0.0963 0.147*** 
 (0.0472) (0.0748) (0.0590) 
Master’s 0.296 -0.633 0.569 
 (0.361) (0.459) (0.440) 
Doctoral 0.384 -0.705 0.465 
 (0.357) (0.451) (0.440) 
Experience (+10) -0.0361 -0.00765 0.0200 
 (0.0702) (0.116) (0.0874) 
    
Contextual Factors of School 
Enrollment (+100) 0.03*** 0.0206* -0.0132* 
 (0.00711) (0.0119) (0.00736) 
Elementary 0.370*** -0.209** 0.0757 
 (0.0703) (0.102) (0.0915) 
Combined -0.418*** -0.388 -0.0141 
 (0.106) (0.247) (0.128) 
Urban 0.230** -0.343** -0.0162 
 (0.112) (0.161) (0.113) 
Suburban -0.0887 -0.486*** -0.0480 
 (0.0941) (0.145) (0.107) 
% Minority Teachers 0.000928 0.00117 -0.00152 
 (0.00260) (0.00383) (0.00323) 
% Minority Students 0.00357** -0.00307 -0.000116 
 (0.00180) (0.00302) (0.00226) 
% Low-income Students -0.00491*** -0.00542** -0.000354 
 (0.00142) (0.00269) (0.00194) 
Cut1 -3.180*** -5.353*** -4.275*** 
 (0.428) (0.602) (0.591) 
Cut2 -0.986** -4.059*** -2.742*** 
 (0.433) (0.563) (0.459) 
    
138 
 
Table 26 (continued)    
Variable D5 D6 D7 
Cut3 0.756* -2.699*** -0.277 
 (0.435) (0.566) (0.463) 
*** p<0.01;   ** p<0.05;   * p<0.1 
Note: N = 6,420 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
LOGIT MODELS OF PRINCIPAL TURNOVER 
 
 
 
Table 27: Principal Turnover: Charter Schools vs. Traditional Public Schools 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Charter School 0.340*** 0.311** 0.112 0.096 
 (0.135) (0.141) (0.153) (0.163) 
Principal Autonomy    -0.281** 
    (0.134) 
     
Individual Characteristics of Principal 
Female  -0.142 -0.156 -0.181* 
  (0.093) (0.097) (0.100) 
Minority  0.217** -0.022 -0.074 
  (0.111) (0.124) (0.129) 
Age  -0.151*** -0.150*** -0.154*** 
  (0.039) (0.041) (0.042) 
Age2  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Master’s Degree  0.219 0.261 0.314 
  (0.345) (0.350) (0.342) 
Doctoral Degree  0.264 0.333 0.442 
  (0.342) (0.351) (0.343) 
Experience  0.039** 0.045*** 0.060*** 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) 
Experience2  -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
  (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) 
Contextual Factors of School 
Enrollment (+100)   -0.032*** -0.029** 
   (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Elementary   -0.145* -0.158 
   (0.084) (0.127) 
Combined   0.126 0.043 
   (0.160) (0.176) 
Urban   0.001 0.076 
   (0.126) (0.133) 
Suburban   -0.009 0.141 
   (0.103) (0.111) 
% Minority Teachers   0.002 0.002 
   (0.003) (0.003) 
% Minority Students   0.005** 0.005** 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
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Table 27 (continued)     
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
% Low-income Students   -0.001 -0.002 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
     
Working Conditions of Principal 
Teachers’ Classroom Control    -0.055 
    (0.143) 
Teachers’ School-wide Influence    -0.053 
    (0.140) 
Teachers’ Evaluation of Principal    -0.578*** 
    (0.118) 
Student Discipline Problems    0.171 
    (0.130) 
Student Motivation    0.013 
    (0.117) 
Parental Involvement    0.017 
    (0.088) 
Poor School Performance    -0.103 
    (0.108) 
Annual Salary (+$1000)    -0.0086*** 
    (0.0023) 
Weekly Workload (hrs)    0.006* 
    (0.003) 
Union Membership    -0.075 
    (0.092) 
     
Constant -1.262*** 1.291 1.330 4.709*** 
 (0.0366) (0.901) (0.939) (1.275) 
*** p<0.01;   ** p<0.05;   * p<0.1 
Notes: N = 6,470 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
141 
 
Table 27 (Continued) 
Variable Model 5 Model 6 
Charter School 3.811* 1.905*** 
 (2.301) (0.703) 
Principal Autonomy -0.227* -0.266** 
 (0.138) (0.134) 
   
Individual Characteristics of Principal 
Female -0.180* -0.183* 
 (0.101) (0.100) 
Minority -0.068 -0.077 
 (0.129) (0.130) 
Age -0.153*** -0.151*** 
 (0.042) (0.042) 
Age2 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Master’s Degree 0.350 0.442 
 (0.362) (0.347) 
Doctoral Degree 0.483 0.567 
 (0.365) (0.348) 
Experience 0.061*** 0.059*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) 
Experience2 -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Contextual Factors of School 
Enrollment (+100) -0.029** -0.029** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Elementary -0.157 -0.157 
 (0.127) (0.128) 
Combined 0.043 0.064 
 (0.179) (0.177) 
Urban 0.072 0.056 
 (0.133) (0.134) 
Suburban 0.142 0.125 
 (0.111) (0.112) 
% Minority Teachers 0.002 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
% Minority Students 0.005** 0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
% Low-income Students -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Working Conditions of Principal 
Teachers’ Classroom Control -0.050 -0.046 
 (0.143) (0.145) 
   
142 
 
Table 27 (continued)   
Variable Model 5 Model 6 
Teachers’ School-wide Influence -0.050 -0.057 
 (0.141) (0.141) 
Teachers’ Evaluation of Principal -0.584*** -0.583*** 
 (0.118) (0.118) 
Student Discipline Problems 0.174 0.178 
 (0.130) (0.130) 
Student Motivation 0.017 0.026 
 (0.117) (0.117) 
Parental Involvement 0.021 0.020 
 (0.089) (0.088) 
Poor School Performance -0.099 -0.106 
 (0.108) (0.107) 
Annual Salary (+$1000) -0.0085*** -0.0071*** 
 (0.0023) (0.0023) 
Weekly Workload (hrs) 0.006* 0.006* 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Union Membership -0.073 -0.084 
 (0.092) (0.092) 
   
Interaction Terms   
Principal Autonomy * Charter -1.01*  
 (0.614)  
Annual Salary (+$1000) * Charter  -0.023*** 
  (0.009) 
   
Constant 4.400*** 4.275*** 
 (1.307) (1.296) 
*** p<0.01;   ** p<0.05;   * p<0.1 
Notes: N = 6,470 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS. 
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 Table 28: Principal Turnover: Each Type of Charter Schools vs. TPSs 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
EMO Charter 0.180 0.171 0.135 0.120 
 (0.791) (0.843) (0.846) (0.799) 
CMO Charter 0.936*** 0.931*** 0.676*** 0.637** 
 (0.241) (0.267) (0.265) (0.257) 
Regular Charter 0.162 0.146 -0.055 -0.069 
 (0.153) (0.155) (0.173) (0.183) 
Principal Autonomy    -0.278** 
    (0.134) 
     
Individual Characteristics of Principal 
Female  -0.143 -0.157 -0.180* 
  (0.093) (0.097) (0.100) 
Minority  0.221** -0.014 -0.065 
  (0.111) (0.123) (0.128) 
Age  -0.144*** -0.143*** -0.148*** 
  (0.039) (0.041) (0.042) 
Age2  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Master’s Degree  0.307 0.339 0.390 
  (0.364) (0.368) (0.360) 
Doctoral Degree  0.355 0.415 0.522 
  (0.363) (0.370) (0.363) 
Experience  0.039** 0.045*** 0.060*** 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) 
Experience2  -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
  (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) 
Contextual Factors of School 
Enrollment (+100)   -0.032*** -0.029** 
   (0.010) (0.012) 
Elementary   -0.145* -0.158 
   (0.085) (0.128) 
Combined   0.120 0.038 
   (0.161) (0.176) 
Urban   0.005 0.081 
   (0.126) (0.133) 
Suburban   -0.011 0.141 
   (0.103) (0.112) 
% Minority Teachers   0.002 0.002 
   (0.003) (0.003) 
% Minority Students   0.005** 0.005** 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
% Low-income Students   -0.001 -0.002 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
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Table 28 (continued)     
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Working Conditions of Principal 
Teachers’ Classroom Control    -0.054 
    (0.143) 
Teachers’ School-wide Influence    -0.049 
    (0.140) 
Teachers’ Evaluation of Principal    -0.577*** 
    (0.118) 
Student Discipline Problems    0.174 
    (0.130) 
Student Motivation    0.014 
    (0.117) 
Parental Involvement    0.014 
    (0.088) 
Poor School Performance    -0.102 
    (0.108) 
Annual Salary (+$1000)    -0.0087*** 
    (0.0022) 
Weekly Workload (hrs)    0.006* 
    (0.003) 
Union Membership    -0.073 
    (0.092) 
     
Constant -1.262*** 1.034 1.101 4.481*** 
 (0.037) (0.919) (0.955) (1.289) 
*** p<0.01;   ** p<0.05;   * p<0.1 
Notes: N = 6,470 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS. 
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 Table 28 (continued) 
Variable Model 5  
EMO Charter 2.013**  
 (1.116)  
CMO Charter 2.554**  
 (0.735)  
Regular Charter 1.785*  
 (0.695)  
Principal Autonomy -0.263*  
 (0.134)  
   
Individual Characteristics of Principal 
Female -0.182*  
 (0.101)  
Minority -0.068  
 (0.129)  
Age -0.146***  
 (0.042)  
Age2 0.002***  
 (0.0004)  
Master’s Degree 0.525*  
 (0.358)  
Doctoral Degree 0.654**  
 (0.358)  
Experience 0.059***  
 (0.018)  
Experience2 -0.002***  
 (0.001)  
Contextual Factors of School 
Enrollment (+100) -0.029***  
 (0.0001)  
Elementary -0.156  
 (0.128)  
Combined 0.062  
 (0.176)  
Urban 0.062  
 (0.135)  
Suburban 0.125  
 (0.112)  
% Minority Teachers 0.002  
 (0.003)  
% Minority Students 0.005**  
 (0.002)  
% Low-income Students -0.002  
 (0.002)  
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Table 28 (continued)   
Variable Model 5  
Working Conditions of Principal 
Teachers’ Classroom Control -0.046  
 (0.145)  
Teachers’ School-wide Influence -0.053  
 (0.141)  
Teachers’ Evaluation of Principal -0.583***  
 (0.118)  
Student Discipline Problems 0.180  
 (0.131)  
Student Motivation 0.028  
 (0.117)  
Parental Involvement 0.018  
 (0.088)  
Poor School Performance -0.105  
 (0.108)  
Annual Salary (+$1000) -0.0072***  
 (0.0023)  
Weekly Workload (hrs) 0.006  
 (0.003)  
Union Membership -0.081  
 (0.092)  
Interaction Terms   
Annual Salary (+$1000) * EMO Charter -0.026***  
 (0.011)  
Annual Salary (+$1000) * CMO Charter -0.036  
 (0.009)  
Annual Salary (+$1000) * Regular Charter -0.026*  
 (0.009)  
   
Constant 4.041*** 4.036*** 
 (1.300) (1.304) 
*** p<0.01;   ** p<0.05;   * p<0.1 
Notes: N = 6,470 public school principals. Data are from the 2011-12 SASS. 
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